Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

48. National Security Council Report¹

NSC 5913/1

Washington, September 25, 1959.

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY IN THE FAR EAST

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5429/5
• B. NIE 13-59
• C. NSC 5913
• D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 15, 1959
• E. NSC Action No. 2128

The National Security Council, Mr. Julian B. Baird, for the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 419th Council meeting on September 17, 1959, adopted the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5913, subject to the amendments set forth in NSC Action No. 2128–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5913, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5913/1; directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; and designates the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

A “Summary Tabulation of Expenditures in the Far East” is also enclosed for the information of the Council.

The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5429/5.

James S. Lay, Jr.²

Enclosure

STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY IN THE FAR EAST³

General Considerations

1. The primary problem confronting U.S. policy in the Far East is to cope with the growing threat to Free World security posed by increasing Communist power in Asia. There has been a basic trend over the past five years toward a stabilization of the line of demarcation between Communist and non-Communist Asia and toward an intensified awareness in the free Far Eastern countries of the nature of the Communist threat. But at the same time the power of Communist China backed by the USSR has increased rapidly and continued increases in this power must be expected. One factor of major significance in this connection is the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be based in Communist China some time before 1963, though almost certainly under Soviet custody.

2. Our planning must assume that for the predictable future the Peiping regime will continue to exercise effective control over mainland China, that its military and economic strength and its resultant power position in Asia will continue to increase, and that despite likely frictions the Sino-Soviet alliance will hold firm. On the other hand, Communist China will undoubtedly encounter severe strains, dislocations, and setbacks in its efforts to deal with the problems confronting it. Its underfed and overworked population has been subjected to the highest degree of regimentation seen in modern times, with resultant extensive bitterness toward the regime. Moreover, the ruthless character and aggressiveness which the Chinese Communist regime has displayed in domestic programs, in the Tibetan situation, and in foreign policy have increased apprehension in Asia of Communist China’s strength and intentions, and much of the admiration and sympathy which it enjoyed has been lost. However, these problems are unlikely to prevent it from posing a growing threat to Free World security over the next five years.

3. A major contributory source of the danger we face in the Far East derives from the rate of Chinese Communist economic growth. This growth makes a real contribution to Bloc economic and military power. The likelihood that Communist China will continue to outstrip the rate of growth of free Asian countries, with the possible exception of Japan, is also having considerable impact on the attitudes of non-Communist Asian countries, although it may be offset in some measure by growing recognition of the human costs involved in the Chinese Communist experiment and of China’s continuing failure to satisfy even the basic requirements of her population. These factors underline the importance of steady economic growth and political and social stability in non-Communist Asia, if it is not to succumb to Communist pressures or lures. However, economic growth cannot be emphasized to the detriment of adequate security measures, for, without security and the stability and confidence deriving from security, real economic progress will be unattainable.

4. The weakness and instability of various non-Communist Far East countries—including in some instances a lack of popular identification with the regime in power—engendered by the area’s incomplete political, social and economic revolutions, are major handicaps in meeting the Communist threat. Despite some progress toward remedying this weakness and instability, these handicaps are unlikely to be overcome within the next few years. Moreover, deep-seated antagonisms and differing assessments as to how to meet the threat continue to divide the countries of the area and severely hamper efforts to combine their collective resources for their own defense and welfare. These factors will continue to provide opportunities for Communist exploitation, both internally and externally.

5. This vulnerability of the non-Communist Far East, particularly the imbalance between Communist and indigenous non-Communist power in the area, causes the area to be heavily dependent on the United States and has made a countervailing U.S. presence there indispensable. This U.S. presence, together with local attitudes and efforts, has improved Free World capabilities to cope with the Communist threat and has sufficed to stabilize the line of demarcation between Communist and non-Communist Asia over the last five years.

