Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Indonesia, Volume XVII

108. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, May 22, 1958, 8 p.m.

984. Eyes only Secretary and Robertson. President Chiang summoned me late this afternoon. Foreign Minister Yeh was present.

Chiang referred to Indonesian situation saying position of revolutionaries is deteriorating and will become hopeless within one week unless substantial help is received meantime.

He spoke of flow of Communist assistance to Djakarta government including Russian-made planes flown through Red China and Rangoon and of dire consequences to free world if Indonesia is allowed to come under Communist control. Taiwan and Philippines would then be exposed from south and route to Australia interdicted. Position and prestige of US would be gravely affected and whole world situation altered in favor of Communists. Communist control of Indonesia would hold us up to ridicule of Communist world and facilitate their goal of world conquest.

Chiang said if Chinese Reds attempt to use Taiwan Strait area to move troops or supplies to Indonesia he will immediately order his forces to attack them. In any case he is considering issuance of public announcement to this effect. He is prepared, he said, to intervene militarily if Chinese Reds intervene.

Chiang said he has received urgent request from Indonesian revolutionaries to send men and equipment to assist in recovery of Morotai.

Bringing out map, he expatiated at length on importance of Morotai to control balance of struggle. He is proposing to send one regiment of marines and a squadron of aircraft to assistance of revolutionaries who otherwise will be defeated and men and equipment already supplied lost. Chiang hoped US would provide help and in any case not impede him in his plans. He asked me to communicate foregoing to Secretary Dulles and I said I would of course do it.

I said to President I was not very conversant with developments in Indonesia and could not speak with authority. I recalled what you had said to him about difficulties of giving help when you saw him on March 14.¹ I said I gathered help of some kind had been provided, but fact was revolutionaries had failed to fight effectively and they therefore faced utter defeat. It would be most risky for outsiders to fight their battles for them and I urged President to reconsider carefully his proposal to send proposed fighting forces. I read to him extract from your Tuesday press conference on subject of Indonesia² and said I inferred from your remarks that US would not intervene. I also said his proposed intervention would provide Reds with pretext they seek to intervene openly on side of Djakarta and surely he would not want to provide them with that opportunity. I also referred to news reports of dissident approaches to Djakarta for final compromise settlement and asked if it would not be risky for him to proceed with his proposed intervention if these reports proved to be true. President replied that Sukarno would not compromise with insurgents. He also scouted possibility that agreement could be reached among Djakarta adherents whereby Reds could be eliminated. In his view only solution is sufficient aid to revolutionaries in men and equipment to defeat Djakarta. In agreeing to pass his remarks on to you I intimated it to be my opinion that his proposed course of action would be received with astonishment and dismay in Washington.

Chiang spoke earnestly and with emotion at times. He appeared to be in dead earnest but I doubt whether he will move to implement his proposals before receiving your reactions. I would suggest that these be transmitted soonest for communication to him. Of course any information of an encouraging nature about Indonesian developments would be highly useful for diverting him from the risky course he is contemplating so seriously.

For your information, Foreign Minister Yeh is out of sympathy with Chiang’s proposed course of action and told me after interview that he had spent an hour this morning attempting to dissuade President from intervening.³

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–2258. Top Secret; Niact.
1. A memorandum of the Dulles–Chiang conversation of March 14 is printed in vol. XIX, pp. 8–12.
2. See footnote 3, Document 105.

3. Telegram 749 to Taipei, May 22, for Ambassador Everett F. Drumright, reads: “You should inform President Chiang that

   • “1. In view of collapse of dissidents on Sumatra due to their unwillingness to fight and small leverage of Celebes group we are seeking develop anti-communist assets in government in Djakarta in effort to curb Sukarno and drift toward communism;
   • “2. We urge him suspend any moves he is contemplating until we can determine whether government will move. If our hopes of action by the government are not realized we will want to discuss this matter with him at a later date.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/5–2258)

   In telegram 986 from Taipei, May 23, Drumright reported that he saw Chiang that afternoon and conveyed to him substance of telegram 749. “He asked me to thank you for your reply,” the Ambassador noted, “and to tell you he will hold up contemplated action until he hears from you as to further developments.” (Ibid., 793.00/5–2358) See Supplement.