Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia,
Volume XVII
15. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
for National Security Council Affairs (Triebel) to the President’s Special Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Cutler)0
Washington,
February 10,
1958.
SUBJECT
- U.S. Policy on Indonesia (NSC
5518)1
- 1.
- Enclosure A, which was developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
November 1957, is forwarded herewith for Planning Board
consideration in connection with the scheduled review of NSC 5518.
- 2.
- Paragraph 5–d of Enclosure A recommends an immediate token
military aid program for Indonesia. Subsequent to the development of
Enclosure A and the recent unrest in Indonesia, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff have stated that in view of the general political instability
of Indonesia, recent developments affecting the interests of U.S.
Allies, and the uncertainty as to the manner in which military
assistance would be utilized, it now appears that political and
other considerations may dictate whether or not token aid should be
provided to Indonesia, and if so, when it should be
delivered.
C.O. Triebel
Rear Admiral,
USN
[Page 31]
Enclosure A
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been increasingly concerned in
recent months by political developments in Indonesia and with
the probable effectiveness of U.S. policy and action to
forestall or cope with the rising influence of Communism in that
country. If this strategic area should be lost to the Communist
Bloc, the position of the United States and its allies in the
Far East would suffer irreparable and catastrophic damage. U.S.
policy and concepts for its implementation must be directed
toward avoidance of disaster if possible, in addition to dealing
with disaster if and when it occurs.
- 2.
-
NSC Action 17882
approved the Special Report on Indonesia3 with
certain amendments and directed that the Special Report be used
in a review of U.S. Policy toward Indonesia. This report, among
other things, suggests three approaches toward achieving U.S.
objectives in Indonesia:
- “a. Employ all feasible covert means to strengthen the
determination, will and cohesion of the anti-Communist
forces in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and
Sulawesi, in order through their strength to affect
favorably the situation in Java, and to provide a
rallying point if the Communists should take over
Java.
- “b. If the situation on Java continues to deteriorate,
then move to more forthright means in pursuit of the
course of action outlined in a.
-
“c. Utilize such leverage as is available and may
be built up by the anti-Communist forces in the
outer islands to continue our efforts to try to
unify and stimulate into action, singly or in
unison, non- and anti-Communist elements on Java
against the Communists.”
The conclusion is reached that the
approach in subparagraph c above has the greatest
promise of achieving U.S. objectives. As regards
Indonesian military forces, the recommendation is
made to:
“Seek to prevent the growth of the military
potential of the government military forces on
Java, as these may ultimately fall under Communist
influence and be used to reduce the anti-Communist
forces in the outer islands. However, utilize and
support the non- and anti-Communist elements in
the military and paramilitary forces on Java and
in the Central Government.”
- 3.
- Although U.S. policy as stated above provides, among other
things, for strengthening anti-Communist elements in outlying
islands [Page 32] as a means of
influencing policies of the Central Government, it is
essentially negative. It implies that Java may ultimately fall
to Communist control. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the
opinion that concepts for the implementation of U.S. policy in
Indonesia must take cognizance of the following:
- a.
- Java contains two-thirds of an estimated total
Indonesian population of 85 million. Although the island
itself possesses only a small proportion of the natural
resources of the nation, its people are the more
politically sophisticated, the best organized, and have
traditionally exercised political and economic
leadership. Essentially all Naval and Air Forces are
based on Java, as are over 100,000 of the 180,000 Army
troops. To lose Java and permit the influence of this
concentration of military, economic, and political
strength to be exploited by the Communists is virtually
to lose Indonesia over the long term.
- b.
- Nationalism is and will probably continue to be the
strongest single force within Indonesia, and it
overrides the many divisive elements which exist.
Whatever government controls Java it will be able to
speak with the voice of nationalism and will almost
certainly be able to advance itself as the legitimate
government of Indonesia before the world forum. It must
be recognized that a Communist controlled nationalist
government in Java would receive the immediate and
complete overt support of the Communist Bloc, and
ultimately the support of the Afro-Asian Bloc within the
UN, to a degree which
would make it substantially impossible for the West to
rectify the situation. On the other hand, if the West
were adequately prepared to give timely and effective
support to, and if necessary to assist in the creation
of, a non-Communist nationalist government on Java in
time of crisis, it would have good prospects of being
able to achieve long term success.
