Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

398. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, September 16, 1960—11:46 p.m.

316. Joint State–Defense message. Vientiane’s 536.² Agree that continuation present stalemate leading to degradation situation in Laos unacceptable for US and Free World interests.

Re your three alternatives:

1. Agree that we cannot give full support to Boun Oum/Phoumi camp (to extent recommended by CINCPAC’s 142358Z)³ leading to their assumption of power because:

a. It would probably drive Kong Le and part 2nd Para Battalion into bush substantially and dangerously reinforcing PL.

b. It would raise serious doubts in minds of Lao and allies re value US word since US has consistently stated it supported legally constituted government and had warned Phoumi that it cannot support dissident movement.

c. We question degree of internal support Phoumi would receive upon being returned to power under US aegis and after campaign of siege, sabotage, and psychological warfare.

d. We would risk sharp break with some SEATO allies (UK, France, Australia, and New Zealand) quite conceivably leading to eventual collapse of organization.

e. It would greatly enhance likelihood large scale Communist insurgency.

f. Confronted by such insurgency, with limited popular support and international sympathy, Phoumi government might well eventually have to give way to neutralist government which would be prepared to make greater concessions to Communists than ever contemplated by Souvanna.

While this course of action might offer early solution, predictable consequences make it unacceptable. We would at best be gaining very short-term advantage at cost of long-term deteriorating situation.

2. Agree inaction now risky as it may prolong dangerous stalemate.

3. Full support Souvanna government as you propose is not acceptable because:

a. There would be no way to ensure that if Souvanna accepted our conditions he would ultimately wish or be able to abide by them.

b. This solution might not be able to stop Phoumi.

c. Kong Le would be vindicated and might gain position of considerable long-run influence.

d. Adverse impact of this solution on situation in Thailand and Viet-Nam would not be balanced off by support from Western allies.

e. King would be opposed to this solution.

f. We would in effect be stuck with Souvanna who just does not have qualifications that are required to hold Laos against PL military and subversive tactics.

Foregoing for your background is Department’s analysis on which following is based.

4. It appears to us that there is a fourth alternative and that is to seek bring to life new government which would be acceptable to majority patriotic elements. Again King appears key person. Therefore if by September 19 situation does not appear to move toward resolution, i.e., resignation Souvanna and creation new government you should immediately seek new audience with King to make presentation along following lines:

“Situation Laos continues degenerate; patriotic elements, Army, and country itself divided. PL intensifying their attacks in north. Law, order and constitution no longer respected. After coup, now revolution. Government in complete disorder. Kong Le still exercises baneful influence in Vientiane. Revolutionary movement threatening civil war. US fails see how Laos can survive if such situation is to continue very long. It has used its best efforts to encourage reconciliation all patriotic elements but to no avail. US is now reluctantly approaching decision that its aid can no longer be effectively used to help preserve independence of country. Therefore unless Lao resolve their internal divisions and restore unity of country Ambassador has been authorized to suspend all aid to government until a situation is brought about in which US aid can once more be effective.

“In US view solution might be sought as follows:

“King call to Luang Prabang principal personages of realm including Souvanna and Phoumi in attempt to bring about effective operation in Vientiane of Souvanna government as constituted in Luang Prabang on August 30 or, failing that, order them agree upon new governmental formula under widely respected figure (Deptel 308)⁴ under whom Phoumi would serve and in which cabinet Souvanna might have position. Finally any government to govern effectively must from outset bring Kong Le under control.”

5. In informing Souvanna of your request for audience with King you should make US position clear to him.

6. You should also immediately inform Phoumi that his program of sabotage and psychological warfare against Vientiane will cause strong adverse reaction both in Laos and abroad. You may use sabotage water works as example of destructive and useless action. You should tell Phoumi of terms of démarche to King.

7. FYI. Foregoing concept is based on paragraphs 15–20 of Operations Plan for Laos. Withdrawal of aid if such pressure is necessary would be undertaken gradually and this message does not mean we contemplate abandon Laos. If course of action contained this message fails to achieve our purpose, US will have to at such time consider any and all alternatives then open. None are foreclosed by present action. End FYI.

8. Defense [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] concur.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1560. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Usher and Chapman and cleared with SEA, in draft with the Department of Defense, Merchant, Parsons, and Steeves. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Document 395.
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. In telegram 308, September 14, the Department suggested that a new Lao Government under Phoumi or Boun Oum would not reconcile the “broad segment of patriotic elements” in Laos and would not win free world support. The Department encouraged the Embassy to make a démarche to the King, in conjunction with the French and British Ambassadors if possible, for the appointment of a “government of national reconciliation” under a “widely respected figure.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1460; included in the microfiche supplement)