156. Minutes of ANZUS Council Meeting0
[Here follow a list of participants (24), discussion of other subjects, and statements by Foreign Minister Casey and Prime Minister Nash.]
Begin Top Secret
Secretary Dulles: We see the problem of West New Guinea within the context of the larger problem of Indonesia. The big stake in the area [Page 284] is Indonesia itself rather than the problem of West New Guinea. We say if West New Guinea and all of Indonesia goes under Communist control, the situation will be very bad. [11 lines of source text not declassified]
Begin Secret
I think we have achieved a measure of success in that respect, although it would be premature to say that it had been a complete success. I think it has created a situation where at the present time the government of Indonesia—and I agree that in that government by far the most potent force is Sukarno—sees now the danger of allowing the Communist influence to grow and alienating the West and perhaps leading to a revival of subversive activities, and they have switched to a more truly neutralist policy in the sense of trying to have a policy which would not seriously antagonize either the Communist world or the Western world and particularly the United States.
That has been brought about in part by [1 line of source text not declassified] encouragement to Nasution, in particular, the army people who are disposed to be anti-Communist.
There have been a number of developments which indicated that there was growing resistance in Indonesia to Communism and to the possible Communist take-over. Perhaps one of the most significant episodes in that respect has been the postponement of the elections, which will give more time to organize the anti-Communist parties. At the moment the organization of the Communist party has been so effective that probably if there were early elections it would be preponderant in the returns.
The policy that we embarked upon here may require us to continue and possibly to extend somewhat our military assistance. That I must say is not in the form I think you used the word of “gifts” at one point. There are no gifts involved in the military field. They are all sales.
Mr. Robertson: On this $7,000,000 deal, it is a sale, but it is a sale on which there is a low value. It is a sale at a reduced price.
Secretary Dulles: Whether that is a gift, below value, is a debatable question. I am sure the Defense Department would like to get a higher price for it, but it is a question of how you value this more or less obsolete, secondary equipment. That is a debatable point.
I had a long talk yesterday with Mr. Luns,1 who I would say takes, according to my estimation, a more reasonable view of this situation than some of his associates, and I do not think that he is strongly opposed to our policy although we did not give any indication as to what the development of that policy might involve in the way of further [Page 285] equipment. Indeed, we have come to no conclusion about that ourselves. There are various recommendations made to us from Djakarta which are in process of being evaluated at the present time, and they have not come up to me yet with any recommendation, so I am in ignorance as to what the plans may be, although I do know that they contemplate some assistance to both the Air Force and the Navy and that they involve a category of goods which could be used for either aggressive or defensive purposes.
It is not easy to draw a line, as you are well aware, between so-called offensive and defensive weapons. Almost any weapon can be used offensively. Obviously if you give them pistols and sidearms, they are less effective than if you give them other types of arms.
Now from the standpoint of the armament business, I would say first of all that we think that the Indonesians are extremely foolish in devoting as much of their resources as they are to armament. They are in a desperate economic position and I think it is folly for them to be spending as much of their diminishing resources as they are upon armament. They are mortgaging themselves to the Soviet bloc to a very considerable extent already. We make such arguments to many countries of the world, and always my experience is that those arguments fall upon deaf ears. I have never talked with anybody anywhere in the world that I know of, including in the United States, who spends less money on armament because of economic necessities and the need for a balanced budget and considerations of that kind. And I think the situation is one where the demands of the military people will to a considerable extent be met, and the problem is, will they be met from the United States or from the Soviet Union or from whatever sources which will be available to them.
Of course, as I said, there are other markets in Europe to which they would turn, just as they were able to buy a considerable amount from the United Kingdom and other countries of Europe which will have potential markets open to them.
We are in a sort of curious situation in these matters, because whenever a country turns to the Soviet Union for military aid we throw up our hands in horror and consider that to be a very serious political defeat, and then when they turn to us for military aid and assistance, we do not put the same interpretation upon their actions. Of course, in fact, the nation which supplies military equipment does get a certain control over the country that receives it, because of the dependence upon replacements and spare parts and the like. And it is far better, we think, that Indonesia should be dependent upon us in that respect than dependent upon the Soviet Union or the Soviet bloc.
Now we have given quite a lot of consideration to a request made by Mr. Luns to see what if anything we could do further to discourage [Page 286] the Indonesians from the possible use of force against West New Guinea, and to indicate a measure of support to West New Guinea if it should be attacked.
The principle involved is, as we see it, the same principle as is involved in China today, where a country claims that it is entitled to do it and that to establish that claim would be in effect a civil war and therefore they are justified in doing it. They can make that case against West New Guinea, or, as they call it, West Irian, and that would doubtless receive some support in some quarters. But we would ourselves reject that thesis just as we rejected it in Korea and just as we rejected it in China. And we do not believe that force ought to be used for these purposes and that it is a pretense to say that it is a purely internal affair when in fact we know that it does involve external international factors.
