There is attached a paper on “Possible Contingencies in the Indonesian
Situation” prepared at your request by a special working group
consisting of representatives of State, Defense and CIA, with Mr. Howard Jones as Chairman.
At the meeting in which it was decided that such a paper should be
prepared,1 the question of referring it to the NSC Planning Board was discussed but no
decision was reached. In view of the sensitivity of the subject I
believe it would be better not to pass this paper to the NSC Planning Board but to discuss it only
with those of its members who must have this information.
Attachment
POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES IN THE INDONESIAN
SITUATION
I. The dissidents repudiate all Central Government
control without formal declaration of independence
or
Declare themselves to be the legal Indonesian
Government
or
Declare an independent Sumatra State
Assumptions:
- 1)
- The dissidents are able to maintain control of the areas
presently under their jurisdiction even in the face of
Central Government military pressure.
- 2)
- There is no outbreak of open hostilities.
U.S. Courses of Action:
- a)
- Pending an assessment of the situation, continue to recognize
the Central Government at the same time maintaining such
relations [Page 17] with the
regional authorities as generally accorded a de facto regime but
without extending them de jure recognition.
- b)
- Urge American-owned interests operating in the areas under the
control of the regional authorities to maintain similar
relations with the regional authorities.
- c)
- Extend overt economic aid to the regional authorities.
- d)
- Continue present programs of technical and economic
assistance.
- e)
- [2-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified]
- f)
- Encourage a reasonable settlement of differences between the
Central Government and the regional authorities which would lead
to the accession to power of a Central Authority prepared to
reduce Communist influence in Indonesia.
II. The present Government or one resembling it
remains in power; the outer islands take no further steps to
establish separate political identity nor claim to represent the
legitimate Government of Indonesia; there are no significant
outbreaks of armed violence; Sukarno continues to maintain his power and
influence.
U.S. Courses of Action:
- a)
- Maintain our relations with the Central Government.
- b)
- Continue our technical assistance and economic development
programs with special emphasis given to projects in the outer
islands.
- c)
- Seek to encourage the growth of anti-Communist strength on
Java.
- d)
- Encourage discreetly the political and economic development of
the outer islands.
- e)
- Employ all feasible means to strengthen the determination,
will and cohesion of the anti-Communist forces in the outer
islands.
- f)
- Withhold military assistance from the Central
Government.
III. A new moderate anti-Communist Government,
which is prepared to seek a reasonable settlement with the
dissident elements and to take action against the Communists,
comes to power.
[U.S. Courses of Action]
- a)
- Continue and be prepared to expand economic assistance to the
Government, concentrating as much as possible in the outer
islands.
- b)
- Encourage a reasonable settlement of differences between the
Central Government and the regional authorities which would lead
to the accession to power of a Central Authority prepared to
reduce Communist influence in Indonesia.
- c)
- Through strengthening of the government, seek to exploit any
tendency Sukarno may
have to adjust himself to the situation and/or reduce his
influence.
- d)
- Extend token military assistance and be prepared to negotiate
for the sale of military equipment to the Indonesian
Government.
- e)
- Seek a settlement to Dutch-Indonesian problems, including the
West New Guinea issue.
- f)
- Encourage the government to take action against the
Indonesian-Communist party.
- g)
- Continue, and as appropriate expand, other programs of
assistance and cooperation, e.g. education, leader grants, etc.,
with the Indonesian Government.
IV. Civil War.
U.S. Courses of Action:
- a)
- Consider extending de facto recognition to the regional
authorities.
- b)
- [1-1/2 lines of source text not
declassified]
- c)
- Pending an assessment of the situation, continue to accord
recognition to the Central Government.
- d)
- Consult with the U.K. and ANZUS on military measures which might be
necessary.
(Note: The extent of U.S. action under this
contingency will depend on the assistance, if any, given by the
Soviet Bloc.)
V. The Central Government is taken over by the
Communists.
U.S. Courses of Action:
- a)
- Encourage the outer islands to declare themselves as the
legitimate Indonesian Government and extend to this government
de facto or if necessary de jure recognition.
- b)
- In case of de jure recognition seek the support of other
governments for the new government.
- c)
- Extend all necessary assistance to enable this government to
maintain this position.
- d)
- Encourage anti-Communist elements on Java to rise against the
Red regime.
- e)
- Consult with the U.K. and ANZUS on military measures which might be
necessary.
VI. The Central Government purchases from the
Soviet Bloc arms of a kind and in such quantity as to endanger
the position of the anti-Communist forces in Indonesia.
(Note: This contingency could either
precipitate a breaking away of the outer islands and the outbreak of
civil war or could follow such action should the Central Government
seek to reestablish its control by force.)
[Page 19]
U.S. Courses of Action:
a) Maintain the position of the outer islands to resist military
pressure from the Central Government.2