6. With Asian Communist strength continuing to grow, it is clear that the maintenance of this line of demarcation will require a strong countervailing U.S. presence in the area for many years, including the provision of sufficient U.S. aid and support—as well as a firm determination on the part of the Free Far East states to maintain their independence.

7. Asian nationalism, a dominant force which is directed toward the preservation of national independence and against those who are seen as trying to subvert or abridge independence, is tending increasingly to be a source of strength rather than weakness for the Free World position in the Far East. This nationalism has in the past had an anti-colonial and anti-Western focus. To a considerable extent this focus continues and there is still considerable lack of popular understanding in the area regarding Communism. However, there is increasing recognition, particularly among responsible leaders, of the nature of the Communist menace to national independence and ways of life, and there is increasing determination and capacity to resist Communist encroachments. Thus, as anti-colonial and anti-Western attitudes gradually fade, Communist China is tending to emerge in the minds of Asians as the greatest threat to free Asian nationalist aspirations, and concomitantly the image of the United States is improving. However, increased awareness of the Communist threat may not in itself produce greater capacity to resist. Herein lies the core of the problem for the United States.

8. In the effort to build up greater non-Communist strength in Asia, particular consideration must be given to the key roles which can be played by Japan and India as two free Asian countries with major power potentials. Neither of these countries would have the strength to serve alone as a counterweight to Communist China, but together, in coordination with other Free World countries, they could help balance effectively Peiping’s growing power. Moreover, the national interests of these two countries will probably tend increasingly to come into conflict with the expansionist tendencies of Peiping. Their resources, properly employed, could greatly complement U.S. power in stabilizing the power balance in the Far East. This potential underlines the importance of the achievement by Japan and India of stronger power positions and of persuading them to exert their influence, in ways compatible with U.S. interests, toward enabling the weaker countries around the periphery of Communist Asia to counter Communist expansionist and subversive pressures. Japan is already making significant contributions to the economic development of South and Southeast Asia.

9. Since the Communist regime in China is unlikely to be replaced in the foreseeable future and since it is unlikely to be alienated from the Soviet Union, the principal means for dealing with the threat it poses is by helping to build up the political and economic strength and stability of free Asia, while maintaining an adequate over-all Free World military posture. At the same time, we must be prepared to exploit any opportunities which may occur to retard the growth and extension of Chinese Communist power and influence and to place strains on Sino-Soviet relations.

Objectives

10. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of the Free World countries and other Free World areas against further Communist expansion or subversion.

11. a. Strong, stable, free Far East nations, which are determined to maintain their independence.

b. Evolutionary development of democratic governments supported by stable political, economic and social institutions.

12. Eventual reunification under free governments of the divided countries of the area.

13. Development of conditions which in time are likely to be conducive to bringing about acceptable changes in the character, policies and actions of Asian Communist regimes and to permitting settlement of issues on terms compatible with U.S. security interests.

14. a. Retardation of the growth of and, to the extent feasible, reduction of the power of, Asian Communist regimes, especially Communist China.

b. Reduction of the prestige of Asian Communist regimes, especially Communist China.

15. The weakening of the ties that link the Sino-Soviet bloc.

16. Development of political, economic and social forces in the Far East which will advance Free World unity, Free World and regional cooperation, and common purposes in the area.

17. Identification of the United States with the maintenance of national independence, the promotion of human values, and improvement of conditions of life as goals of free Asian nations and peoples, and recognition by Free World nations of the Far East that these goals, taken together, can only be realized within the Free World.

Policy Guidance

General

18. Give firm support to the free governments of the area in their efforts to maintain their territorial and political integrity against aggression or subversion by the Communists.

19. Insure a strong U.S. position in the area in terms of both power and prestige.

20. In accordance with measures set forth below, strengthen the economic, political and military position of free Far East nations.

Political

21. a. Promote the tenure and standing of friendly governments which are striving earnestly for economic, political and social advancement.

b. While seeking as feasible to achieve our long-range aim of encouraging democratic growth, especially respect for basic human rights, encourage strong, stable governments which have popular support and are best suited to the current requirements of various countries, taking into account their traditions, circumstances and capabilities.

