54. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

3374. To Steeves. From Parsons.

1.
During meeting 6th with Rob Scott, MacDermot and Ministry of Defence representative,2 British agreed that instructions could be issued to British Council representative to agree to [in?] informal off-the-record session January 8 to appointment of Thailand as “appointed nation”. British understanding is that command structure under contingency planning for Laos would not come up January 8 meeting. (Ministry Defence representative read minutes of last Council representative meeting instructing Planning Office produce “summary’.) In event command structure put forward as per Bangkok 259 sent Department 1807,3 British Council representative would probably seek instructions, according impression left with me at meeting.
2.
During meeting Deptel 51224 reached me. It appears that Department’s analysis of British proposed change in terms of reference stressed “external aggression” rather than emphasizing “indirect” nature this aggression. This is key word as Rob Scott emphasized by commenting that without it there would be basic change in nature of plan. I am impressed that British have no desire to modify terms of reference to exclusion of insurgence. On contrary, they are prepared to act against insurgency if evident Laos was on verge of collapse although for considerations of domestic and international politics, they feel obliged to cloak such action in language which would, if public statement necessary, permit them to face parliamentary and Soviet criticism.
3.
Regarding fears (Deptel 5122) as to possibility that their new terms of reference would open door to haggling, it appears to me that when time came if UK were determined to haggle, which I do not think would be case, they could do so almost as easily under present terms as they could under those they are now proposing. I appreciate your strong views on this subject but I believe that it should not prove impossible for us to agree with British on some formulation which would both satisfy their problem and ours. As I believe British, in all honesty, can not accept present terms, I told MacDermot Washington reaction negative to their alternative but said it seemed to me we5 might be able work out something which fitted both our needs. He readily agreed.
4.
Meeting this afternoon dealt primarily with SEATO contingency planning and it was apparent, despite rather confused presentation of Foreign Office working level which apparently does not have its thinking entirely coordinated with Ministry of Defense on MPO 5C/59,6 that textual modifications of plan will probably be presented by British and other Council representatives at Bangkok meeting which considers it.
5.
In view paragraph 1 and information in Bangkok’s 59 as to how Johnson-Australian representative plan to handle meeting, I think subject Department’s views it would be better to go ahead rather than drop matter completely 18th. I told British I thought it important we try maintain some momentum particularly in view long delay.
Barbour
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–660. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bangkok.
  2. A memorandum of this conversation by Ballantyne is ibid., 751J.00/1–660; included in the microfiche supplement. The Ministry of Defence official was Captain Hogg of the Royal Navy.
  3. In this telegram, January 6, Johnson suggested that the United States could if it chose present its thinking on the question of the “appointed nation” without forcing the issue to an immediate decision. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–660)
  4. See footnote 3, supra.
  5. In telegram 3377 from London, January 7, the Embassy noted that “UK” should read “we.” (Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–660)
  6. Dated November 27, 1959, this document embodies the changes made by the Military Advisers at the September 1959 meeting in Bangkok. (SEATO designator MS/147(a)/25/59; Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files, Reel S–2–59)