Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

46. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, September 21, 1959—10:30 p.m.

2350. British Embassy (De la Mare) today informed us (Green) U.K. considers present MPO Plan 5B/59² “unrealistic” on two principal grounds: 1) definition of Communist insurgency in paragraph 1 is faulty in that SEATO intervention under circumstances described would not have necessary degree of world support, and 2) present plan does not spell out realistic force contributions on part of U.S. and other members. Unless U.S. perceived objection U.K. Military Adviser instructed to recommend that definition of Communist insurgency be referred back to Council Representatives. U.K. Council Representative would then propose at special September 22 meeting that present version “Armed action against established Government of country by organized bands or groups, responsive in varying degrees to covert foreign control, direction or support, under conditions which do not permit such action to be identified as external aggression” be changed to read “Armed attack against established government of country by organized bands or groups subject to such a degree of foreign direction, support or control as to amount to aggression.”

British [3½ lines of source text not declassified] fear leak and believe this would be particularly embarrassing if it known that SEATO has plan for intervention which not based on countering external aggression.

We registered strong concern about this last minute proposal for redefinition of Communist insurgency arguing along following lines: 1) proposal may have effect of delaying planning which we believe should be advanced into readiness stage at once, 2) it may be interpreted by Asian members as indication that one or more Western members not prepared live up to Treaty commitments when faced with actual situation that might require action, and 3) redefinition proposal might leak, causing anxiety to RLG and encouraging Communists to greater activity in psychological warfare and other areas short of provable aggression.

Our foregoing objections based on our understanding British position based more on legal and public relations considerations than on question of substance. If, however, effect of their proposal would be to require hard proof of outside support of an insurrection when only strong circumstantial evidence available we feel this would be conceding too great an advantage to Communists. Laos has great strategic importance and its loss through internal subversion supported only covertly from without would be extremely serious blow to free world. Moreover, whereas British seem only concerned about effect of leaks on world opinion we emphasized possibility that leaks may serve to invite Communists to seek loopholes in our defenses and pursue courses they would not undertake in face of determined SEATO stand.

We questioned why British had raised this issue on very eve of key SEATO meetings. De la Mare claimed British have indicated in past they had reservations about definition but acknowledged they never made big issue of it. He was apologetic and embarrassed re timing of this British move. We suggested that if British could not see way clear to accept MPO 5B/59 definition of insurgency, then U.K. might merely record reservations on definition and allow planning to progress. We argued that contingency plan could not be implemented automatically but only after political decision by member governments.

Re commitment of forces we told British we feel it is time to advance planning in this and other areas cited paragraph 14 of plan³ and our Military Adviser has been appropriately instructed.

In conclusion we reemphasized that whatever course of action British decided to take in premises, we believe it should be responsive to imperative need to get forward immediately with a practical SEATO plan of action for meeting contingencies in Laos.

For Bangkok: Ambassador Johnson should take this question up immediately with British colleague with view to preventing any disruptions or delays in SEATO emergency planning.

For London: Same approach to U.K. Foreign Office recommended.

For Wellington: Consider foregoing reply to your 100 and 105 which just received.⁴

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2159. Top Secret; Priority; Seato; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Howard D. Jones and Marshall Green in FE and approved by Robert Murphy. Also sent niact to Bangkok and Wellington and repeated to Canberra, Karachi, Manila, Paris, Vientiane, CINCPAC for POLAD, and USUN.
2. See footnote 4, Document 37.
3. See footnote 5, Document 38.
4. In telegram 100 from Wellington, September 21, Ambassador Russell reported that Prime Minister Nash was disturbed about the definition of Communist insurgency in MPO 5B/59. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2159; included in the microfiche supplement) In telegram 106, September 21, Russell described his discussions with the U.K. High Commissioner in Wellington regarding the British position on SEATO planning. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–2159)