Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

41. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, September 9, 1959—10 p.m.

641. Department telegram 553 repeated to addressees.² I first saw Pote Sarasin with respect reference telegram and subsequently today had more than 2-hour session with Prime Minister at which Pote Sarasin was present together with Prince Wongsan, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Reaction of both Pote and Sarit to numbered paragraph 5³ reference telegram was gratification and relief at having this clear indication of US attitude. While much my conversation with Sarit was directed toward getting as clear understanding as I could of what degree he would be willing to be in “forefront” militarily against background assurances contained numbered paragraph 5, I was not successful in pinning him down. However, he assured me Thailand would take no action in Laos without prior consultation with US.

In view of Sarit’s unwillingness to be pinned down and as this was our first really substantive conversation looking toward possibility military action in Laos, I did not feel it desirable to try to press him too far but rather to plant thoughts which I hope will germinate.

In my first separate conversation with Pote he expressed view that it would be grave mistake for foreign troops, Thai or US, to become involved in “shooting Laotians in Laos.” That is, he felt that essential element for overt foreign military intervention must be to repel aggression by Viet Minh personnel. Undoubted fact that Viet Minh were training, supplying and inciting dissidence in Laos was not enough to justify overt foreign intervention, and intervention under such circumstances probably would not be successful. Even though supported from without, RLG should be able to deal with internal dissidence without overt intervention of foreign forces. However, Pote had no answer as to what can and should be done to prevent steady whittling away of RLG position under these circumstances to point Laos falls to Communists. He recognizes this possibility and recognizes effect on Thailand and SEATO would be almost equally disastrous as if fall had come through overt Viet Minh invasion.

Sarit had done no thinking in terms intervention for purpose preventing fall Phong Saly and Sam Neua. He indicated Phoumi⁴ had asked him to bomb enemy around Sam Neua but he felt this was “foolish” and had refused even consider. As far as Thai action concerned, Sarit has been thinking in following terms:

(1) If Phong Saly and Sam Neua fell, he would wait to see whether “they” moved any further towards Thailand;

(2) If “they” moved further, he would move Thai forces to border; and

(3) If “they” did not stop, he would move into Laos.

He seems to discount effect on morale RLG loss of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, relying on conviction that in this event FAL would stage a coup and take over government. He says such a coup is planned by Phoumi, Ouan and Sunthorn (latter spelling phonetic from Thai). Apparently on his trip here early this week Phoumi had asked Sarit for “money and guns” to support a coup if it became necessary. However, Sarit said that he had not agreed. I, of course, pointed out desirability such action at this time, and that we were supplying “guns” to FAL as rapidly as they could be absorbed. Sarit asked who was supervising distribution as he had heard rumor a shipment had fallen into hands of Communists. I said that I was sure that American personnel in Laos were supervising distribution and I knew of no American arms that had fallen into hands of Communists except isolated instances in which PL may have captured individual arms from FAL personnel.

I suggested to Sarit it important if at all possible prevent Phong Saly and Sam Neua fall, and that there were many additional things short of overt intervention that could be done assist RLG and FAL. Sarit agreed but said that he did not know what FAL wanted. He had agreed to Phoumi’s request for training FAL PARU troops in Thailand and for “staff planning coordination.” He was also sending a group of two or three officers to Vientiane in next few days. Perhaps he would have clear idea when these conversations finished. He said also while he had agreed to principle training FAL PARU units Phoumi had not given him very clear idea exactly what was wanted and detailed arrangements apparently not yet discussed. I emphasized we were prepared immediately assist any way possible when we knew what FAL and RTA wanted. Upshot this portion conversation was remark by Sarit that perhaps also better get Phoumi back down to Bangkok to find out what FAL really wanted in this and other fields.

With respect Thai forces Sarit said envisages three steps—1, alert (which was now in effect); 2, recall of conscripts who had been released to save money (to do this would cost 4 million baht a day); and 3, moving troops out to the border and then into Laos (to do this would require money and equipment which Thai Government did not have). Support would also be required for RTA supply and logistics units not now receiving MAP support. He also again mentioned desire for support for full strength 21st RCT. I again emphasized essentiality staff work on these matters between Ministry of Defense and JUSMAG.

Sarit urged public show of force by US and suggested squadron or two of fighters or bombers be stationed at Taklee for “week or two.” Public show force might deter Communists pressing any further into Laos and thus prevent necessity using force. “Would also be good for morale Thailand and Laos.” I explained our desire not appear be saber-rattling particularly at this stage UN consideration matter but promised pass on his suggestion.

With respect numbered paragraphs 1 through 4 reference telegram,⁵ I emphasized importance of Thailand taking lead in urging other SEATO countries do maximum both militarily and politically prepare SEATO promptly take whatever action circumstances may require. He entirely concurred.

At end conversation I gave Sarit copy of report on status bridge construction between Udorn and Nong Kai⁶ which USOM had prepared for me, suggesting he discuss with Thai Highway Department expediting completion eleven bridges still under construction. I promised follow up my end through USOM.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–959. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Seato. Repeated priority to Canberra, Karachi, London, Manila, Paris, Wellington, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Dated September 7. (Ibid., 790.5/9–459; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. This paragraph noted that the Embassy could inform Pote and Sarit in confidence that whether or not SEATO was organizationally prepared to act immediately on a Lao request for military assistance, the United States was making preliminary dispositions of U.S. forces in the Pacific.
4. Phoumi Nosavan, Laotian Secretary of State for National Defense and Veterans Affairs.
5. These paragraphs stressed the importance of SEATO placing itself in a position where it could act with minimum delay if required by the Laotian situation, including military action, and that these preparations should go forward simultaneously with U.N. consideration of the Laotian question.
6. Not found.