418. Memorandum of Discussion at the 462d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 19601
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and items 1 and 2.]
2. [3.] Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security
Mr. Dulles said that since the Council had been discussing limited war, he felt it would be appropriate to start his briefing with Laos. Since last week’s truce between the Kong Le forces in Vientiane and the Phoumi forces at Savannakhet, the situation had disintegrated. The truce did not work out because Kong Le did not consider himself bound by it. The Pathet Lao have been gaining strength and Souvanna Phouma has indicated a willingness to negotiate with them. The allegiance of various military forces in some of the outlying districts of Laos is uncertain. Mr. Dulles said he did not know what had happened [Page 881] as a result of some military movements around Sam Neua. One report was that Phoumi forces approaching that place had gone over to the Pathet Lao; other reports indicated these forces were defeated in action. Souvanna Phouma is about to go to Luang Prabang to negotiate with the King. In any case, Mr. Dulles was convinced that the situation was serious. One immediate question was what the U.S. Military Mission should do. Some U.S. officers are attached to Laotian divisions of doubtful loyalty.
Mr. Gates wondered whether our Ambassador had been able to put enough backbone in the King to make possible a fair conference with the Pathet Lao. Mr. Merchant said he had no report on this matter yet. He did not have much to add to Mr. Dulles’ briefing. It had been agreed that the U.S. would get local currency into Laos to pay Phoumi’s forces. He felt that the situation in Laos, in general, was difficult and complicated. One difficulty lay in the war-weariness of the Laotians, which led to a deterioration of the will of the Laotian forces to fight the Pathet Lao. It appears more and more that Souvanna Phouma is either a willing accomplice or a captive of Kong Le. Since the first week in August, the U.S. has been trying to get the non-Communist leaders to cooperate to avoid civil war among different units of the Laotian army. Our Ambassador is seeing the King now in a last effort to persuade him to use his royal prerogatives to form a coalition government and halt deterioration of the political situation, under threat of withdrawing U.S. aid. The results of the interview may be the basis for hard decisions. We may have to abandon our effort at unity and as an alternative give all-out support to the Phoumi element still willing to fight. Mr. Merchant concluded his observations by recalling that before his recent coup, Kong Le had been one of the staunchest anti-Communists.
Mr. McCone asked how the change in Kong Le could be accounted for. Mr. Merchant said perhaps Kong Le had been an undercover Communist all the time.
Mr. Dulles pointed out that corruption in the government was an important factor in the Laotian situation. Souvanna Phouma had indicated a willingness to resume diplomatic relations with the USSR through the Soviet Ambassador in Cambodia. It was possible that a neutralist government leaning toward Communism would be the outcome in Vientiane soon unless we can recoup the situation through Phoumi, who does inexplicable things but still fights.
[Here follow discussion of subject unrelated to Laos and the remaining agenda items.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs on October 6.↩