Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

47. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, September 23, 1959—6 p.m.

1586. Reference: Department telegram 2350² addressees. Embassy officer saw Assistant Under Secretary Superintending Far Eastern Departments (MacDermot) at first opportunity morning September 23 and made representations as instructed reference telegram.

MacDermot said Foreign Office had raised questions about MPO Plan 5B/59 with unfortunately belated timing because UK Council representative Bangkok had asked for urgent instructions on those points. However, when De la Mare had communicated Department’s objections to Foreign Office by telephone right after discussion in Department, Foreign Office had sent UK representative Bangkok instructions to agree that planning should proceed provided realistic force commitments specified by US and others.³UK representative should record, however, UK reservations relating to special UK position on Laos because of Geneva agreements “which UK considers still binding.” (Bangkok telegram 779 to Department⁴ received after Embassy officer’s call at Foreign Office corroborates foregoing.) MacDermot said UK can not bind itself to enter Laos in circumstances which would compromise its obligation under Geneva agreements, but Foreign Office confident that SEATO would not in practice do anything which would present such difficulty. What Foreign Office is more concerned about is security of discussions of military planning by Council representatives. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] This need not inhibit advanced planning discussions by military advisers or between those members of SEATO “like ourselves who would do most of work anyway,” MacDermot said.

Foreign Office had received report of military advisers meeting September 22. MacDermot indicated Foreign Office pleased with fact Admiral Felt had laid forth specifics of forces US would commit under contingency plan. Foreign Office also pleased to note that Admiral Felt had acknowledged his understanding and acceptance of UK reservations based on its unique position relative to Laos under Geneva agreements.

MacDermot asserted there was no doubt that SEATO forces would go into Laos if situation demanded [2½ lines of source text not declassified].

During discussion MacDermot also mentioned that as result Lloyd–Herter agreeing it desirable there be some UN presence in Laos following UN sub-committee, Foreign Office is trying to think up some device which has good chance of either winning Security Council approval or making Soviets look bad if they object. He said none had yet been found, but he thought it should be possible to devise one. He assumed Department also trying to find answer to what comes after sub-committee.

Comment: We feel that Foreign Office concern that UK may be compromised by untimely leak or otherwise about plan to commit forces to SEATO intervention Laos [2 line of source text not declassified] is expression of essentially undimmed British desire to get back to some kind of modus vivendi in Laos such as Geneva agreements provided for and which in Foreign Office view is only really practical protection for Laos. We think De la Mare’s approach on British reservations to committing its forces under plan may in fact have been “floating upwards” from working level of ideas expressed to Embassy officer September 15 (Embassy telegram 1428 to Department, sent Vientiane 42, Bangkok 19, CINCPAC 32, USUN 23).⁵

Another Foreign Office concern which we have noted which we think may help explain British reservations on MPO Plan 5B/59 has now apparently been dispelled by Admiral Felt’s specifying US forces for plan. We understand British concern was not only that there might be leak about plan to use Commonwealth brigade Malaya, but that there might be resulting problem with Malaya under UK–Malaya defense agreement.

Although we have no specific evidence, we feel sure that HMG also anxious to avoid if possible during current election campaign any public disclosures or discussion of possible use of UK forces under SEATO in Laos.

Perhaps even deeper motive for Foreign Office and, indeed, HMG concern over some disclosure commitment UK forces to SEATO plan for Laos is pervading thought it might well trigger even greater Communist effort in Laos.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2359. Top Secret; Priority; SEATO; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, Karachi, Vientiane, Wellington, CINCPAC for POLAD, and USUN.
2. Supra.
3. This decision was reported to Eisenhower: “UK to join limited SEATO planning. While retaining reservations on some of the political assumptions, the UK has agreed to go forward with SEATO planning regarding Laos. The planning remains completely subject to political decision and does not constitute a political commitment.” (“Synopsis of Intelligence Items Reported to the President” by Goodpaster, September 24; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)
4. Dated September 22. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2259)
5. Not printed.