Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

50. Record of the Informal SEATO Council Meeting, Washington, September 28, 1959¹

Washington, September 28, 1959

[Here follow a list of persons present (24) and the record of Secretary Herter’s review of the Camp David meetings and of Assistant Secretary Parsons’ analysis of developments in the People’s Republic of China.]

Secretary General’s Comments

The Secretary then noted that the various member countries of SEATO had assumed certain obligations under the Manila Pact in respect of Laos and asked the Secretary General of SEATO, Mr. Pote Sarasin, if he would care to comment.

The Secretary General expressed his gratitude for this opportunity to report to the Council members, particularly concerning the problem in Laos. He stated that the Council Representatives in Bangkok had met six times during September and that his intention was to discuss the political aspects of the Laotian problem rather than those on the military side. The Secretary General then reviewed briefly the sequence of events in Laos until he had departed from Bangkok on September 23, mentioning the desertion of two Pathet Lao detachments and the significant stepping up of military operations on August 30, when four or five Pathet Lao battalions had reportedly moved in. The Council Representatives had endeavored to analyze the reasons for this action by the Communists—was it, in fact, an action or a reaction? Mr. Sarasin believed that it could have been a reaction to the efforts of the Royal Laotian Government to integrate the Pathet Lao into Government forces, a move which the Communists may have found unsatisfactory, or it possibly could have represented a new initiative by the Communists in an effort to reinvoke the terms of the Geneva Treaty. There was no doubt that in these actions there had been intervention by the Northern Vietnamese; the evidence of this was to be found among refugees coming back from the affected areas and in the indication of deep Laotian concern over the situation which was evident in their appeal for United Nations forces. A further possibility was that the Communists might have been endeavoring to revive the International Control Commission; they had asked for another Geneva conference to settle the issue and this also might be considered further indication of Communist intent to intervene in Laotian affairs.

On September 4 the Foreign Minister of Laos² had got in touch with the Thai Foreign Minister³ and with the Secretary General, himself, and had asked for a meeting. This meeting took place with the Thai Acting Foreign Minister and the Secretary General in Bangkok on September 7. The Foreign Minister of Laos was at that point very much alarmed over the possibility of the imminent fall of Sam Neua and deeply concerned that if it did fall its recovery by Laotian forces would be most difficult.

Also on September 7, the Laotian Minister had appealed to the United Nations to send forces and had asked the Secretary General what SEATO would do if Laos called for similar aid from the SEATO Organization. The Secretary General had explained to the Foreign Minister the Articles of the Manila Treaty which would apply in such a situation. He had also suggested to the Minister the usefulness of having Lao representatives visit neighboring non-SEATO countries such as India to inform them of developments in Laos.

For four or five days after the Laotian appeal to the United Nations, there was little or no Pathet Lao military action and the insurgents thereafter pulled back. The Secretary General noted that the Council Representatives believed that the presence of a United Nations Subcommittee in Laos has been of great benefit in the situation. The Council Representatives had also raised the question of quietly sending individual representatives from member countries to Vientiane for the purpose of keeping contact with the Lao Government and of reporting to their own governments upon the situation in Laos.

The Proposal for the SEATO Secretary General to Visit Vientiane

The Secretary General then raised the desirability of his making a visit to Vientiane, a matter upon which he asked for the views of the Council. He noted that the Council Representatives had discussed this matter at some length and that there had been agreement among them that the visit, in any case, should not take place until there had been an invitation from the Royal Government of Laos.

Whether or not he should make this visit had not, however, been decided in principle by the Council Representatives. For his part, the Secretary General believed that it would be useful for him to establish liaison with the Government of Laos. Such a visit would also have the advantage of increasing the confidence of the Royal Government of Laos through this indication of SEATO’s interest in the Laotian situation; it also might act as a deterrent to the Laotian Government’s making any rash appeal to SEATO without adequate consultation or advance warning.

The Secretary General said that the Council Representatives had agreed that SEATO must give every support to the action of the United Nations in Laos, that it must give moral support to the Royal Government of Laos and that a breathing spell was now occurring in Laos of which advantage must be taken to strengthen the Laos Government in meeting this threat to its independence and integrity. The Secretary General noted that the Council Representatives had issued a communiqué on September 25, after his departure from Bangkok, at the conclusion of the Military Advisers meeting. He had not heard what had been the outcome of that latter meeting.