I told Mr. Luns that we would explore the possibilities of putting him in a position to make some statement of our views on this subject when he got back. It is a delicate thing to do because we do not want by anything we say to imply that we reject the sincerity of the number of statements which the Indonesian Government has made disavowing any intention to use force. I admit some of their statements are equivocal, and on the other hand some of their statements are unequivocal, and we don’t want in a sense to release them from these unequivocal statements by indicating that we don’t believe them or rely upon them. So I don’t know yet whether we will find the formula that we will consider would enable Mr. Luns to carry out his purposes without doing such harm to our Indonesian relations that would make it undesirable, but we are studying that very actively at the present time.
I think there is no doubt in the world but what if there were such an attack, that the Government of the United States would be disposed to be as helpful as it could to the Dutch in resisting such an attack. We are not in the same position as regards that area as we are as regards the SEATO area or the area around China and Korea, which is covered by treaties, or by Congressional Resolutions or by both, and where the will of Congress has been manifested to the degree that the President has authority without further reference to the Congress to use military force.
However, we certainly could and I think would give logistical assistance under those circumstances, and would strongly oppose in the United Nations, and otherwise, the action. We would think it was a highly improper breach of the principles of the Charter and that the law-abiding countries ought to unite to oppose and resist it with moral and material strength. We do not think that any change ought to occur there by the use of force, and I hope that perhaps we would find a way to make that clear which would not be offensive or dangerously offensive to the Indonesians. But our basic position is that we do not think that any [Page 287] change should be effected by force, and if it were attempted by force that we would strongly oppose that in our political actions. We would be disposed logistically to assist the defenders. Whether or not it would be necessary or desirable to get Congressional action to permit actual military activity is a matter that could not be answered at this time, and perhaps it would depend upon the circumstances of the time.
If our relations with Indonesia develop as we expect, or at least as we hope, and there does develop a considerable dependence upon the United States, we would think it highly unlikely that they would in fact attempt to take West New Guinea by force. And, as I say, that is perhaps the best hope in the situation. It is not easy to get the Dutch to place confidence in that line of policy, and I can well understand and sympathize with the problems which Mr. Luns has in Parliament with his public opinion, which is convinced that there is (an Indonesian intention) to take it (West New Guinea) by force, and they see us as supplying the sinews of war to Indonesia to be used against the Dutch. I can understand that problem, and I would like as well as we could to alleviate it. We are confident that the policy we are following is the wisest policy from the standpoint of both trying to prevent Indonesia falling into the grasp of the Communists and also from the standpoint of preventing armed attack against West New Guinea.
Minister Casey: If there were an attack in due course in spite of everything, I imagine that would be bowled into the Security Council at once, wouldn’t it?
Secretary Dulles: I would suppose so.
Minister Casey: I would hope by you.
Secretary Dulles: If it happens when I am here, I will not be reluctant. I can’t commit my successor.
Minister Casey: I want to commit you. That is all. (Laughter)
Secretary Dulles: Of course you can get a veto there quite surely.
(Off-record discussion.)
Mr. Robertson: What is the size of your program there?
Minister Casey: Indonesia—I just can’t remember offhand, but we have got now in Australia, I would guess, three or four hundred students and we are getting more all the time. We have got more students from Indonesia than any other Asian country.
Secretary Dulles: I would think I can just say this. I would very much doubt the wisdom of putting anything in the communiqué.
Minister Casey: Oh, not mentioning this directly, no; but broadening out what is said about the use of force any place at any time.
Secretary Dulles: Well, that might be.
Minister Casey: Broadening out this question.
[Page 288]One other point, Mr. Secretary: There was being considered generally at one time, I think, whether or not you came to a decision about it, that you should be the sole supplier of arms as far as the NATO countries are concerned.2 Has that gone by the board completely or is that a possibility still?
Secretary Dulles: I don’t think it is a very good possibility, although I do think this, I think there should be, if it can be practically arranged, an exchange of information between friendly countries, members of NATO, so that we each know what the other is doing and do not run the risk of an excessive action in that respect through each being ignorant of what the others may be doing. We tried to have arrangements of that sort in regard to Israel at one time. It tended to break down in practice. But I would think it highly useful if we could have some kind of informal understanding at least among the NATO members and perhaps some others that in this traffic-in-arms business we should try to keep each other informed so that the aggregate amounts are not too excessive.
Minister Casey: Do you think you would be in a position to get at least a statement from them in specific terms against the use of force, not tacking it onto any tranche of arms that you were providing them with?
Secretary Dulles: We have, of course gotten a lot of these, and I don’t attach a great deal of importance to those things. Whenever they get anything from us, they have to get it under the terms of the conventional agreements that state they must not use the arms for any aggressive purposes. And we have obtained statements from them that they would not use it against West New Guinea and the like. I don’t attach a great deal of value to those statements. Even among the more reliable countries, France for example, we have had agreements which would preclude use of arms in Algeria; but to stop them once they get these arms and their political policy calls for them—they go ahead and use them. They are not dependable.
