Office of the Historian

52. Memorandum of a Conversation, British Embassy, Paris, December 14, 1959, 2:15 p.m.1

US/MC/14
Paris, December 14, 1959, 2:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary of State
    • Mr. Merchant
    • Mr. Reinhardt
    • Mr. Bohlen
    • Mr. Macomber
    • Mr. Kohler
    • Amb. Whitney
    • Mr. Farley
    • Mr. Tuthill
  • United Kingdom
    • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
    • Amb. Gladwyn Jebb
    • Sir Anthony Rumbold
    • Sir Patrick Dean
    • Minister David Ormsby-Gore
    • Asst. Under Secretary Con D.W. O’Neill
    • Pvt. Under Secretary Peter Ramsbotham

SUBJECT

  • Laos; SEATO Contigency Planning

After discussing other subjects, the conversation turned to Laos. Lloyd pointed out that the U.S. was not a party to the Geneva agreement. He stated that there is provision in the agreement against the stationing of foreign troops in Laos. Unless there is a “certain degree of aggression”, Britain has an obligation not to send troops in.

Lloyd asked if the U.S. wished to intervene in the event that Pathet Lao was getting the upper hand. Secretary Herter added “if aided from the outside”.

Lloyd stated that in an Alliance there was need for contingency planning; however, he did not wish to have a General discussing his “troops”. He felt it unlikely that contingency planning could be kept within Western circles. The French opposed it.

Secretary Herter stressed the importance of the Thais. He had been impressed by the cheering way each of the Allies in SEATO had spoken up and had indicated a willingness to make a contribution. He pointed out that the picking of an “appointed nation” and Commanding General are dissimilar things.

Lloyd stated that for the moment there is a French impasse. Contingency planning is not possible and Couve would have to be convinced concerning the necessity for informal planning.2 New Zealand wished to take action only in the event of “direct external aggression”.

Lloyd stated that he did not mind planning if it was clear that it took a political decision for action. Secretary Herter agreed that the need was to move forward informally. Lloyd pointed out the difficulty of defining “Communist insurgency”. He stated that he would like the French to take a more extensive view of their responsibilities. They had agreed to train 1500 men and had finally shown up with only 200. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

[2½ lines of source text not declassified] One of Lloyd’s staff asked about the Hammarskjold Mission3 which went out against the wishes [Page 171] of the USSR. Hammarskjold had switched from political to economic problems and was favoring technical and financial assistance as well as contact with the North Vietnamese. He understood that the U.S. favored economic plans but opposed contacts with the North Vietnamese. The British felt that Hammarskjold should be encouraged and did not mind the contacts with the North Vietnamese. If no such contacts were made, the situation could go from bad to worse.

Secretary Herter stated that the U.S. supported economic surveys and technical assistance which could be dovetailed in with American aid. He was doubtful, however, about the desirability of contacts with the North Vietnamese.

Lloyd stated that the British objective was to obtain a neutral Laos looking towards the West. In order to obtain this, a certain amount of “indifference” from Laos’ northern neighbors was necessary. The terrain is very dificult and infiltration is very easy. Lloyd pointed to the British experience in Malaya as evidence of the difficulty in stamping out a revolt.

Lloyd stated that the Russians have been fairly sensible and have asked Lloyd to help stop the trials. He doubted whether Hammarskjold could get very far, but felt he ought to try. He felt we might obtain an unexpressed agreement of the general desire not to turn the area into turmoil.

Secretary Herter stated that Hammarskjold may also ask for good treatment for the Communists in Vietnam. Secretary Herter stated that it would be highly undesirable if Dag Hammarskjold advocated better treatment for Communists in Vietnam. Mr. Merchant stated that the Laotian Government would be demoralized if Hammarskjold went in without our backing.

Lloyd stated that the Russians should be assured that the United States is not building up forces in Laos. Secretary Herter pointed out that Hammarskjold can see all and report. However, he wishes to do more. Lloyd favored finding out just what Hammarskjold wished to do.

  1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by John W. Tuthill, Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, on December 15, and approved in S on December 21. Herter, Lloyd, and the other participants were in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting held December 15–17 and 22.↩
  2. Information on the talks on this issue held between Lloyd and Couve de Murville is in telegram 2655 from Paris, December 10. (ibid., 790.5/12–1059; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
  3. Reference is to U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s trip to Laos in mid-November.↩