The Secretary expressed his gratitude for the excellent report of the Secretary General and stated that two important questions seemed to rest with SEATO for the moment (1) the Secretary General’s possible visit to Laos and (2) the report of the Military Advisers meeting at Bangkok just concluded of which we had not yet seen the results.

The Situation in Laos

The Secretary indicated his interest in hearing from the other members of the Council who were present. Mr. Casey, however, considered that it might be more appropriate for them to get the American point of view first, a suggestion to which the Secretary acceded.

The Secretary then summarized the views of the United States toward the Laotian problem in the following general terms. He noted that we had all been through a trying period which was due, to a large extent, to the problem of interpreting the facts of the situation in Laos. The single greatest problem still remained the differing interpretation of these facts between the various SEATO members; there had otherwise been close agreement on our approach to the situation. The Government of Laos had been extremely worried about its ability to cope with the developments, had made an appeal to the United Nations and had been on the point of addressing a similar appeal to SEATO, both without prior consultation with any other nation (the Secretary General confirmed this). The United States believed that (1) the Communist take-over of Laos, if successful, would not stop there but would present a threat to all of Southeast Asia, (2) the Government of Laos is weak and we have a responsibility, as part of our SEATO Treaty obligations, to strengthen that Government. The question then is, “What can we do individually or collectively to achieve a strengthening of the Government?” and we must think not only in military terms but also in terms of the long-term need to build up Laos in other ways.

The Secretary emphasized the United States’ belief that a continuing United Nations presence in Laos is important; the United Nations Subcommittee has already served to improve the morale of the Laotian Government and has had the effect of slowing down the military action along the border. The United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjold, is worried about the procedural side of the Security Council action in creating the subcommittee. The United States, nevertheless, believes that a precedent for such action is to be found in the Spanish case; in any event, it would certainly appear that the Subcommittee should stay in Laos as long as is necessary to obtain a full and complete report upon the situation there. We very much hope that the Subcommittee, itself, will agree upon the desirability of this course. Mr. Hammarskjold evidently feels, however, that the continued presence of the United Nations in Laos may require a new mandate from the General Assembly to supplant the present one from the Security Council.

The Secretary then stated that the United States would favor a visit by the SEATO Secretary General to Vientiane on the following grounds: (1) if the Royal Government of Laos invited him to come, such an invitation would reflect its belief in the advantages of establishing liaison with SEATO through the Secretary General on a consultative basis which would be normal under the terms of the Manila Treaty, (2) the Secretary General through such a visit might be able to insure that there would be no premature or panic request by the Royal Government of Laos for SEATO forces.

The discussion then passed to the other representatives around the table. Mr. Casey observed that Australia was convinced that the Royal Government of Laos must not be allowed to fall to the Communists. There were both political and military weapons available to prevent this. Australia would be glad if the political weapon, represented by the United Nations, was fully exploited in the first instance and hoped that it might succeed. The United Nations presence in Laos was achieved in a painless manner, has had a calming effect on the Laotian Government and has tended to restore confidence. He believed that the members of SEATO must fully support the independence of Laos and that the United Nations card must be played to the limit by inducing the United Nations Subcommittee to remain in Laos as long as possible. Mr. Casey believed that all of the member Governments should try to urge the Subcommittee to remain and that if and when the Subcommittee thought it necessary to leave Laos, some other form of United Nations presence should be substituted. He urged that every effort be made to build up the Royal Government of Laos morally, politically, and militarily. As of assistance in doing so, Australia was of the opinion that Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone should make some sort of statement to the effect that, while Laos would not want the return of the International Control Commission, it would support the principles of the Geneva Agreement, and that while it would not join in military alliances in contravention of that Agreement, it must not be stopped from accepting the normal forms of outside aid necessary to its stability and the maintenance of its independence.

Mr. Casey emphasized that SEATO should be brought to a position of readiness to move in the Laotian situation if necessary. For the moment, overt evidence of the intervention of North Vietnam was not strong and a high priority should be accorded to the establishing of evidence sufficiently firm so that it could be brought to public knowledge. If United Nations presence in Laos failed in the long term, SEATO must then be ready to undertake its obligations under Article IV of the Treaty. If this were to happen, SEATO should avoid becoming involved, however, in a long drawn-out jungle war such as had been fought in Malaya.

Mr. Casey expressed the view that if SEATO is called upon to act in Laos, its objectives should be (1) maintenance of the Royal Government of Laos, (2) military protection of at least the main centers of population in the southern part of Laos, (3) approval, in principle, of advance military planning, and (4) economic support for Laos.

