Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, September 15, 1960—9 p.m.

536. Addressees pass interested agencies. Throughout current crisis, US has, correctly in my view, refrained from intervention in hope Lao would find effective solution their problem in their own way. Solution found LP has not worked out as hoped and despite legal establishment Souvanna govt, US, in words Deptel 391,² has “hesitated take position which might be interpreted as full endorsement Souvanna (who known neutralist) and condemnation Phoumi (who known pro-US), leading to serious doubts US objectives in Laos both in that country and in area.”

Uncertainties present position with stalemate between opposing claimants, unwillingness King exert decisive influence one side or other is leading increased disregard established legal procedures, undermining authority central govt, and benefiting PL. I believe time has now come when continuation these conditions unacceptable for US and free world interests and that US must now exercise its still considerable and perhaps decisive influence. Army and govt must be united soon.

Three alternatives exist: (1) Support Phoumi and Boun Oum, (2) inaction leading probably to resignation Souvanna, and (3) full support Souvanna govt with last effort convince Phoumi his and best interests country lie in his cooperation perhaps as C-in-C FAL.

First alternative completely unacceptable since it would involve support group which has, by own announcement, abrogated legal govt, Assembly and Constitution.

Result second alternative uncertain and risky. Souvanna might hang on for considerable time. Phoumi would continue with program sabotage, psywar and assassination (e.g., partly successful sabotage last night waterworks which only municipal supply pure water Vientiane civilians). PL would take advantage divided Army command exploit situation their advantage. US would be confronted series impossible decisions (e.g., how pay Army and civilians and how support military effort against PL where needed. Also possibly involve appeal to UN which could raise many problems for US.).

Believe most unwise US try hasten Souvanna resignation or to direct composition new govt. Believe also unwise say anything to Khamphan this juncture. If new govt should be clearly Boun Oum/Phoumi, result sooner or later certainly sharp to violent PL reaction, trouble Vientiane, and possible new coup Vientiane. Any popular feelings brought to surface by Kong Le coup would be now frustrated and composition and capacity govt plus extent its popular support highly uncertain. If Souvanna were willing serve as Deputy PriMin under Boun Oum and Phoumi willing remain only as C-in-C, adverse reaction probably much less sharp.

Despite Phoumi abilities and strong anti-Communist convictions, events past few weeks have detracted his effectiveness as our main reliance against Communism here. Revolt in his elite troops, his refusal return Vientiane, his advocacy policy force rather than conciliation which is distasteful to combat psywar Lao, his influences in coup against legal govt in which he had himself accepted major role, feelings of many that he had rigged elections, et cetera, have created considerable opposition to him.

Souvanna, on other hand, has considerable personal popularity and his policies have considerable popular support. Should he disappear from political scene, highly important moderating factor in Lao political life would be lost. He overestimates his own powers. He is not a particularly good organizer and perhaps not too clear a thinker. He may lack will power in pinches and he certainly lacks support of the King. His policy of greater neutralism has many risks. Yet he is not Communist and many indications he has learned since 1957. He still wishes have Phoumi in govt and participate in PL negotiations. He has broken off PL negotiations because of current divided posture govt not wishing negotiate from weakness. (This confirmed to me today by Burmese Min as result his talks majority Souvanna ministers. Souvanna told Zellweger recently there should be no negotiations with PL but only discussions implementation 1957 agreements. Starting new negotiations, he said, would lead to interminable process; if agreement reached PL would ask for something more and further negotiation would ensue.)

I doubt whether really true that Army can only be united around Phoumi. I believe that if we made it known that Souvanna government had complete control pay and supplies which our aid provides, regional commanders would not be long in following his orders. Civil functionaries would follow suit (Embtel 521).³

US influence still of enormous importance, whichever party in power. But in many ways able exert greater influence over Souvanna than bull-headed Phoumi. Former has fewer personal blind spots and is not consumed by same personal ambition. Doesn’t need to be. He is already important national figure and will remain so regardless of what happens. Part of wisdom for US is now to support Souvanna wholeheartedly and openly for following reasons:

A) Will be supporting greater segment of national feeling.

B) Mixture carrot and stick usually better than stick alone, especially with Lao.

C) Will be supporting legally constituted govt, not group which has shown itself willing publicly ignore govt, Assembly and Constitution at will.

D) Can command full support UK, France and UN, and powerful neutrals such as India, though discouraging Thailand and S. Vietnam.

E) Will discomfit PL and Communists by US support same man they are supporting, and show Lao people US supports their preferred and legally constituted choice.

F) Surest way keeping Kong Le and his cohorts in Vientiane under control until effectively united.

I feel however that before giving such support we should get certain assurances from Souvanna. Among them:

A) Assurance that his policy will be to have no negotiations with the PL until FAL is reunited and they surrender territory seized since September 6.

B) That there should be no PL in his Cabinet.

C) That there should be no elections except perhaps for the additional seats for the Assembly which he has suggested. (Embtel 465)⁴

D) That US training teams should leave only when their job is completed, and necessary US MAP will continue.

E) That Gen Ouan should establish direct relations with regional commanders through which PEO could give them necessary support whether or not Phoumi approves.

F) That there should be no recognition of Communist China or the Vietminh and, if possible, Sov Russia.

G) That he would proclaim amnesty for Savannakhet group and its followers and would have Phoumi as C-in-C FAL if he could be persuaded to accept it.

H) That Minister of Interior be someone we can work with like [garble—Somsanith?].

I therefore recommend that I be authorized to tell Souvanna that if he will give these assurances US will declare openly its complete support his govt as duly constituted govt Laos and will state that all aid and support from the US for Laos will be channeled through his govt. That we will be prepared to carry through to the fullest and support him if he withholds pay or supplies to certain areas to convince them central govt and not Savannakhet group is real center of power in Laos. I recommend also that I be authorized see Phoumi personally and tell him this is US position in hope finally convincing him that US will not support his going alone. I should not urge Phoumi any further return Vientiane but leave that Souvanna, when equipped with full assurance US support.

All members Country Team concur with exception public affairs officer who evaluates public support Souvanna as less than indicated above, due reaction older conservative elements to what they believe to be trend toward Communist subversion in Vientiane area.

Brown

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/9–1560. Secret; Niact. Also sent to CINCPAC for POLAD and repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, and London. Received at 4:33 p.m.
2. Dated September 12. (ibid., 751J.00/9–1260; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. See footnote 7, Document 394.
4. Telegram 465, September 5, reported that Souvanna told Brown that he was considering suggesting an enlargement of the present National Assembly by 12 seats (1 for each province) as a way of deflecting the expected call for new elections. In this way, Souvanna could compensate for the at least partially rigged previous results. Even if the Pathet Lao won all 12 seats, Souvanna noted that they would not dominate the enlarged Assembly of 71. (ibid., 751J.00/9–560)