394. Paper Prepared by the Assistant White House Staff Secretary (Eisenhower)1
SYNOPSIS OF STATE AND INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL REPORTED TO THE PRESIDENT
[Here follows material on subjects unrelated to Laos.]
Laos
On September 10th Phoumi indicated his intention to start a revolution.2 The success would of course depend on the degree of support he still enjoys in the Army. Phoumi was not satisfied by new concessions offered by Souvanna through a delegation of army officers sent to Savannakhet on September 9th.3 Laotian Army reports indicate increased Pathet Lao guerrilla activities in four different areas of North Laos.4
Prince Boun Oum joined Phoumi in this action on September 10th and Souvanna declared a state of emergency. Souvanna conferred with the king on September 11th and the king invited rebels to come to Luang Prabang for further consultations.5 Phoumi is apparently receiving at least moral support from Thailand.6
Meanwhile, State instructed Ambassador Brown to seek an audience with the king and point out our fears that Laos is faced with a real threat of dismemberment due to the disintegration of the unity of patriotic elements. Brown is to emphasize that we see no peaceful solution outside of a royal reconciliation under the authority of the [Page 841] king.7 we are particularly concerned that Kong Le will join with the Pathet Lao. The French refused to join us in this démarche to the king.8
The U.S. is in a little bit of a spot here since while we feel the best solution would be a return to the Souvanna government on the part of Phoumi, we hesitate to choose sides with neutralist Souvanna in the light of Phoumi’s pro-U.S. orientation. Finally, the issue is now so full of emotion we are trying to avoid becoming identified with one solution.
Brown has also been instructed to point out to both General Ouan (Souvanna’s armed forces commander) and Phoumi that we cannot stand by in the face of renewed Pathet Lao activities in the north while military commanders are engaged in political activities. If necessary, we will also support troops directly ourselves.9
Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum have sent emissaries to the king to explain the reasons for their rebellion against Souvanna. Their solution would be the formation of a new government under Boun Oum with Phoumi as armed forces commander. They would “prefer” to retain Souvanna in the cabinet.
[Here follows material on subjects unrelated to Laos.]
- Source: Eisehower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret.↩
- Reported in Document 391.↩
- Reported in Joint Situation Report 30, [document number not declassified], September 9. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, International Series, Laos Situation Reports)↩
- Reported in Joint Situation Report 29, [document number not declassified], September 8. (Ibid.)↩
- Reported in telegram 512 from Vientiane, September 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1160; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- The Embassy in Bangkok reported in telegram 462, September 10, that there was “positive confirmation that Sarit last night sent a message to Phoumi to effect that while decision of course Phoumi’s, considering all circumstances Sarit believed Phoumi should return to Vientiane.” Information available to the Embassy also confirmed that Sarit was not giving any material support to Phoumi and had made it clear to Phoumi that he could expect no support from Thailand. The Embassy concluded that “Sarit is playing square with us” and even going against his own convictions. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1060)↩
- See supra. Reports of Brown’s audience with King Savang, who refused to attempt a reconciliation between Souvanna and Phoumi, are in telegram 521 and 522 from Vientiane, both September 13. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1360; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Reported in telegram 514 from Vientiane, September 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1260)↩
- Instructed in telegram 299 to Vientiane, September 12. (ibid., 751J.5622/9–1260)↩