Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

51. U.S. Minutes of the ANZUS Meeting, Department of State, Washington, October 26, 1959, 10 a.m.–12:30 p.m. and 3–5:30 p.m.¹

Washington, October 26, 1959, 10 a.m.–12:30 p.m. and 3–5:30 p.m.

[Here follow a list of persons present, introductory remarks, and discussion of East-West relations, the relations of the People’s Republic of China with other nations, and Chinese and Soviet economic activities in Southeast Asia.]

Singapore

The Secretary suggested that although Singapore was not included as an item on the Agenda, it might be a good idea to say something about the situation there. Minister Casey said that he had visited Singapore on the way to the United States some two months ago. He said his talks in Singapore had been limited to Sir Robert Scott² and the Governor, Mr. Goode, and that on the basis of those conversations he had jotted down his impressions, a copy of which he made available to the other representatives (copy attached). He said that the outlook in Singapore was not pleasant. Mr. Casey said that the Prime Minister³ had refused to see him. On his return to Australia, Mr. Casey will be in Singapore again and will make another effort to see the Prime Minister. He thought that the use of the base in Singapore in case of conflict was not very encouraging.

Admiral Dowling⁴ commented that he agreed that, in so far as Malaya is concerned, there would be no merger between the Federation and Singapore primarily because of the Chinese in Singapore. He said that he had spoken with the Commander in Chief of the forces in Singapore and as a result believes the British themselves are conscious of the difficulties which might arise in keeping the base operable. He said the British are considering the problem and that the military are confident they will be able to hold on to it. The Australians, he said, have questioned whether the base will be operable in case of war. The British are working out some plan to work the base without Chinese labor but have not as yet made it known. Admiral Felt said that this was a very sensitive area but he was confident the British could defend it if the need should arise.

Mr. Parsons said he did not wish to take issue with Mr. Casey on his appraisal of the Singapore situation but he thought that some recent developments there would be of interest. The President of the Asia Foundation had been received recently by the Prime Minister fully expecting to be asked to close the Foundation’s office in Singapore. The Prime Minister never mentioned the matter of closing the office but instead asked if the Foundation could arrange for some 50 students to come to the United States for further training. Another recent incident was that the Prime Minister had come to the home of the Consul General in Singapore for a dinner for Mr. Steeves (recently appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) and in the conversation appeared very interested in what Mr. Steeves had to say about our policy in the area. The third recent development, he said, was that a United States naval vessel had refueled and the crew had been given shore leave in Singapore without any problem. Admiral Felt commented that he thought there would be no problem in the future concerning naval visits to Singapore.

Mr. Casey was asked whether he saw any evidence of movement of business from Singapore to Malaya. The Minister said there was some movement but not large. What some of the companies are doing, he said, is organizing associated companies in the Federation. The Minister commented that in his opinion Lee is not a Communist, that his advice in fact is to the contrary, that he is a left-winger and an “anti.” Lee still wants all the benefits of associations with us. Prime Minister Nash commented that Lee is a left-winger with considerable vision, [2 line of source text not declassified]. Mr. Nash thought the Prime Minister realized that Singapore could not live without the base there and that he wants the base there, among other reasons because of the foreign exchange it brings in. In Mr. Nash’s opinion the Prime Minister wishes to get along with the United States and the United Kingdom and he will do all he can to assure this. Mr. Dulles said our estimate of the Singapore situation is about the same. We are inclined to think that the Prime Minister is highly intelligent, but one big question in our mind is whether he can keep control of his party. Mr. Dulles thought that the British were working pretty well with him and that we should try to work with the Prime Minister. Mr. Nash pointed out that the Prime Minister was a member of the group that went to London to negotiate the constitution for Singapore. He thought that we would be placing the wrong interpretation on Lee’s action if we thought he wanted to go the wrong way.

Agenda Item 4. Laos.