22. Show respect and understanding for the foreign policy position of any free Far Eastern country, whether allied or neutral, provided that country is striving to defend and strengthen its independence.

23. Seek to allay animosities among various free Far Eastern countries, urging moderation and mutual respect between parties to disputes and taking an active role where that would serve our general interests.

24. Employ all feasible means to prevent free Far Eastern countries and territories from falling under Communist control by overt armed attack, subversion, economic domination, or other means, including as necessary and appropriate:

a. Concerting action with other nations;

b. Carrying out U.S. obligations under applicable security treaties;

d. The use of U.S. armed forces in accordance with constitutional processes.

25. Continue to seek and utilize appropriate means to bring about better understanding by the Free World nations of the Far East as to the importance of nuclear weapons in effectively deterring war and as to the need for their prompt and selective use when required.

26. Stress to host governments the importance to them of the presence of U.S. forces on their territories. When host countries seek adjustments in arrangements governing the stationing of our forces, respond promptly, and to the extent feasible negotiate appropriate adjustments.

27. Continue to refuse recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and other Asian Communist regimes and avoid actions which might contribute to their international standing and prestige. Continue to oppose the seating of any of these regimes in the United Nations, its agencies, or other international organizations.

28. Continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government of China and its right to represent China in the United Nations, its agencies and other international organizations; seek to obtain increasing international support for the GRC and otherwise take steps to maintain and advance its international standing.

29. If any specific issues arise in our relationships with unrecognized Communist regimes where efforts at negotiation of these issues would seem to produce a net advantage to the United States, be prepared to negotiate such issues without implying recognition of such regimes.

30. Continue present restrictive policies on travel of Americans to Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam except where such travel will further U.S. national interests and the objectives set forth in this policy.

[Numbered paragraph 31 (8 lines of source text) not declassified]

32. Encourage regional and Free World cooperation advantageous to U.S. objectives through such measures as appropriate support of the Colombo Plan, ECAFE, and regional undertakings such as the Mekong Valley Project and the Southeast Asian telecommunications network.

33. The United States should not allow the attitudes and emotions of European countries to influence unduly actions considered essential to attaining or preserving U.S. objectives in the Far East.

Military

34. Ensure a strong U.S. military position in the West Pacific area as clear evidence of U.S. capability and intent effectively to fulfill all of our treaty commitments in the Far East, and be determined and show our determination to use military power as may be necessary to protect our allies and friends from Communist aggression.

35. Promote and strengthen our multilateral (SEATO, ANZUS) and bilateral (with Korea, GRC, Japan and the Philippines) defense arrangements in the West Pacific and develop wider understanding of common purposes among all our allies and other friends in the Far East.

36. a. Through military and support assistance and other measures, support to the extent practicable and necessary in the interests of U.S. security the maintenance by free Asian states, requesting such support, of military forces which (1) are capable of maintaining internal security and of identifying and delaying Communist aggression and which (2) together with U.S. and other allied military power are capable of coping with, and thereby deterring, Communist aggression.

b. Also be prepared to provide limited military assistance to selected free Asian nations which are demonstrating a willingness to defend and strengthen their independence, in order (1) to influence such nations toward a Free World alignment, or (2) to seek to prevent them from falling within the Communist sphere of influence.

37. a. Except under circumstances approved by the President, do not agree to GRC, ROK or GVN offensive actions against Communist territory.

b. Under circumstances approved by the President, agree to actions by the GRC, ROK or GVN against Communist China, North Korea, and North Vietnam which are prompt and clear retaliation against a Communist attack, provided such retaliation is against targets of military significance which meet U. S. criteria as to feasibility and chance of success and which are selected with due consideration for the risk of provoking heavy Communist reaction against free Asian countries.

