49. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1

822. Department telegram 746.2 Separate Top Secret message being sent today gives details on very satisfactory progress made by Military Advisers on MPO Plan 5B and remaining action now required of Council Representatives.3 (Delay in transmitting that message occasioned by necessity coordination between myself and Admiral Felt who had to depart for Saigon before draft completed.) As will be seen from that message Plan 5B with modifications was approved by Military Advisers. Action included listing of forces “which might be made available” from all eight countries. While not formal and final governmental commitment such action is strong moral commitment and presumably made under instructions in each case. For most part offers were substantial. UK, New Zealand and Australia offered one infantry battalion each to form brigade group to provide own transportation and logistic support and to start arriving D plus two. France offered one infantry battalion but requires some transport and logistic support. Thailand one infantry battalion fully supported; will increase to one [Page 145] RCT if US provides needed additional support. Pakistan one brigade group available within three weeks request, but “subject US-Pakistan bilateral agreement on transportation and support”. Philippines engineer and ordnance units but no combat forces. All except France and Philippines also offered air units.

This substantial progress Military Advisers together with agreement yesterday on Council Representatives communiqué4 represents encouraging advance by SEATO. However, must recognize major differences remain unresolved. That is, at least France, UK and New Zealand apparently would not be willing consider implementing Plan 5B unless and until there is clear “proof” of overt invasion by Viet Minh forces. Thailand would not act until after fall Phong Saly and Sam Neua. Question is what is to be done if UN restraints fail and, as in this event is most likely, without overt Viet Minh invasion, hold of RLG weakened by PL action supported from North Vietnam to point coalition government or take-over by PL seems probable. While we can hope UN action will continue prove effective and give us time strengthen RLG, this latter situation is one most likely to face SEATO if UN action not effective and SEATO is far from agreement as to what it would do in this eventuality.

Johnson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2759. Top Secret; Priority; SEATO. Repeated priority to CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. In telegram 746, September 25, the Department requested an analysis of the 11th Meeting of the SEATO Military Advisers, which concluded on September 24.
  3. Reference is to telegram 821 from Bangkok, dated September 25 but apparently sent later. In it, Johnson reported that the Military Advisers had agreed on a draft of the directive mentioned in paragraph 14 of MPO Plan 5B/59 (see footnote 5, Document 38) to be forwarded to the Council Representatives for approval. Johnson also reported that subsequent to the Military Advisers’ meeting, which had decided to defer any recommendation of an “appointed nation,” he had met with Admiral Felt and Horace Smith, Ambassador to Laos. Their joint recommendation was that the United States should support Thailand as the “appointed nation,” a Thai officer as commander of any SEATO force, and a U.S. officer to command any field force. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2359; included in the microfiche supplement) In telegram 791 to Bangkok, October 1, the Department approved this recommendation with the stipulation that agreement be negotiated on a “contingent command structure only.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/10–159)

    Additional information on the Military Advisers meeting is in CINCPAC message 270730Z to JCS, DA IN 249622, September 28. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up; included in the microfiche supplement)

  4. The communiqué of the Military Advisers meeting, dated September 24, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 19, 1959, p. 564. A communiqué of the Council Representatives meeting is ibid.