42. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State1

657. Department telegram 553.2 It is my understanding that one of essential steps to be taken if SEATO is to place itself in posture where it can be prepared act militarily in Laos with minimum delay is to complete action upon MPO Plan 5B/59. Paragraph 14 that paper appears well to set forth the points upon which prior agreement is essential. If it is desired that I address Council representatives, as I believe I should, for action on this paper, it will be important that I be instructed soonest with regard to US position on the points that it is considered appropriate be discussed in Council representatives and that US representative on Senior Planners Committee be instructed those points considered appropriate to discuss in that body.

Of course, one of most fundamental questions is that of identity of “appointed nation.” In pursuance our desire see Thailand “in forefront under SEATO banner,” believe it would be logical that Thailand assume this role. (Assume this would permit Thai commander of SEATO force to appoint an American deputy.)

It also seems to me Council representatives could seek to reach governmental agreement on draft directive to commander SEATO force as well as upon “SEATO political advisor” mentioned paragraph 19 B.

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Would welcome CINCPAC suggestions on how through Council representatives I could make maximum contribution towards reaching agreement on other points.3

Johnson
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/9–1059. Top Secret; SEATO; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
  2. See footnotes 2, 3, and 5, supra.
  3. In CINCPAC message 132229Z from Honolulu, September 13, quoted in JCS 9965642Z to CINCPAC, September 18, Admiral Felt requested orders to specify at the SEATO Military Advisers Meeting, September 22–24, which forces the United States was prepared to commit to a potential SEATO force in Laos, as well as to join in recommendations that the United States be “the appointed nation.” In reply, the JCS approved most of Felt’s contingency recommendations on forces but stated that if other SEATO nations unanimously wanted to draft the United States as the appointed nation, he was to reserve his position and ask for instructions. (Department of State, EA/Laos Files: Lot 68 D 77, Laos 1959; included in the microfiche supplement)