Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

416. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 5, 1960—7 p.m.

680. Eyes only for Under Secretary Merchant and Assistant Secretary Parsons from Ambassador. I have thought long and hard over Deptel 365² and JCS message 983752 Oct 3³ in which State has concurred. I am, of course, following my instructions 365 and as you know, have asked further instructions re execution JCS message (Embtel 671).⁴

Following are my views:

1) Events have moved so far and so fast here that there is now little or no chance salvage country, or even south alone, through Phoumi. Support of him in absence agreement between him and Souvanna will lead to further disintegration and to accomplish anything will probably have to be so extensive as to constitute clear outside intervention and so involve serious risk actual war.

2) We must therefore, before embarking on this course, make a conscious decision whether such risk is something we prepared contemplate.

3) In my view we have now to cut our losses, which are already serious. Alternative to chaos or division is to make best of Souvanna, who is himself worried about rapidly increasing strength PL and wants all support he can get to strengthen his hand against them. We should gain Phoumi cooperation if possible, but if this fails, and unless King pulls some Lao rabbit out of his hat as result my démarche tomorrow, Souvanna is only rallying point left in country.

4) Action contemplated para 1 JCS message, if pursued to extent probably necessary be effective, will be regarded as clear declaration support for Phoumi against lawful govt (constitutional point is important), confirming suspicions long harbored that US has been secretly supporting him.

5) It will be considered intervention internal affairs another country, which against our stated policy and which we have most recently criticized when USSR gave direct support Lumumba.

6) It risks precipitating civil war and intervention from north with consequence risk international war. It will certainly arouse PL to further propaganda and other activities, and probably result in action breach already tenuous cease-fire by Vientiane forces.

7) It will surely diminish, if not eliminate, our still considerable influence with Souvanna govt and other non-Phoumi forces in country. The US position in Vientiane would, of course, be most difficult, as it would [be] hard for us to remain persona grata with legal govt if we were known to be supporting those whom it considers to be rebels against it.

8) Perhaps most serious of all, it would be placing us behind a decreasing force (see for example Bangkok’s 591⁵ and 601⁶) with declining will to fight which in my opinion cannot succeed reunite country or even south, but, if by some miracle it did, would do so only precariously by force and invite consequences correctly set forth para 1 Deptel 316.⁷

9) I think there is still a chance that a Souvanna govt, given our support and guidance, can avoid Communist control of Laos. I do not believe that Souvanna is working to hand over Laos to Communism, as suggested Deptel 365. (See also Deptel 175)⁸ I feel that unless King takes some effective action as result my démarche tomorrow to bring about a wholly new govt or to bring Souvanna and Phoumi into some sort of effective cooperation, there will be no other alternative to Souvanna which offers hope of salvaging anything we care about from the present wreck. We must always remember Lao inherent reluctance to fight. This would be particularly true if King responds affirmatively to plea for support which Souvanna apparently plans make to him tomorrow. (Embtel 678)⁹

10) I would hope therefore that we could start taking an earnest look at what we could salvage from Souvanna.

11) I do not wish to bind anyone else here by this message. It is sent on my sole responsibility. I have however shown it to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and ARMA who have authorized me state they concur. I know also that Director USOM is in full agreement with views expressed. I believe ARMA has quite independently sent a message to his superiors in Washington which you may wish see. He has not shown it to me, nor have I asked to see it.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–560. Top Secret; Niact; No Distribution.
2. Document 412.
3. Supra.
4. In telegram 671, October 4, Brown requested that, while PEO was preparing to support Phoumi’s forces, he be authorized to refrain from indications of such support until he saw King Savang on October 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–460; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. See footnote 5, Document 412.
6. In telegram 601, October 4, the Embassy in Bangkok transmitted an extremely negative appraisal of the Lao situation by SEATO Secretary General Pote Sarasin. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–460; included in the microfiche supplement)
7. Document 398.
8. Document 367.
9. Telegram 678, October 5, reported that Souvanna felt it imperative to start negotiations with the Pathet Lao before their strength increased. He asked for U.S. support, “pointing out how lack of it weakened him in these negotiations.” Souvanna was going to see the King on October 6 to ask him to order Phoumi and Boun Oum to forget their differences. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–560)