Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, October 22, 1960—4:45 p.m.

444. Joint State/Defense message. Bangkok’s 716.² While agree that for first time in many weeks there are indications some forward progress being made toward stabilization situation, we fearful that this could at any moment be upset either by increased Kong Le group control over Souvanna’s conduct of negotiations with Pathet Lao or by Kong Le group move to take over government by another coup. Our use here of term Kong Le group is intended to encompass whole ominous combination of Kong Le and his second paratroop battalion working in conjunction with Quinim and Pathet Lao.

Since it now appears Souvanna does not intend move government to Luang Prabang it becomes doubly important eliminate Kong Le influence Vientiane.

We realize you may well consider it inadvisable make further démarche to Souvanna just now, while availing ourselves his agreement to supply all elements FAL. However, believe we must ask you at earliest date to approach Souvanna to impress upon him grave seriousness of this matter.

Meanwhile, we have been studying various possible approaches to problem of reducing or eliminating the Kong Le threat. Would appreciate your early reactions and recommendations on each of following possibilities:

A. Force (by RLG)

1. Approach

a. Obviously to advantage of RLG to make clear Souvanna is master in his own house.

b. Would do much to reassure Ouan, Houmphan and Savannakhet forces that Souvanna is acting in what all consider to be best interests of Laos.

c. US Govt, is in difficult position of justifying aid to RLG as long as the image of Kong Le domination remains. (Amb. has previously pointed out circumstances leading to this widespread conclusion. Purely nominal nature of Kong Le “arrest” and apparent dispatch of new military attachés without reference to Min. of Defense only reinforce this image.)

d. No government can be expected to function well in capital which lives in state of apprehension.

e. Clear that King mistrusts Kong Le.

f. Therefore apparent Souvanna must apply whatever force is necessary to establish himself as free of coercion by a junior officer.

g. Fortunately, careful planning for use of resources at his disposal now permits him to act from a position of strength.

2. Technique

a. Companies of 2nd para. battalion must be placed under officers loyal to Ouan, Houmphan or Phoumi and ordered to separate posts well away from Vientiane.

b. Kong Le and Lt. Duane must be ordered out of country—to school or other mission in non-Communist country.

c. If Kong Le refused to accept above orders, as seems probable, Souvanna must order all troops loyal to RLG to cooperate in taking control of Vientiane, and must appeal to the personnel of the 2nd para, battalion not to oppose government they were instrumental in instituting.

3. Execution

a. Prior to embarking upon above course agreement must be obtained in secrecy for use of forces loyal to Ouan, Houmphan and Phoumi which can be spared from present locations to be rapidly concentrated with use of contract and Laos aircraft to move into Vientiane and take over control—attacking 2nd para. battalion only if unable to persuade them not to resist. Pathet Lao forces can be expected to fight and to try to get 2nd para. battalion to fight. PL must be ruthlessly dealt with if they do this. If they should not, those who do not flee must be rounded up as part of measures for control of Vientiane.

b. Careful planning and timing are essence of execution, plan should first be drawn by CHPEO, closely guarded and concurrence by all necessary echelons sought in manner and with timing best calculated by Country Team to secure results.

4. Timing

a. Considered essential not to upset precarious arrangement under which we now supplying anti-Communist forces. Execution should therefore be planned to take advantage of maximum input of material which can be effectively utilized in operations.

b. On other hand considered of vital importance to be rid of Kong Le influence as soon as practicable. Planning should therefore be undertaken at once at aim of implementing as soon as objective of above paragraph is realized.

B. Some additional ideas that might be considered for implementation by Country Team are as follows:

1. Use of carrot rather than stick. Presumably this would not be successful in view Kong Le’s reported dedication to pro-Commie course ([document number not declassified]).³

2. Persuasion. Attempt direct approach to him to persuade him that his aims can be accomplished by loyalty to new government and that he is being duped by Communist elements in league with Pathet Lao. Recognize this not likely to produce results but possibly could be used in conjunction with other actions to partly neutralize or at least confuse him.

Note: This line of action could of course be undertaken at any time without upsetting present delicate balance of agreement with Souvanna.

3. Maneuver. Seek to render his position harmless. There are several possible ways which might be pursued but now [none?] appears to offer anything except hope:

a. Convince a substantial portion of his battalion that Kong Le is being used by the Communists.

b. Continue to seek statements and other evidence of support for strong line against PL by all other FAL units with intention of demonstrating isolation of 2nd para. battalion.

c. Assigning substantial portion of battalion out of Vientiane on one or another pretext, and gradually moving in a sufficient number of troops loyal to Ouan, Houmphan and/or Phoumi so as to negate apparent control of capital by 2nd para. battalion.

4. Seek to get strong and united appeal from all respected FAL commanders to the effect that although original motives of 2nd para. battalion were understandable, they have now been led astray and are hurting their country and the FAL.

5. Gradual break-up of 2nd para. battalion by piecemeal movement of companies to other areas to meet requirements of RLG.

Might be noted here that it is continuing role of Kong Le and 2nd para. battalion in prolonging Lao crisis and endangering US position and objectives there which has caused us reconsider our position on US pay for Kong Le troops. We stand in very vulnerable position in this issue here and it is for that reason we have decided we must pursue line indicated para 2 Deptel 442.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–3160. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Usher and Colonel McCrea of the Department of Defense and cleared by SEA and Steeves. Repeated to Bangkok and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 716, October 22, Brown gave the Department of State a cautiously optimistic assessment of the situation in Laos based on recent developments. Brown recommended that the United States try to exploit the improving situation so as to permit U.S. support to all factions resisting the Pathet Lao. To this end, Brown suggested that he seek an audience with King Savang. (ibid., 751J.00/10–2160; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Not found.
4. In this paragraph of telegram 442 to Vientiane, October 21, the Department of State authorized the Embassy to inform Souvanna that while it was within the sovereign right of the Royal Lao Government to pay Kong Le’s 2d Battalion, it was equally within the sovereign right of the United States to decline to reimburse the government for payment of forces cooperating with the Pathet Lao. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/10–2160)