38. a. In the event of unprovoked Communist armed attack against U.S. military or non-military personnel, aircraft, or vessels outside Communist territory, U.S. forces in the area will take against the Communist attacking force during the course of the attack aggressive protective measures, including if necessary and feasible, immediate pursuit of the Communist attacking force into hostile airspace or waters.

b. In addition to the action directed in a above, and as constitutionally authorized and specifically approved by the President, take such additional punitive action as may be necessary and appropriate.

Economic

39. Vigorously support and encourage sound economic growth and development in the less developed areas of the Far East in order to strengthen their orientation toward the Free World and to assist the governments of the areas in their efforts to give their peoples a sense of present progress and future hope and to strengthen their orientation toward the Free World. Make U.S. public capital available in adequate amounts on a long-term basis for the purpose of supplementing the capital available from other sources for sound economic development in less developed areas. Continue to emphasize U.S. technical assistance programs.

40. a. In supporting and encouraging sound economic development in the less developed nations of the Far East, do not encourage aspirations for economic development in excess of economic capabilities, or unrealistic expectations of external economic assistance, and accordingly seek to support economic actions which are within the limits of practical realities.

b. While recognizing that the basic initiative as well as the primary responsibility for economic growth, and for providing the bulk of the resources required for development, must remain with the less developed nations themselves, continue the present vigorous U.S. effort in the less developed areas of the Far East.

c. Avoid giving the impression that the United States is guaranteeing or underwriting the achievement of specific rates of economic growth or the fulfillment of over-all economic targets in less developed countries.

41. Emphasize the broader objectives of economic development which include enhancement of the dignity of the individual and the preservation of human freedoms as well as the defeat of poverty, disease and undernourishment.

42. In the administration of U.S. bilateral aid programs give due weight to the advantages of (a) impact-type projects, and (b) projects which would make a significant contribution toward closer cooperation among the free nations of the Far East and between those nations and the rest of the Free World.

43. Continue, to the fullest extent practicable and taking into account all relevant economic and political considerations, to utilize U.S. assistance so as to promote and encourage private enterprise in the less developed countries of the Far East.

44. Utilize and support the efforts of Free World international institutions to the maximum extent possible to promote economic development and to bring about economic reforms in the less developed nations of the Far East.

45. Consider the channeling of some development assistance through regional development programs in the Far East if the governments concerned clearly manifest a desire for such regional programs and are willing to join in their financial support, and if such programs appear to offer real advantages over bilateral programs. However, do not become a member of any regional financing institution in the area.

46. a. Encourage free industrialized nations, including Japan and Australia, to contribute to promoting sound economic growth in the less developed nations of the Far East by facilitating the movement of private capital and by supplying public capital.

b. Encourage U.S. private industries and foundations to participate increasingly in providing investment capital and technical know-how required for economic growth of free Far Eastern nations, especially the less developed countries.

c. Encourage governments of individual less developed nations to follow policies and develop institutional arrangements which would facilitate mobilization of local capital for domestic economic development and would promote both domestic and foreign private investment.

d. Encourage less developed nations to undertake desirable political, economic, and social reforms, to help remove some of the obstacles to economic development.

47. a. Wherever feasible without creating antagonism in Free World nations toward the United States, encourage those nations of the Far East which are particularly vulnerable to Communist subversion to minimize their political and cultural contacts with the Sino-Soviet bloc to avoid extensive use of Sino-Soviet bloc technicians, and to limit other Sino-Soviet bloc economic contacts to those required for the conduct of such trade and economic aid programs as they consider it advisable to accept.

b. Encourage free Far East countries to orient their economies toward the Free World and to rely primarily on non-Communist markets and sources of supply for trade, technicians, capital development and atomic development. Make the less developed nations fully aware of the opportunities open to them to achieve economic progress through expanding trade with the United States and the rest of the Free World, through private capital and through the effective utilization of the economic and technical assistance offered by the United States and other Free World nations.

