Office of the Historian

399. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, September 18, 1960—9 p.m.

555. Addressees pass interested agencies. Ref: Deptel 316.2 Before proceeding to irrevocable action, I want to be sure that Washington fully understands immediate obstacles and risks involved.

(A)
Believe action outlined para 4 reftel will encounter two immediate obstacles: (1) King’s unwillingness take decisive action, (2) Phoumi’s obstinacy. Even if King willing call conference there is distinct possibility Phoumi and Boun Oum may “respectfully” decline as they did last time (Embtel 522).3 Not likely therefore that King will risk second snubbing, or act unless Souvanna first resigns.
B)
I just don’t see any “respected figure” on the horizon whom King is likely choose who could have leadership qualities or authority necessary control Kong Le, or to avoid being widely considered as Phoumi/US stooge.
C)
Deptel 316 says that any government to govern effectively must from outset bring Kong Le under control. What is likely is that mere fame of Souvanna’s resignation will lead Kong Le immediately try reoccupy Vientiane, with or without PL help, and chances are PL [Page 851] will start nationwide insurrection aided by increased covert assistance DRV. Therefore, before new government even has chance get organized and complete formalities necessary for investiture, Kong Le may be in far more powerful position than he is now and new government may be faced with serious PL problems all over country.
D)
Souvanna at this juncture clearly only man who has been able restrain Kong Le and to carry appeal to him and his followers. Kong Le-ism is force that has to be reckoned with, even in FAL.
E)
Situation would be exacerbated if on Souvanna resignation King should, as would be his inclination, appoint Boun Oum/Phoumi government with consequences outlined reftel para 1.
F)
US would undoubtedly be accused of bringing downfall Souvanna government.

Strongly recommend that if plan is to be followed despite risks, it be discussed at once and at high level with Brit and French, to whom it will undoubtedly come, at first at least, as great shock and disappointment.

Our task would be try persuade them to see our view dangers present situation and try get their support. This I cannot do from here. It would be worth waiting day or two here to make this attempt,4 especially in view stabilization situation Sam Neua (Embtel 554).5

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1860. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated priority to Bangkok, to London, Paris, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received at 1:29 p.m.↩
  2. Supra.↩
  3. See footnote 7, Document 394.↩
  4. In telegram 321 to Vientiane, September 18, the Department authorized the Embassy to hold up the action requested in telegram 316 to Vientiane pending further consideration in Washington. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1860)↩
  5. Dated September 18. (ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)↩