The Secretary asked Mr. Parsons to introduce the subject of Laos. Mr. Parsons commented that Prime Minister Phoui is in Washington at the Walter Reed Hospital undergoing checking but wants to return to Laos as soon as possible. Mr. Parsons reviewed briefly recent developments in Laos. He said that the pressure on Laos from the Viet-Minh was supported by the Peiping and Moscow radios. Also, the Communists had made use of the Pathet-Lao movement. We regarded the recent actions in Laos as Communist probing at a very weak spot. We were still looking for some means to meet this situation when, to our surprise, the Government of Laos appealed to the UN and indicated it would also appeal to SEATO. We exercised what influence we could and as a result the Government did not appeal to SEATO. The UN action has had a tranquilizing effect. We are now faced with the problem as to what should be the nature of the UN presence in Laos. Mr. Parsons said that we favor a UN presence and have worked out an understanding on this with the Secretary General of the UN.

Mr. Parsons said that our attitude toward the Phoui Government is that it is probably the best government one can find for Laos at the present time. Phoui is a man of common sense who works closely with us and with the free world. He has difficulties, however, in holding the other elements in Laos together and we would want to help Phoui in maintaining proper unity. He said that we would counsel moderation to the Lao Government on any stand it takes internationally. It would help if the Lao Government would reiterate that it does not intend to have foreign troops or bases on its territory, that it intends to maintain neutrality and not to be provocative. Phoui’s mandate expires this year and there are some elements that want an unconstitutional solution. We would oppose this. There are two basic problems facing us: 1) how to continue our aid program to Laos, and 2) how to advise and assist the Government in Laos in coming to grips with its internal security problem. There is no doubt that the Pathet-Lao is an arm of international Communism. The recent trouble in that country results from the fact that Laos has been doing relatively well, thus causing the Communists to try different tactics. In our dealings in Laos, we have worked as closely as possible with the French in view of their special position there. Discussions with the French and the British have taken place to make sure there is no friction among the three.

Mr. Nash asked how far Laos could have gone without American aid, to which Mr. Parsons replied not very far. The Prime Minister wondered how far we have the right to interfere with the internal affairs of that Government, and why we should breach the Geneva Accords. Mr. Parsons pointed out that we are not a party to these Accords. The Secretary pointed out also that according to the legal experts the training of the Laotian forces is not a breach of the Accords. Prime Minister Nash wanted to know why the French had stationed only 300 troops in Laos when they had been authorized by the Accords to station up to 3,000. Mr. Parsons commented that it was probably due to commitments elsewhere. The Prime Minister wondered if there had not been a breach of the Geneva Accords by the French in transferring their facilities to the United States. Mr. Parsons said that there had been no transfer of facilities. He said that we are collaborating with the French, and the facilities are under French supervision. Also, we have been giving equipment to the Lao Army since 1950.

The Prime Minister wondered how much danger there was of getting mixed up with local politics in Laos and how far we have the right to go in that country. Mr. Parsons commented that we deal with the Prime Minister and the Government in Laos in the same way as we do with that of any other country. He said Laos lacks everything, including trained people and looked for guidance from people of experience more than any other Government. The French have advisors in every office of the Laotian Government. Then there is our own financial advisor. The Secretary said that there is, of course, the general ethical problem if you give technical assistance of how much interference in internal affairs is necessary and proper. Certainly there was no influence on our part when Laos appealed to the UN, for we were not consulted and were taken by surprise.

Prime Minister Nash commented that the appeal by Laos to the UN could not have been effective without the action taken by the United States. He thought it had been very effective. He wondered whether our purpose was not to maintain in office an existing government which we wanted rather than one which corresponded with Laotian wishes. Mr. Parsons explained how the Government had come into office, referring to the November 1957 agreement and the Lao constitutional procedures and stating that in our opinion Phoui was a wise and able person, by far the most capable man in his country. Mr. Nash remarked that, rightly or wrongly aid had been given by the United States to the Laotian Government and by the VietMinh to the Pathet-Lao. He wondered whether the two were not comparable and how far we had the right to interfere in this way. The Secretary replied that it was not stretching matters much to say that if it had not been for our aid to Europe following World War II, there would be no free Europe, and that what we were doing in Laos and other countries was, in principle, no different. He commented that basically the United States is as isolationist as ever and we would like to get rid of some of the responsibilities which we have assumed in world affairs. We hang on to our responsibilities abroad, he said, because we see no alternative but it is done in the interest of the free world.