c. Alert less developed nations to the probability that the Sino-Soviet bloc will attempt to utilize trade and assistance programs as a technique for political subversion. However, recognizing that a number of less developed nations can be expected to trade with and accept economic assistance from the bloc whenever it appears to be economically or politically advantageous to them, maintain a flexible posture which seeks to minimize damage to U.S. prestige in the event of acceptance by less developed nations of the area of economic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

d. In general, avoid attempts to counter each and every move in the Sino-Soviet bloc offensive. However, such measures as may be feasible in particular circumstances (including in very exceptional cases only direct actions in aid or trade taken specifically for this purpose) may be taken to discourage less developed nations from: (1) accepting Sino-Soviet bloc aid in certain particularly sensitive fields of a kind or on terms which would be damaging to their security, and (2) engaging in trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc at levels sufficient to create undue economic dependence on the bloc, or on terms or under conditions seriously prejudicial to U.S. interests.

48. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of free Far Eastern countries for trade with each other and with the United States and other Free World countries, having due regard for national security and total national advantage and taking into account the impact on our foreign policy objectives (especially the collective security effort) of any proposed actions which would adversely affect imports from friendly countries.

49. Conduct the disposal of U.S. surplus agricultural products abroad so as to be consistent with and give support to our foreign policy objectives and to avoid material injury to the trade of friendly nations.

50. Make a special, sustained effort to promote the education of an expanding number of technically competent non-Communist civilian and military leaders; and stress the importance of developing adequate managerial and executive skills.

51. a. Continue to apply U.S. financial controls against, and an embargo on trade with, Communist China and North Korea, and an embargo on exports to North Viet Nam.

b. Urge other Free World countries to maintain the current level of multilateral export controls on trade with Communist China, North Korea and North Viet Nam. In support of this effort, without frustrating the multilateral embargo program, endeavor to handle questions of routine exceptions in such manner as to preserve and foster the willingness of other countries to retain the present level of controls. Seek bilaterally to encourage individual Free World countries, wherever clearly feasible and desirable from a foreign policy standpoint, to maintain unilateral controls toward Communist China at a more restrictive level than the multilateral controls.

Information and Cultural

52. a. Operate informational, cultural and exchange programs at levels adequate to support U.S. objectives in the area, strengthening them if necessary.

b. Make a special effort to include in such programs influential individuals who might be weaned away from pro-bloc sympathies.

c. Seek, by appropriate means, utilizing Asians to the greatest extent feasible, to (1) increase the understanding and orientation of Asian peoples toward the Free World and (2) convince them of the American economic and military capability to preserve security within the area in concert with other free nations; (3) build confidence in American Free World leadership through appropriate interpretation of the character and institutions of American civilization; and (4) expose the menace of Chinese Communist imperialism and world Communism pointing out to Asian peoples that their self interest, welfare and freedom will be furthered by opposition to Communism.

d. In our determined efforts to oppose Communist aggression and expansion, take care to emphasize to Asians that we stand for positive constructive actions and objectives and that we are animated by a desire to further the interests, welfare and freedom of the Asian people themselves.

Other

53. Special attention should be paid to the key roles which Japan and India can play in contributing to greater non-Communist strength in the Far East, and they should be encouraged to assert their influence toward countering the outward thrust of Communist power in ways compatible with U.S. interests and the interests of other Free World countries.

54. Seek to induce selected industrialized nations of Western Europe and other Free World countries to increase their contributions to the security and progress of the non-Communist areas of the Far East.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5913 Series. Secret. An attached summary tabulation of expenditures, not printed here, is included in the microfiche supplement.
2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
3. Includes Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, the Philippines, Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Sarawak, North Borneo, New Guinea, Brunei, Timor, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Communist China, North Korea, North Viet Nam. It also takes cognizance of the importance of India to the Far East. [Footnote in the source text.]