Office of the Historian

417. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, October 5, 1960—11 p.m.

681. Pass JCS. Eyes only Ambassadors. Re JCS 983752 DTG 0322Z1Z.2

1.
Following is CT opinion on the question of whether we can expect that the provision of additional matériel to Phoumi forces at this time will ensure that such forces:
A.
Can avoid further defeats by Kong Le forces with or without PL assistance or
B.
Can successfully resist the Pathet Lao in Regions 3 and 4.
2.
There are some generalizations that apply to Phoumi’s forces in either of the above situations:
A.
They have recently suffered both military and psychological defeats and have lost confidence in themselves and, probably, in their leader.
B.
They suffer from the psychological disadvantages of:
(1)
Not belonging to the forces of the legal government and are operating outside the government.
(2)
They have been given no clear objective or sense of mission other than to support Phoumi and thereby fight Communism, which many of them may suspect is for his own personal aims.
(3)
They are strongly tempted by the appeal of neutrality and negotiations as opposed to fighting the Pathet Lao.
3.
Given these initial disadvantages it seems unlikely that the mere provision of matériel will have any substantial effect upon the ability of Phoumi’s forces to successfully defend themselves against Kong Le and/or PL in the immediate future. A sense of purpose and executive leadership must be given. Given a reasonable period of time for reconstituting and redeployment of these forces, and if their initial combat operations after said reconstitution are successful, thereby restoring confidence in themselves and their officers, it is likely that Phoumi’s forces would be successful against the Kong Le–PL forces.
4.
One unit, the 1st Para BN, may not be suffering under the same handicaps as the remainder of Phoumi forces. It is believed to be better trained, better officered, and a segment of approx 200 men have been removed from the events of Laos during the past several weeks. The willingness of the 1st Paras to fight against their fellow 2nd Paras with [Page 880] whom they have long trained and with whom they share a camaraderie is not known. The records of the two elements of the 1st Para committed to date, one in Sam Neua and the other in the Nam Cadinh area, do not encourage optimism in regard to their future performance.
5.
With reference to alternative B, para 1 above, assuming that:
A.
Phoumi redeploys his forces against the Pathet Lao rather than against Vientiane,
B.
The Pathet Lao have not been substantially reinforced during the past eight weeks,
C.
The Pathet Lao level of activity continues at approximately the same level of isolated, small-scale engagements which characterized PL operations in the 3rd and 4th Mil Regs in the last year.
D.
His troops are reconstituted and imbued with at least the same degree of sense of mission in opposing the Pathet Lao that they possessed prior to the coup, then and only then is it believed that the Phoumi forces in the southern regions should be able to gradually restore the security situation that existed prior to 9 Aug.
6.
Disregarding international implications, other addition of LTAG teams at BN level would materially increase the prospects of success of such operations as envisioned either paras 1A or 1B above.
Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–560. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
  2. Document 415.↩