Mr. Casey said he endorsed what Mr. Parsons had said. Laos is a very backward country. It is menaced by outright invasion, stimulation of internal revolt and the dissipation of Pathet-Lao forces throughout Laos which threaten the country with Communist subversion. Any one of these factors could bring Laos within the Communist orbit. It is our clear obligation and aim to stop this from happening. Our means of doing this is the political one, that of the UN presence. He said that he clearly agreed a UN presence is the next step. As to the internal situation, what we are trying to do is not to interfere in domestic politics but to maintain democratic processes there. That is our aim the world over and it is proper, he thought. The United States has maintained the Laotian Armed Forces for over five years and supplied technical and economic aid. In talking with Prime Minister Phoui on Saturday, the latter did not say very much new but endorsed what had been done in Laos. (Minister Casey said that he had given Mr. Parsons a record of the talk.) One of the things that can be done in Laos is to maintain the prestige of Phoui and the standing of his Government. If Phoui could be given something to take back with him, it would enhance his prestige at home. The Lao Foreign Minister had asked whether it would be appropriate to work toward a status similar to that of Austria, to which Mr. Casey had replied that such a solution appeared out of the question for it would mean complete neutralism. Mr. Casey said that we are quite legal and in order in trying to maintain Laos outside the Communist regime. He thought the UN action had been effective and the right step to take. Should, however, that not succeed, it is not impossible that Laos may need SEATO. Even under SEATO action, he believed he was right in believing that no attempt would be made to retake the two northern provinces if they had been overrun.

Minister Casey said that in recent conversations, including one with General Williams in Saigon, he had been told that Viet-Nam could not make a man or rifle available to Laos and he wondered if this was in fact the case and the reason for this. The Secretary explained that under Viet-Nam’s agreement with us, they cannot make any equipment available without our permission. Minister Casey wondered whether the Vietnamese situation was in any way related to that in Laos. The Secretary said it depended to a large extent on what the Viet-Minh did. If they should move into Laos, it would be a matter of great concern to the exposed Vietnamese.

Minister Casey asked whether the UK saw the Laos situation the same as the United States. The Secretary replied that it did not entirely. He said that Selwyn Lloyd took very seriously the UK responsibility under the Geneva Accords and that he had a strong feeling that Laos should be a neutralist country. Mr. Parsons commented that at the time of the crisis there appeared to be some misunderstanding.

The Secretary said that he believed Agenda Item 5 could be taken up with Item 6 after lunch, and the meeting was adjourned for the luncheon.

Agenda Item 5. Review of SEATO activities, especially military planning against insurgency.

Agenda Item 6. Comments by military representatives.

The Secretary asked Admiral Dowling to introduce this item. Admiral Dowling referred to the meeting of the military representatives held in Bangkok September 22–25, adding that all of the eight nations had approached the problems before them with a sense of urgency, aware that anything could happen in Laos and that a military plan was necessary. He said that for 18 months there had been a plan but it had been most incomplete. At the meeting the military representatives had been conscious of the fact that as military advisers they were not committing their countries to war, nor were they committing forces to intervention, but were committing only forces to a plan, a plan which he hoped would not need to be implemented. He said there had been considerable agreement and that the consensus was that the meeting had been an important one. The Asian members particularly had begun to wonder if SEATO was anything more than a paper tiger and the efforts in Bangkok had been successful in satisfying the Asian members that we mean business if business is needed and that there is a plan against insurgency. He said that the advisers had also provided a suitable guide for the necessary command organization as well as the role of the joint field forces commander when and if appointed. The role of the field forces commander is of great importance at the present time since it is not known who will be the “appointed nation” or who, in fact, will be the commander. The Admiral said that he did not propose going into the details of the plan except to indicate that the commitments of forces on the part of the members amounted to about one Division. There are two phases to be considered: 1) the initial movement of forces in the first few days, and 2) the follow-up movement. The terrain was very difficult and, judging from the experience in Malaya, military operations were not promising. There 200,000 men had been operating for ten years and it had been calculated that for every Communist terrorist killed or captured 1,300,000 man-hours were expended. Consequently, the plan for Laos calls not for fighting the Communists in the forest but for bolstering the Laotion forces by providing the rear guard and wherewithal for their advance operations. Before a military force can be put into the field, he said, not only would the approval of all eight nations be necessary, but there would also have to be decisions on the “appointed nation”, phasing, financial support, etc. There are also important political factors which will have to be effected first. The military advisers’ representatives in Bangkok are working on these problems with the Council of Representatives.