With regard to the visit of the Secretary General to Vientiane, Mr. Casey noted that his Government was hesitant to have the Secretary General make such a visit while the United Nations Subcommittee was in Laos, since to do so might draw attention away from the United Nations aspects of a solution; the stress should now be on the political weapon being used in Laos. His personal views on the matter, however, were not rigid.

Monsieur Couve de Murville also attached the greatest importance to preserving the independence and integrity of Laos and stressed the implications of this for all of Southeast Asia. The French Government considered it most important to find the proper settlement of the Laotian problem. The French Foreign Minister noted that there had, however, been controversy among the various SEATO members as to the method of approaching the Laotian problem since it was most difficult to obtain accurate information as to the situation; the difficulties of terrain and the lack of communications rendered it uncertain as to what was actually happening.

The Minister went on to point out that the members of SEATO have a common purpose in Laos. There is certainly some evidence of Northern Vietnamese help to the Pathet Lao; although the form and degree of such help is not clear, we could assume that this is the case. The question of Laos is now in the hands of the United Nations, which is a good step, and there should be no hurry for the Subcommittee to complete its report. French information was to the effect that the Subcommittee would probably make its report by mid-October. There were two possible alternative steps which the United Nations might take thereafter. The first of these would be the establishment of a general committee of four or five States to be set up by the General Assembly. The second alternative might be for the United Nations Secretary General to send a personal representative to Laos to maintain contact with the Government and to report to him upon developments.

Monsieur Couve de Murville said that the French Government is inclined toward the second of these alternatives as being the more subtle, avoiding the problem of organizing a further Subcommittee and keeping in mind that there is precedent for such action. Since it would not be possible to maintain the present Subcommittee in Laos indefinitely, we must face the prospect of a veto in the Security Council. The member governments of SEATO should, therefore, be prepared sooner or later to have the question go to the General Assembly and this might happen at the current session. The SEATO members should study what are likely to be the positions of the various United Nations members toward the foregoing alternatives.

Mr. Couve de Murville noted that the French Government would approve, in principle, a visit of the SEATO Secretary General to Vientiane provided that an invitation were issued by the Royal Government of Laos; the problem, however, would be one of timing and of the relationship of the visit to United Nations Subcommittee activities. He suggested that the various member governments should consult as to the timing of such a visit when an invitation had been received from Vientiane. The French Foreign Minister then reiterated his agreement with the Secretary that it was important to maintain the continuity of United Nations presence in Laos, but he believed that additional steps in this direction should await the report from the Subcommittee.

Mr. White (New Zealand)⁴ stated that the New Zealand Government agreed upon the importance of having an adequate fact-finding operation in Laos and also concurred in the view that the United Nations Subcommittee has strengthened the morale of the Royal Government of Laos. It was the opinion of the New Zealand Government that the best course of action for SEATO was to support the United Nations fact-finding mission and to keep the United Nations’ presence in Laos; while the Subcommittee remained in Laos, however, the New Zealand Government believed that nothing should be done which would cut across the lines of work of that Subcommittee. New Zealand, therefore, did not favor a visit of the Secretary General until the outcome of the Subcommittee’s work had been made clear. A visit by the SEATO Secretary General might also tend to prejudice action in the General Assembly with respect to the future of the United Nations presence in Laos, a factor which should be taken into careful consideration.

Mr. White stated that his Government fully recognized the need for external economic and other support for the Royal Government of Laos in meeting internal resistance, but added that it was also of the opinion that a solution could not be obtained by engaging in jungle warfare at this stage. In the long term, Mr. White was of the opinion that the best prospect for the survival of the Royal Government of Laos would be its assumption of a generally neutral posture in the future.

The Pakistan Foreign Minister⁵ concurred with what had been said in regard to the healthy effect which United Nations action in Laos had produced and stated that his Government believed that nothing should be permitted to interfere with United Nations action. The morale of the Royal Government of Laos needed strengthening and so did the economy of the country. It was also important that SEATO’s continuing interest in Laos should be made evident. With respect to the proposed visit of the SEATO Secretary General to Vientiane, the Foreign Minister agreed with what had been said by the New Zealand representative to the effect that this trip should not be undertaken for the present.