- c.
- The principal obstacle facing the West in its attempt
to influence Indonesian affairs is the heritage of
anti-colonialism and continued Indonesian suspicion of
Western motives. The Indonesians are quick to resent any
real or fancied attempts to influence their internal
affairs and can be expected to react sharply under all
such circumstances. For this reason, covert activity
must be extremely circumspect and by its nature must be
limited in size and scope. It must be augmented by and
coordinated with the efforts of other governmental
agencies under an accepted concept for the
implementation of national policy.
- d.
- Achievement of U.S. objectives over the long term is
unlikely unless a non-Communist nationalist government
in some form continues to exist in Java. The United
States must be able to immediately exploit favorable
developments toward that end. We must plan for timely
and adequate support of such a government and, if
necessary, assist in its creation when the inevitable
crisis in Indonesia comes to pass.
- e.
- In time of crisis in Java, it is probable that
Indonesian military forces particularly the Army, will
be a decisive factor. Although it is known that the
Communist apparatus has infiltrated the Indonesian Air
Force and Army to a considerable degree, the latter
continues to be the principal stabilizing force within
the nation and the element which has the most promising
capability of maintaining a national orientation
favorable to the West. At this time, Indonesia, although
preferring U.S. arms, is actively considering offers
from Communist Bloc sources. Provision of a controlled
military aid program to forestall direct Communist
influence in military affairs is considered necessary as
a calculated risk. A token military aid program for
Indonesia should be initiated at an early date. No
military aid should be provided which would enhance
appreciably the mobility of central government forces
with respect to the possible employment of Javanese
troops in the outlying islands. Further study of the
internal Indonesian situation governing the distribution
of such arms, and observation of the results of token
aid, would be the governing factors in a possible more
extensive aid program. Such a military aid program is
not regarded as contravening the provisions of paragraph
7. b. of the “Special Report on Indonesia.”
- 4.
- It is realized that U.S. actions in Indonesia will be subject
to close scrutiny by our SEATO
allies and other confirmed pro-Western governments in Southeast
Asia. Any overt moves on our part should be associated with a
program to explain our objectives and convince our allies of the
strategic necessity of insuring a pro-Western orientation of the
Indonesian Government.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the above
views on the implementation of U.S. policy in Indonesia be
brought to the early attention of the National Security Council,
specifically to point out:
- a.
- The loss of Indonesia to the Communist Bloc would do
irreparable and catastrophic damage to the position of
the U.S. and its allies in the Far East.
- b.
- A Communist-controlled nationalist government, once
established in Java, would receive the immediate and
overt support of the Communist Bloc, and ultimately the
support of the Afro-Asian Bloc in the UN, to a degree which would
make it substantially impossible for the West to prevent
consolidation of Communist control throughout the island
chain over the long term.
- c.
- To insure continued non-Communist control of Java in
time of crisis, the United States must be adequately
prepared to give timely and effective support to, and if
necessary assist in the creation of, a non-Communist
nationalist government when the inevitable crisis in
Java comes to pass.
- d.
- An immediate token military aid program, with
particular reference to the Indonesian Army, is
necessary to forestall direct Communist Bloc influence
in Indonesian military affairs. Such an aid program
should not enhance to a significant extent the mobility
of forces under the control of the central government
with respect to their possible employment in the
outlying islands. The distribution and use of U.S. token
aid to Indonesia should be carefully observed. Should
the program matériel be distributed or used contrary to
U.S. interests, the aid should be terminated. Should the
program enhance U.S. interests, it might then provide a
useful means of measuring a more extensive aid program
for Indonesia.
- e.
- Increasing influence of Communist elements on the
Central Government of Indonesia must be countered by
resolute implementation of a more positive concept for
the achievement of U.S. objectives in Indonesia. The
scope, nature and quality of the effort now being made
to this end by cognizant departments and agencies of the
U.S. Government should be re-examined on an urgent
basis.4