General Weir⁸ said he had nothing to add to what Admiral Dowling had presented except to reiterate his remarks. He would like to stress, however, what is considered to be the correct role regarding the Lao situation, that is, that if a SEATO force should have to go into Laos, it would be best that it go in to support a Laotion force and that it would be extremely unwise for us to get involved in any action against the insurgents themselves.

Admiral Felt said that he agreed but he thought that certain clarification was necessary so there would be no misunderstanding. He said that whereas none of us wishes to be involved in a large-scale conflict with insurgents, we had in fact agreed to engage in combat operations with the insurgents by providing air support, communcations, furnishing of psychological warfare units and “special operations.” These do not involve large numbers of people but it is envisaged that these tasks will be performed. Admiral Dowling concurred.

The Secretary said that from reading the despatches on the deliberations in Bangkok, he got the feeling that each nation was taking its responsiblities seriously and that SEATO was in fact an organization in being and not only a paper organization; also, that something substantial which would have considerable moral effect in the area had been decided upon. This impression had given him great satisfaction. He thought the decision was a big step forward and that a moral impetus had been achieved. Agreement on a plan was a very different thing from the political decision to use the plan, but the military representatives deserved a great deal of credit for having put a plan together. He felt that we owed the military representatives a debt of gratitude for what had been done.

Admiral Dowling said he had something of the same feeling, that is, that with respect to the Asian members the results of the Bangkok meeting had given a certain uplift to the organization.

Admiral Felt said that the French have asked for permission to tell the Laotians about the plan. Since the meeting they have again raised this point, and undoubtedly will raise it again. He thought the military representatives would need some political guidance on this. The Secretary said that it was something that should be thought out, but his off-the-cuff reaction was against it. Mr. Casey indicated that he also was against it but he felt the Laotians might be told that if everything else failed, SEATO would live up to its obligations. Mr. Parsons said that if it became militarily necessary for Laos to know more than it does now, we might take a look at it but it did not appear to him to be politically necessary.

Prime Minister Nash said that he had not looked with favor on the need for a military plan at first because there was no definition of “insurgency.” After another look at it, however, it seemed to him to be the same as planning for any military exercise in which New Zealanders take part. He had come to the conclusion, therefore that planning was logical and use of a plan was another thing altogether. He thought, however, there was still need to be clear that it was aggression we were fighting and not “insurgency.” Any plan to combat Communist insurgents when only internal, in his opinion, lacked political reality and there would be difficulty in justifying such intervention in the UN. The Prime Minister referred to a leak after the SEATO meeting at Wellington and said he was concerned that there might also be leaks now as to any military plan undertaken by the SEATO organization. He was not happy with the prospect of any intervention by SEATO. He thought a way out of the situation had been the appointment by the UN of a group of UN observers and he thought that this action was much sounder than anything SEATO might have done.

The Prime Minister said that he had no hesitation in saying New Zealand would live up to its obligations. He thought that the situation had been safeguarded by the UN action and that the less SEATO is mentioned the better.

The Secretary said he thought that any indiscretion which had served to let it be known that SEATO would do something might not have been too bad a thing. At the moment the UN presence has helped the situation and a continuing UN presence might be a good thing. He said that the UN presence would probably simplify any action by SEATO which might later be necessary.