The Philippine Ambassador⁶ thanked the Secretary for his excellent review of the Khrushchev talks and for the briefings which had been given on Laos by the Department of State. He was gratified by the remarkably rapid 12-hour action of the United Nations in responding to the appeal from Laos and noted that a representative of the Philippine Government had been dispatched to Vientiane to keep it informed concerning developments. The Philippine Government favored a careful and continuing study of the Laotian situation by the Council Representatives in Bangkok.

The Ambassador took note of a statement by the President of the Philippines that the Philippine Government would honor its commitments under the Manila Treaty. He agreed with the comments of the Australian representative that there were two weapons, political and military, which could be used in the current situation. His Government strongly favored the policy of allowing the political weapon to be fully exploited and believed that the visit of the Secretary General to Vientiane should be deferred until the United Nations Subcommittee report had been received. He noted that his Government also favored a continuing United Nations presence in Laos and once again stressed the readiness of the Philippines to live up to its commitments under the Manila Treaty.

Mr. Khoman (Thailand) stated that the Thai Government would honor its commitments under the Manila Treaty, Article IV of which extends protection to Laos. It was his view, however, that the Secretary General could hardly fail to visit Vientiane as a logical consequence of his position in the SEATO organization, although the timing of such a visit must be considered. He believed that the Royal Government of Laos had showed commendable restraint in not immediately invoking the terms of the Manila Treaty, as it might have done. The Minister was of the opinion that the visit of the Secretary General to Vientiane must be considered in the light of SEATO commitments under the Treaty and believed that the timing of the visit should also be viewed in relation to the degree to which the United Nations Subcommittee has completed its work. Such a visit might also serve, in effect, to keep SEATO out of the Laotian picture by preventing an unforeseen or precipitate appeal to SEATO for aid. In any event, he thought it would be very bad if an invitation came to the SYG from Laos and it was not promptly accepted whatever the timing of the actual visit. He added that Thailand fully supported the United Nations action with regard to Laos, which his Government considered to have been most effective.

Mr. Khoman then observed that the situation in Laos might continue for a long time and that a United Nations Subcommittee and a personal representative of the SEATO Secretary General might well be able to operate side-by-side in Vientiane, there being a need for some form of relationship between SEATO and the United Nations on the Laotian problem. Every means available to SEATO in stabilizing the situation should be made use of and such a visit might tend to prevent the ultimate necessity for SEATO having to intervene. The usefulness of SEATO in stimulating action in the United Nations, should that become desirable, should also not be forgotten.

The Thai Minister then took strong exception to the thesis that the two northern provinces of Laos should be considered apart from the rest of the country, such a course not being recognized by the Manila Treaty; Thailand would abide fully by its commitments under that Treaty.

The British Ambassador⁷ commented that even though an election might be in progress in Britain, British signature on the Manila Treaty remains in force and Britain will abide by the commitments thus undertaken. He stated that the members of SEATO must see to it that the Government of Laos does not fall to the Communists, that the country is free to develop, but that such development should take place within the framework of the Geneva Agreements. It would be to the advantage of the Laotian Government if it would stay within these limits, since the Laotians acquired certain rights under Article IV, which among other things provided for the unity of their country. It would be well for Laos to avoid getting into a situation similar to that which developed in Malaya, where Communist insurgency had required the employment of 25,000 regular troops, 50,000 constabulary, and 520,000 home guard and where the direct cost had been on the order of $500 million, to say nothing of the indirect cost of moving large segments of the population and dislocating the internal order of the country.

The British Ambassador commented upon the problem of continuing the United Nations presence in Laos, stating that his Government thought a solution might be found in having a representative of the United Nations Secretary General sent there. This decision, however, did not appear to be needed until mid-October when the United Nations Subcommittee was evidently going to submit its report. The British Government was anxious for the Subcommittee to stay as long as it reasonably could and believed a hiatus must be avoided when the Subcommittee had terminated its immediate responsibilities in Laos. How such a hiatus was to be avoided would depend upon the members of the United Nations themselves and a big majority would be desirable in the General Assembly to deal with the problem.

Concerning the visit of the SEATO Secretary General to Vientiane, the Ambassador believed that he must accept if invited by the Royal Laotian Government. The British Government would, however, want to have a look at the matter of timing and would assume that the visit would be without publicity. The British, therefore, agreed in principle that such a visit should be made under these conditions but thought that it might be left to the Council Representatives to decide upon the timing. There might also be negative value in such a visit in the sense that it might tend to head-off an unwise request by the Laotian Government for SEATO intervention.

Mr. White agreed, in principle, with the statement of the British Ambassador and supported the view that the question of timing should be taken up in the Council Representatives.

