Office of the Historian

53. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

London, January 5, 1960—7 p.m.

3355. For Steeves from Parsons. Contrary to expectation SEATO contingency planning came up in first session of discussions with Hoyer-Millar, Rob Scott, MacDermot and CRO representative afternoon fifth.2 I am convinced U.K. not dragging feet and desires agreement on plan on informal basis previously agreed to by us. They do have domestic Parliamentary and external Geneva Accord problem and it is this which leads them to press so insistently for following formula:

“Armed action against the established government by organized bands or groups subject to such a degree of foreign direction, support or control as to amount to indirect external aggression.”

CRO representative felt that despite Nash’s moralistic outlook and aversion to military side of SEATO New Zealand may go far enough to permit completion plan. While not stated in meeting, I believe British would help with Nash if we can meet them on definition.

French are real problem with latest U.K. information indicating continued opposition from Couve de Murville. French Ambassador here today asked if we could have brief tripartite on this subject and U.K. representatives indicated that they hoped I would agree even though I will be in Paris several days hence. Assuming Barbour has no objection, I see no serious objection although we and British both conscious of need to avoid prior Western talks on SEATO in absence Asian partners. British present emphasized most undesirable raise subject at Council representatives meeting 8th both from New Zealand and French standpoint. They were, however, receptive to my personal suggestion of special informal meeting to try and wind up plan soon after January 8th meeting. They thought that it would help with French if I said to their Ambassador here roughly what I told Caccia some weeks ago, namely so far as U.S. concerned we regarded resort to SEATO as one of last phases in meeting future insurgence. During [Page 173] this phase of conversation I specifically asked whether situation existing in Laos late last summer would fit their definition as expressed in formula above. They replied in affirmative without hesitation. Under these circumstances I would appreciate reply soonest as to whether Department considers we could meet British on this point.3 Expect further discussion of subject probably afternoon 6th. You may wish also to speak to Booker4 before replying.

Barbour
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–560. Secret; Niact. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Vientiane, and Wellington.↩

  2. A memorandum of this conversation by Robert J. Ballantyne, Second Secretary of the Embassy in London, is ibid., PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Asia 1959–1960; included in the microfiche supplement. Assistant Secretary Parsons was in London, January 5–7, for talks with U.K. officials.

    The British officials are as follows: Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar, Permanent Under Secretary, Foreign Office; Dermot MacDermot, Assistant Under Secretary in the Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office; Harry Twist, Head of the Southeast Asian Department, Commonwealth Relations Office. Sir Robert Scott became Head of the Imperial Defence College in January 1960.

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  3. In telegram 5122 to London, January 6, marked “For JG Parsons from Steeves,” the Department raised several objections to the British formula for the definition of aggression but endorsed a proposal by the Embassy in Bangkok that the Council Representatives hold a special meeting in 3 weeks to consider the Military Advisers’ request for political guidance on Laos contigency planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–560; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  4. M.R. Booker, Minister of the Australian Embassy in Washington.↩