Mr. Casey referred to Articles 2 and 4 of the SEATO treaty. There was some general discussion of the need for consultation among the members and of a request from any member for action before anything was done. Prime Minister Nash remarked that Laos had never asked for SEATO assistance and Minister Casey replied that it was only with difficulty that we stopped them from asking.

Mr. Parsons expressed appreciation for the outstanding job Brigadier General Thornton⁹ had done in Bangkok.

Mr. Casey said that he supposed some thought had been given to the political and military effect on North Viet-Nam of any action by SEATO and whether this might result in their having to put equal forces into Laos. Admiral Felt said that was a political matter. He did not feel that Laos would ask for help unless the situation in that country were very serious. The Secretary commented that the situation evidently was not that bad or Prime Minister Phoui would not be in this country at the present time. Minister Casey said that in his conversations with the Prime Minister the latter had indicated that there would be a need for small indoctrination units. There is the problem of language, but Mr. Casey thought the Laotians would probably raise this point with the United States. In reply to a question, Mr. Dulles said that the Filipinos engaged in Operation Brotherhood had worked primarily through interpreters and that the program, which is primarily medical, had been successful.

With reference to the need of keeping more Laotians informed and of bringing about a feeling of national unity, Prime Minister Nash suggested that it might be possible to get large numbers of transistors in at a small cost. Minister Casey said that Australia has sent in thousands of transistors already and since his conversation with Prime Minister Phoui, he has asked that more be sent.

Admiral Dowling said there had been some discussion at the military representatives meeting at Bangkok on how to reach the people in the countryside. There had been some discussion over the possibility of getting Laotians outside the country to make broadcasts and so on just as was done in the case of Malaya. The Secretary recalled that success there had only been achieved when villages had been surrounded by barbed wire in order to stop the flow of food and salt to the insurgents. Mr. Parsons said he agreed that statements and broadcasts on the basis of personal experience would be effective. He said that the problem is how to get something done, when each village is a world unto itself. He agreed with a remark by Mr. Nash that printed material was comparatively useless, adding that 85 percent of the people were illiterate.

Admiral Felt said that the objective should be to get these things done now. He also thought that there was a role to be played at this time by the Laotian Army which is actually not an army as we think of one but is divided into small groups which could easily be used as civil action groups as Magsaysay did in the Philippines. He said that it should be remembered that the Pathet-Lao have their two armed battalions still in existence terrorizing the villagers. It is necessary to obtain the confidence of the villagers by making them feel secure and this is a role which the Lao Army must play. He said that U Ne Win in Burma had also discussed with him this approach with relation to Burma. It was a terrific problem because the people are not on the side of the Army. If it were thought that the UN had completed its job, fighting could break out the day after they left.

Mr. Casey wondered whether we were likely to have Laos as a problem area for some time in the future. Admiral Felt commented that a tribe in Sam Neua, which straddles the border with North VietNam, had recently refused to go with the insurgents and stayed with the Government forces. It was a question of the amount of security which they felt existed.

Mr. Casey said he would like to get some idea of what sort of UN presence is envisaged in Laos, whether it will be a multilaterally elected group or a representative of the Secretary General. The Secretary said that he had had a long correspondence with the Secretary General on this subject. The Secretary General prefers a personal representative because he can then handle the adminstrative details himself and will not be required to go to anybody for action. The Secretary said that we have not taken a strong position either way. If the Secretary General can work it out with the Security Council to send a personal representative and he can work it out in such a way as to avoid a Soviet veto, that would be good. The Secretary General feels that if there is a Soviet veto in the Security Council he can get a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, and for this reason the Soviets might simply object to rather than actually veto the proposal. The Secretary said that the Secretary General had wanted to appoint a representative to cover a wider area than just Laos but that the opposition to this had been too great.

Prime Minister Nash commented that a personal representative could get a staff and that this seemed to be the best way out. Also, he said, the Secretary General had received a request from Laos to do something and therefore has a basis on which to act. The Secretary General hopes that a reading between the lines of the group’s report will provide a recommendation for his own one-man approach. Mr. Parsons commented that Prime Minister Phoui had said on the radio yesterday that a UN presence in Laos would be a good thing.

