116. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Dutch Protest Lack of Consultation Concerning Indonesian Developments
PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. J. H. van Roijen, Ambassador of the Netherlands
- Baron van Voorst, Minister, Netherlands Embassy
- Mr. D. Ketel, First Secretary, Netherlands Embassy
- The Secretary
- FE—Mr. Robertson
- EUR—Mr. Jandrey
- WE—Mr. Cameron
In explaining the background of current United States efforts to encourage and influence Indonesian military and civil leaders to take steps to reverse the Communist orientation of Indonesia, the Secretary said that we had first tried to encourage the rebel movements in Sumatra and then in the Celebes. He commented that our efforts would make an epic story. Unfortunately, these rebel movements had apparently spent themselves. Arms supplied to the rebels had fallen into the hands of Indonesian Government forces, lives had been lost and the Indonesian Government, in fact, now holds an American. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
When the movement in the Celebes appeared to be following a pattern similar to that of the Sumatran rebellion it was decided that the moment had come when we should try to influence Indonesian military and civil leaders. We consulted with Australia and the United Kingdom and it was agreed that we should try this line. Our three Ambassadors in Djakarta believe that there is a chance of success. Others, with whom the Secretary associated himself, think that success is very unlikely. Nevertheless, all concurred that this line should be tried. We have, therefore, decided to make some small gestures towards the Indonesian Government. We shall delay anything substantial until that government takes advantage of the opportunity to perform on its side. For example, if there should be a cabinet reshuffle within the next few weeks, we might have some basis for judging whether steps have been taken to reverse the present communist orientation.
In the meantime, we shall try to keep other assets in being, with the idea of possibly reviving them if the efforts in Djakarta fail. In other [Page 212] words, we shall try to keep those embers warm so that they can be fanned into flames if necessary.
If all these things do not work, it may be necessary to consider taking more overt action, possibly involving the assistance of the Philippines and Taiwan. In view of the extreme gravity of such a course of action, it was decided first to try to influence Djakarta.
The Secretary expressed in the strongest terms the top secret character of this information. Mr. Robertson reinforced the Secretary’s statements by explaining how closely this information was being held in this Government. Both the Secretary and Mr. Robertson stressed that any disclosure of what the Secretary had told the Ambassador would be disastrous not only for the United States but for the Free World in Asia. Ambassador Van Roijen said he understood what was involved and said his government would guard the information with the greatest care.1