Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

461. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 19, 1960—2:38 p.m.

530. Bangkok’s 874.²

1. Approve your plan with additions as follows and with exception pay issue which will be subject another message:

2. To Phoumi. Corcoran should return to Savannakhet immediately and renew efforts to persuade Phoumi to our views.

a. Reemphasize growing isolation of Souvanna and need to bring about rapid, legal and if possible peaceful transition to new government. Revolutionary government might enhance position of Souvanna government by contrast with latter’s constitutional status including his ability obtain international support. Remind PhoumiUS itself would then find it perhaps impossible support him.

b. Transition can be brought about by Assembly vote and/or resignation of Souvanna. Pressures should therefore be built up to hold Assembly meeting in Luang Prabang.

c. To emphasize isolation of Souvanna and to develop pressures, greatest need of close liaison with deputies and officers in Vientiane and King and officers in Luang Prabang. (He might more usefully use Ouane for this purpose.) If peaceful transition fails for whatever reason, coordination of entire Army will be of crucial importance. If Phoumi fails to unify Army, it doubtful he can succeed against united PL.

d. Since Assembly key to peaceful transition, Phoumi will be well advised to give Somsanith positive answer to induce him come with his delegation. Phoumi might then be able persuade them go to Luang Prabang to urge on King calling meeting in royal capital. Somsanith might be particularly amenable this idea if Phoumi shows himself conciliatory.

3. To Phoui. We have no report of Phoui’s reaction to our plan Deptel 517.³ Should in particular be encouraged to: a) press King take positive action and at least call Assembly meeting Luang Prabang pointing out to him extent to which Souvanna is collaborating with PL and rapidly accelerating pace of his appeasement of Communist bloc; b) invite deputies over whom he has influence to come Luang Prabang even without summons King (e.g. Peng Norinder in France); c) do his utmost to develop and strengthen liaison with Vientiane and Savannakhet.

4. You should by whatever means possible win over Kouprasith and promote unity of Vientiane officers to be prepared defend capital against PL. You should also help establish liaison between selected officers and Savannakhet and Luang Prabang.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1860. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman and cleared by SEA and with the Department of Defense and Merchant in substance. Repeated niact to Bangkok and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 874, November 18, Johnson reported that discussions with Brown, Admiral Felt, and Admiral Wellings had produced a plan to let the pressures mount on Souvanna for a few days and to confine U.S. action to making identical approaches to Phoumi, Phoui, and the King to replace Souvanna with a legal government which the United States could support. (ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Document 457.