Mr. Casey asked whether the others wanted to discuss the matter of the “appointed nation.” The Secretary said he would like to hear from the military on this point. Admiral Felt said that the military representatives at Bangkok had decided to leave that as a political decision but had drawn up a command structure which would be adaptable to any political decision. He said there had been no discussion of who in fact should be the “appointed nation.”

Admiral Dowling said that General Cabal of the Philippines had tried to raise it late in the session at Bangkok. Admiral Felt reiterated that it was a political problem and emphasized that it should be considered very seriously.

Mr. Casey remarked that he understood that according to current thinking, Thailand would provide the SEATO commander and the United States would provide the force commander.

Mr. Nash said that in his opinion Thailand should be the last nation to be considered for SEATO commander and United States next to last. He thought that probably the best candidate would be Australia. Mr. Casey said he thought it should be the country providing the substantial force. The Secretary said that in his opinion the Prime Minister’s suggestion had a great deal of merit. There is always the danger of repetition that the United States is trying to Americanize Laos. On the other hand, he said, we should keep in mind what we are trying to do and should not overlook the important role which the Thais will have to play since Bangkok would have to be the port of entry, headquarters, etc. He asked if the Thai unit was pretty good.

Admiral Felt replied that the Thais had only a battalion to offer in connection with the plan. He thought that it would be important that we move fast if any nation asks for help. Only three nations are in a position to do so in Laos: The United States, the Commonwealth (considered as a unit) and the Thais. Minister Casey said that his Government had not considered any country other than the United States and Thailand as a possible appointed nation. He said he could not speak for his Government, but his personal instinct was that Australia would not be as ambitious as that and that Australia would be happier with an American field commander.

Prime Minister Nash said that there are other conditions which would also have to be satisfied. Namely, that it is aggression from outside and that the action taken by the member countries is in accord with their constitutional processes. He said also that he would want to know what is meant by internal subversion. Minister Casey said that Article 2 of the SEATO treaty covers the Laos situation. There was general agreement that consultation among the members of SEATO would have to follow before any action were taken on the request from the Lao Government.

The Secretary, referring to Admiral Felt’s statement that there was need for a decision concerning the “appointed nation”, wondered if, since the three participating countries were all members of SEATO, it would not be helpful for them to make a recommendation to the SEATO Council. Admiral Felt pointed out that it was more important to decide on who would be the field commander and that if the decision were made on the “appointed nation”, it might not be possible to keep that secret and such a decision might in itself be considered provocative. From the military viewpoint it was important to know who the commanders would be because there is work to be done. Admiral Dowling also emphasized the need for decision on the field forces commander and referred to the expectation that deputies would be of other nationalities.

The Secretary said that the President had indicated that he would prefer that neither the SEATO commander nor the field forces commander be an American.

Minister Casey asked whether the Secretary had in mind recommending to Prime Minister Phoui that he make a statement reaffirming his country’s position of political neutrality and adherence to the Geneva Accords. He thought such a commitment would be very useful from a public relations standpoint. Mr. Parsons said he had discussed this with Prime Minister Phoui. The Prime Minister had been receptive and this had been reflected to a slight degree in the statement made by the Prime Minister on the “Face the Nation” program. It had not, however, been as detailed as his statement last February.¹⁰ Mr. Casey said he also had discussed this with Prime Minister Phoui and had suggested that he talk to the United States before seeing the U.S. press.

Admiral Dowling said that the recommendations of the military representatives had been passed to the Council of Representatives. Mr. Nash suggested that if Australia were not the “appointed nation” and one could get a very able man from France, it might be wise to select France for that role since they had more right in Laos than anybody else. The Secretary said he would wish to give that serious thought. He said he had had frank discussions with the French Foreign Minister concerning the differences between us and them on the Laos situation and the Foreign Minister had indicated that the answer was probably a complete change in French personnel in Laos.

Agenda Item 7. Indonesia and West New Guinea.

