55. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1
3398. From Parsons. In discussion re Laos and SEATO contingency planning seventh with Selwyn Lloyd, it developed that there has been progress. Lloyd said UK was prepared to act in Laos through SEATO to prevent country from falling to insurgency but thought it should be clear SEATO intervention would be considered only as last resort. Further, he stressed UK fears that Laotians might irresponsibly appeal for SEATO aid to get them out of purely domestic difficulties which their own actions in recent weeks had caused. If such an appeal were made, Lloyd said it was altogether likely that some SEATO members would not feel circumstances warranted SEATO action.
On positive side, however, he agreed that contingency planning could go ahead on informal basis and that language of plan itself should be what military considered acceptable. According Lloyd, plan should be “sound militarily but not unduly provocative.” (MacDermot confirmed to me that this meant that earlier efforts of working level Foreign Office to cast language of plan in “defensive terms” were disapproved.)
I raised possibility that although he had not said his last word Nash would have objections to any agreement on the contingency planning. Lloyd implied that Nash could probably be brought around to any terms of reference which were mutually satisfactory to US and UK. He noted that Couve continued to oppose any SEATO planning for Laos. Lloyd stipulated that although UK would approve contingency planning, he wished to make it quite clear that UK would examine closely circumstances surrounding any appeal and UK did not feel obliged to respond automatically if SEATO invoked. He said UK was taking on no commitment inferentially or otherwise in approving plan and wished to avoid being accused of letting SEATO down if, when appeal came, UK could not agree to participate. UK did not wish, he replied, to give Laotians impression all they needed to do was invoke SEATO and step aside from their responsibilities. He concluded with thought that UK recognized need for maintaining threat to counter Communist aggression, but threat had to be carefully used. During conversation we reviewed steps taken to try and moderate Lao actions and I believe Lloyd feels that everything possible has been [Page 176] done to prevent needless arising of situation which British would find inconsistent with purposes of SEATO contingency planning.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–860. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and Paris. A memorandum by Ballantyne of the conversation described in this telegram, which took place on January 7, is ibid., 751J.00/1–760; included in the microfiche supplement.↩
- According to a memorandum by Robert E. Barbour, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Paris, of a conversation held in Paris on January 8, Pierre Millet, Director of Asian and Oceanic Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, told Parsons that Couve de Murville “had agreed to accept the British ‘compromise’ proposal whereby the SEATO contingency plan (5B/59) could be completed on the basis of an ‘informal understanding.’” (Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–860; included in the microfiche supplement)↩