107. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Indonesian Situation
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Howard Beale, Australian Ambassador
- Mr. M. R. Booker, Counselor, Australian Embassy
- The Secretary
- Mr. Mein, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs
The Ambassador stated [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] that he would like to discuss the current situation. The Secretary said that our basic philosophy had been to encourage the dissidents to a point where they might serve as leverage on the government to reverse the trend toward communism. He said that as a result of this policy many accusations have been made against the United States and many untrue allegations of U.S. involvement have been made by the Indonesian Government. [Page 192] It seemed to us now that the operations had been carried to a point where they could no longer be effective without more overt action on our part. Also, there have recently been feelers from Djakarta implying that if we would dissociate ourselves from the dissidents it might be possible for the anti-Communist elements to shift the orientation of the government away from communism. It is doubtful that such an approach will succeed and more likely that they are playing a come-on game to put a stop to any support to the rebels. It is not a question of intentional misleading on their part but rather that the people in Djakarta do not have the power to do what they would like to do.
The Secretary continued that we were faced with a situation where the dissidents had failed and the undesirability of taking overt action was so great that we did not want to proceed further along those lines at this time. For that reason it was decided to give the political approach a chance. Accordingly, we have within the last few days taken the necessary steps to withdraw any support to the group in the Celebes.
The Secretary said that Ambassador Jones had recommended that he make a press statement, adding that he had made one yesterday. He commented also that other things must be tried for a reasonable period, possibly two or three months, to determine the intentions of the group in Djakarta. In the meantime, however, we are going to keep certain assets on the shelf to be used in case the political approach is not successful.
[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]
The Ambassador asked whether any conditions would be imposed on the sale of military equipment to Indonesia, [1 line of source text not declassified]. The Secretary stated that no proposal has as yet been submitted to him on the sale of military equipment so he did not know what position we might take. The Secretary informed the Ambassador that we had decided to issue some licenses for spare parts but there had been no decisions as yet on military equipment.
The Secretary commented that the Dutch were greatly concerned about this problem also but that he did not think there was any appreciable danger at this time of overt Indonesian action against West New Guinea. The Indonesian Government is in a very difficult economic situation and it is hard to imagine Indonesians precipitating a war on account of West Guinea, which would simply provide a basis for counteraction. The Secretary said that if military equipment is sold to Indonesia there will be definite undertakings required of the Indonesian Government.
[1 paragraph (6 lines of source text) not declassified]
The Ambassador [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] wondered if the success of the Indonesian military forces in mounting and carrying [Page 193] out the campaign in Sumatra might not change the picture. The Secretary commented that the operations had been far more effective than he had been led to believe the Indonesians were capable of, but there had been no resistance. In case of an attack on West New Guinea there would of course be resistance and he thought that without Soviet Bloc assistance Indonesia would not be capable of mounting any such operation.
The Ambassador asked whether any conditions would be attached to any token shipment of arms to Indonesia, [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The Secretary said that we had not as yet undertaken to make a token shipment of arms and therefore no conditions had been set forth to the Indonesian Government. The Secretary emphasized that we were moving gradually.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
The Ambassador returned again to the point of public relations and inquired whether any thought had been given to how any change in policy toward Indonesia might be presented to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] public. The Secretary said that if we do anything publicly we will have to be careful how it is expressed so that any statement will not offend the Indonesians and at the same time will satisfy our public that what we are doing is based on an expectation that the Government of Indonesia wishes to maintain friendly relations with us. We are not entering into any formal agreement with the Indonesian government but merely taking gradual steps hoping thereby to encourage them to take definite action to reverse the trend toward communism.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–2258. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Mein.↩