Minister Casey said that the situation as to West New Guinea had been quiescent for some time. Prime Minister Menzies is going to Indonesia early in December but his visit is strictly one of good will and will not result in any change in Australia’s policy on the West New Guinea issue. The Dutch still fear that force might be used against West New Guinea primarily to establish a lodgment and they continue to be sensitive to the supply of arms to Indonesia except for internal security. The UK had an application for self-propelled landing craft but he had been successful in inducing the British Government to hold off any action on the application until after the British elections. The elections are now over and he has received a message indicating that the matter must again be considered. He had heard rumors that the Indonesians might possibly also wish to discuss with the British the acquisition of small naval vessels. Australia, he said, is concerned lest there be any build-up of forces beyond the point where they are necessary for internal security. He said that he saw no immediate menace, however.

Minister Casey said that the economic situation in Indonesia is bad. Col. Jani has been going around buying arms. When the matter was raised with Subandrio in the course of his visit to Australia, he replied that Indonesia is an archipelago and must be equipped with sufficient forces on Java to quell any disturbances in the outer islands. The Minister said he would be interested in knowing whether the United States has additional plans for assistance to Indonesia. He said that the United States has exercised the greatest deterrent to an Indonesian attack on West New Guinea but, because the force of a deterrent diminishes with the passage of time, it should be reactivated. The Minister said he would be most grateful if the United States could revive its deterrent at suitable intervals. The Secretary commented that this has been done at every opportunity. In reply to Mr. Casey’s question whether these approaches have been made at more than one level, the Secretary said that they had been made at every level except Sukarno, who has not been approached directly.

Minister Casey referred to Minister Subandrio’s talk with the Dutch Chargé, Mr. Hasselman, in which Subandrio said the presence of Dutch naval ships in Indonesian waters would be a casus belli. The Minister said he had been surprised by this but had been relieved to hear from Minister Luns that the Dutch did not take it seriously. Minister Casey wondered whether we took it seriously. The Secretary commented that he was inclined to take anything said by the Indonesians in that connection seriously, that there is nothing to prevent them from taking further anti-Dutch action. Mr. Parsons remarked that Foreign Minister Luns had expressed gratification over our repeated expressions of deterrence. The Secretary added that guerrilla warfare in Indonesia was about as difficult as in Laos and the distances were great. Mr. Dulles agreed that it was not easy to clean out the resistance. At the moment no great effort was being made to do that.

Mr. Casey said he wondered sometimes if Subandrio’s statements on China were not for the purpose of rationalizing Indonesia’s purchase of arms. Prime Minister Nash said he thought that Indonesians would break their word any time Sukarno thought it would serve their purpose to move against West New Guinea. The Secretary commented briefly on the Sukarno, Nasution and PKI balance of power in Indonesia, pointing out that Sukarno at the present time appears to have the edge. He said that it was hard to visualize how the Indonesians would get out of their present economic difficulties.

Mr. Casey reiterated that Australia would like to have the United States repeat at every opportunity its position against the settlement of the West New Guinea issue by force. He said Australia continues to be anxious over Indonesia and West New Guinea in particular. The Secretary asked whether Australia had formally recognized Dutch sovereignty over West New Guinea. Mr. Casey said that they had, many times.

Mr. Casey said that Cuba had recently sought to buy 45 mm. ammunition from the Australians. He said that the Australians had consulted the United States and as a result had turned down the application.

[Here follows discussion of the Middle East, contingency items, and the communiqué. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, November 16, 1959, page 708.]

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Edward P. Prince, Officer in Charge of Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific Island Affairs, and John Gorden Mein, Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs. The full text of the minutes is included in the microfiche supplement.
2. British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, resident in Singapore.
3. Lee Kwan Yew.
4. Vice Admiral Sir Roy Dowling, Chairman of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee.
8. Major General Cyril E. Weir, Chairman of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee.
9. Brigadier L.W. Thornton of New Zealand, Chief of the SEATO Military Planning Office.
10. See footnote 2, Document 213.