I think the most dependable thing is, in fact, the dependence of the country upon us, so that it will not commit any action which would seriously disrupt that relationship. Certainly any act of force against West New Guinea would seriously disrupt our relationship there, and they know that very well. If they only got help from one side, the Communist side, they then wouldn’t mind at all whether they disrupt it. They would not have any relations to disrupt. It would not be a factor.
Allen, do you want to comment on this Indonesian situation? I know you have given it a great deal of thought.
[Page 289]Mr. Allen Dulles: I have here certain figures on the aid that we discussed this morning. The economic aid granted is about $200 million from the Soviet bloc. This is the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Ambassador Beale: Are you speaking of arms aid now?
Mr. Allen Dulles: No; this is just economic aid. I will come to the other in just a moment. The amount obligated so far is about $118 million. Now, a good deal of that has not reached Indonesia. For example, there is a block here of $40 million from Poland for shipping. A good deal of this is shipping, and it has not reached Indonesia and will not reach it for some time. It is much more difficult to give amounts as to the arms aid, but it probably is in excess of $100 million. A great deal of that is from, supposedly, Czechoslovakia. It may be furnished by Russia. About $63 million of it is in aircraft, including about 35 MIG–17’s, 20-to–30 IL–28’s, 20 IL–14 transports, 20 MIG–15 jet trainers, and some helicopters. Of this, however, only a relatively small part appears to have been delivered as of a few weeks ago. About six of the jet fighters, six to eight of the jet bombers, 15 of the jet trainers have been delivered. Now, there have been agreements with Poland, also, with regard to four destroyers and two submarines. It is quite extensive; it may be almost massive.
Minister Casey: You, too, have come around to “massive.” (Laughter)
Mr. Allen Dulles: On the side of technicians, we estimate that they have about 270 bloc technicians on the economic side and about 130 technicians on the military side, or a total of about 400.
[1 paragraph (8-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Allen Dulles: We do not estimate that they are at the moment planning military operations.
Minister Casey: But you will get some advance, possibly considerably advance knowledge of their plans?
Mr. Allen Dulles: I would think we would. We ought to. I would hope so. We ought to get some advance warning.
Secretary Dulles: Have you anything from the standpoint of the question that Mr. Nash put: Is it worthwhile for the Dutch to hold on here? What is the answer to that question?
Minister Casey: What is that?
Secretary Dulles: Is it worthwhile for the Dutch to hold onto it? Are they getting anything out of it?
Minister Casey: No. They are putting an equivalent of seven or eight million pounds into it each year. They haven’t any chance of getting any dividends out of it.
[Page 290]Mr. Robertson: They told me the other day it was close to $20 million U.S. dollars. I hadn’t known it was as high as that.
Minister Casey:Close. Their oil is not impressive there and I believe it is declining, so it is likely to be a sink for money.
Secretary Dulles: I think it seems to me that the danger we need to face there is perhaps more the danger that the Dutch would pull out than the danger that the Indonesians will take it by force. Of the two dangers, I reckon that danger as greater, because, as I understand it, a lot of their business people realize that this issue is poisoning their relations and (depriving them of the) opportunity to get their property back or at least to get some compensation for their (lost) business in Indonesia and at least to start up business again. There is quite a lot of pressure from the business people to say, “Why in the world don’t we give this wretched business away and start fresh and build our relationship with Indonesia.” And from a purely business point of view, that makes a lot of sense, and the Dutch have a great reputation for being pretty hardheaded about these things rather than sentimental. And I would imagine that while at the moment they are quite emotional about this one issue, that one must anticipate that their attitude will change and that they may be disposed to just let this thing go, realizing that there is more in it for them if they can reestablish their good relations with Indonesia and get some of their property back and get business going again rather than to hold onto this wretched affair (West New Guinea) which is going to cost them more money if they are going to have to get ready to defend it against possible armed attack.
And of course you know I have talked about giving logistical support and perhaps even more support—that is only possible if the fellow primarily involved is himself willing to fight for it. A foreign country can’t come in and fight for the territory of another country which isn’t willing to do anything about it itself. So aid that we could give, or maybe that you could give, even though you are not directly involved, would be largely dependent upon their making an effort and their willingness to fight. If they are not willing, we would be out.
Minister Casey: At the moment they are not only willing but determined to resist any aggression—at the moment.
Secretary Dulles: I think they are at the moment.
[Here follows the remainder of the discussion on Indonesia and other subjects.]
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1128. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Attached to a November 3 covering note by Dudley Miller of the Reports and Operations Staff. The meeting was held at the Department of State. For documentation on the ANZUS Council meeting, see vol. XVI, pp. 45–58. The full text of the minutes is included in the Microfiche Supplement for volume XVI, Part 1.↩
- September 30. (Memoranda of conversation by Stabler; Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/9–3059) See Supplement.↩
- See Document 20.↩