Mr. Casey wondered whether it might not be desirable for some representative from one of the SEATO countries discreetly to suggest to Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone that there be private consultation with the Secretary General before the Royal Government of Laos were to issue him an invitation to make this visit. The Secretary inquired whether this might not appear to the Laotians as evidence of timidity on SEATO’s part. Mr. Casey replied that much might depend on how the matter was presented. He suggested that the Secretary General might consider sending a representative who could go to Vientiane quietly for the purpose of sounding out the situation.

The Thai Foreign Minister suggested that the various SEATO Chiefs of Mission in Vientiane could perhaps consult with the Government prior to an invitation being sent to the Secretary General. Mr. Parsons expressed concern that SEATO not be made to appear too discouraging or disinterested in the welfare of Laos by seeming to hesitate in the face of a desire on the part of the Laotian Government for the Secretary General to make a visit.

The Secretary General commented that it is not within the power of SEATO to regulate the actions of the Royal Government of Laos. While he was not necessarily in favor of being in Vientiane while the United Nations was also active on the scene, he would, at the same time, fear that the Royal Government of Laos might still act precipitately in appealing to SEATO and that his going there might be useful in forestalling such a move.

The Philippine Ambassador believed that SEATO should avoid crossing wires with the United Nations and that the timing of the Secretary General’s visit to Vientiane was therefore of importance. If the Council Representatives were to decide that the time for such a visit was right, the Philippine Government would support the Secretary General’s going to Vientiane. The French Foreign Minister considered it unlikely that, in the present circumstance, much was expected of SEATO by the Royal Laotian Government.

The Secretary General explained that, while he did not, at the moment, expect an invitation from Vientiane, it might come at any time and it might conceivably be related to the issuance of the report by the United Nations Subcommittee. The Secretary asked whether the Secretary General thought he should go to Vientiane as an investigator of the situation in Laos or merely in a representative capacity for SEATO. The Secretary General replied that there was need for SEATO to know at first hand the attitude of the Royal Government of Laos and how the general situation there might be developing.

The Pakistan Foreign Minister recalled that the Foreign Minister of Laos, Mr. Khamphan Panya, had recently passed through Karachi on his way to the General Assembly and had asked him whether SEATO would act if the Laotian Government appealed to it for help. The Pakistan Foreign Minister had replied that if the situation and the facts in Laos warranted, and if the other members of SEATO decided to act, Pakistan would support such action. The Laotian Foreign Minister had then assured the Pakistan Foreign Minister that it was not the intention of his Government to appeal to SEATO for the present.

Mr. Casey commented that Australia would live up to its SEATO commitments and noted that Australia was opening a full diplomatic mission in Vientiane. He urged that as many member Governments of SEATO as possible maintain diplomatic representation in Vientiane in order to keep in direct touch with the situation and to reassure the Laotians of their concern for that country’s welfare. The Secretary endorsed Mr. Casey’s suggestion of maintaining a permanent, or even perhaps a temporary, diplomatic representation in Laos.

The Secretary then summed up the consensus of the meeting by saying that if and when invited by the Royal Government of Laos, the SEATO Secretary General should accept the invitation. The Secretary General would, however, use his discretion as to the timing of his visit, taking into account the circumstances prevailing at the time, and keeping the Council Representatives informed. If, however, there were serious objection on the part of any member of SEATO to such a visit, the Secretary General would consult the Council Representatives. Such consultation might also relate to the timing of the visit. It might be possible to determine from the tone of the invitation whether its motivation was inspired by panic or other precipitate ill-advised action or whether it was based upon more normal considerations.

Engineering School

The Secretary General noted that the SEATO Graduate School of Engineering had opened in Bangkok on September 8 and he hoped that the French, Pakistan and other member Governments could support the institution by providing professorial assistance.

Communiqué

The Secretary placed before the Council members a draft communiqué which was then agreed upon, with minor changes, and issued after the conclusion of the meeting. The text of this communiqué follows:

[Here follows the text of the communiqué which was released the same day; see Department of State Bulletin, October 19, 1959, page 565.]

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Emmons and approved by G. Frederick Reinhardt on October 14. The full text is included in the microfiche supplement.
2. Khamphan Panya.
3. Thanat Khoman.
4. G.D.L. White, Chargé d’Affaires of the New Zealand Embassy.
5. Manzur Qadir.
6. Carlos P. Romulo.
7. Sir Harold Caccia.