36. Memorandum of Discussion at the 410th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 18, 19591

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers (NSC 5820/1;2NSC 5429/5;3NSC 5701;4 NSC 5809;5 Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 22, 19596)

Mr. Gray explained the background of the State Department presentation and before calling on Mr. Ramsey7 asked Secretary Dillon if he wished to make any comments on the State Department paper which was to be summarized by Mr. Ramsey. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s introductory remarks are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)8

Secretary Dillon replied that he merely wished to point out that the study to be discussed by Mr. Ramsey was simply a working level paper in the State Department, prepared for that Department’s own use. While the paper also generally reflected State Department views at the top levels, Secretary Dillon emphasized that the higher officials at the State Department have not as yet adopted from the paper any detailed conclusions on U.S. policy with respect to this subject.

Mr. Ramsey thereupon presented his report. (A copy of the summary of conclusions, along the lines presented by Mr. Ramsey is attached to this Memorandum. The entire study is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting.)

At the conclusion of Mr. Ramsey’s presentation, the President stated that while he did not wish to comment on the validity of Mr. Ramsey’s conclusions, he did wish to say that Mr. Ramsey’s report was the finest report which he had ever heard given before the National [Page 98] Security Council. It was, said the President, a fine paper, beautifully organized, and he wished to congratulate Mr. Ramsey. The President inquired whether there were any questions on the report from the members of the Council.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that it had been generally true that military leadership has basically represented a conservative element in the societies of the newly developing countries. While in some instances, the military can be troublesome, it remained true that in these backward societies, it was desirable to encourage the military to stabilize a conservative system. Secretary McElroy cited the contribution of Nasution in Indonesia. Secretary McElroy also said that Mr. Ramsey’s report raised an important question as to whether we should provide at least a minimum of military assistance to these backward and undeveloped countries simply as a means of helping to provide stability. If the State Department were ultimately to follow this conclusion as a basic policy, it would of course be necessary to make the Senate Foreign Relations Committee aware of the fact.

The President observed that Mr. Ramsey’s report had raised in his mind an even larger question. He then pointed out that for the last two and a half years of Secretary Dulles’s life, the Secretary in intimate conversations with the President from time to time had come to the conclusion that we have not yet seen the ending of the test of free government in the world. Can our system of free government stand the strains which it must endure because of our tolerance of pressure groups and other kinds of uninformed thinking?

The President then went on to emphasize a dilemma which constantly faced his Administration. On the one hand, we were anxious to keep our economy strong and stable and to balance our budget. On the other hand, we seemed to be in need of doing more to assist such backward countries as Mr. Ramsey had been describing in this report. Emphasizing again that this was a serious problem, the President referred to his recent conversations with Ambassador Bunker9 about the serious competition from the Soviets which we were facing in India. He agreed wholeheartedly with Ambassador Bunker in the latter’s serious view of this competition. Not the least of the dangers was the terrific propaganda campaign that the Soviet Union was waging against us in India. All this, said the President, reaffirms Secretary Dulles’s view that we have not yet seen the ultimate test of the strength of free governments in the world.

Admiral Burke, commenting on the President’s statement, said that he felt that what was most essential to the preservation of freedom was the development of a feeling of responsibility by the members of governing groups. If no such feeling of responsibility was [Page 99] developed and instead people gave free reign to irresponsible criticism, free government would certainly succumb in the end. Accordingly, it seemed essential to Admiral Burke that the U.S. assist in the training of the young people of these backward countries so that they could develop the requisite sense of responsibility.

Mr. Allen Dulles reminded Admiral Burke that he had written a letter to him last October on the developing trend towards military autocracy in several of the Afro-Asian countries. In this letter Mr. Dulles said that he had stressed the need for our military attachés and for the personnel of our Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) to be carefully selected so that they could develop useful and appropriate relationships with the rising military leaders and factions in the underdeveloped countries to which they were assigned. While Admiral Burke had not replied to this letter, Mr. Dulles said he knew that Admiral Burke had been working on this matter. Mr. Dulles commented that the revolution in Iraq had come as a terrible shock and that he had started a review of our military relationships in the Afro-Asian countries as a result.

The President remarked that the rising young military leaders in these underdeveloped countries could probably be most effectively influenced by our MAAG personnel. He expressed vigorous support for Mr. Dulles’s views and suggested that it would be desirable for us to have more civilian instructors in our higher military schools in order to instruct our own military people on the importance of other than purely military considerations in their relationships with their opposite numbers in the underdeveloped countries. Secretary McElroy agreed with the President’s point but also suggested that it was important to bring the military leaders of these countries to the U.S. for training.

Secretary Dillon expressed the view that Congress would probably pose no objections to such training as the President and the other speakers had been suggesting nor would Congress probably object to providing these underdeveloped countries at least a modicum of armament in order to assist in maintaining stability. On the other hand, Congress would certainly object vigorously to providing heavy armament and big equipment to many of the underdeveloped countries.

Mr. Gray pointed out that in a great many of our NSC policy papers dealing with separate countries, there appeared boiler-plate language with respect to objectives calling for “strong, stable democratic governments with a pro-Western orientation.” This struck Mr. Gray as being basically nothing more than an expression of the desirability of exporting our own democratic institutions. As Mr. Ramsey’s paper indicated, this was not always going to be possible and we must look into these objectives more carefully in the future. The State Department would certainly not want to address itself to following up Mr. Ramsey’s study. Mr. Gray also alluded to the fact that the Department [Page 100] of Defense had established a school for training MAAG personnel. Similarly, he pointed out that of the twelve countries which were now receiving defense support from the U.S., eleven were actually underdeveloped Asian countries. This suggested to Mr. Gray a further look at the content of the programs of study which are prescribed for military personnel from these countries who are studying in the U.S.

The President endorsed Mr. Gray’s suggestions and stated that it seemed to him likely that the trend towards military take-overs in the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa was almost certainly going to continue. Accordingly, we must do our best to orient the potential military leaders of these countries in a pro-Western rather than in a pro-Communist direction. In support of this proposition, the President cited his own experience in the Philippines. He believed that if we had not trained the Filipinos in democracy for some forty years, the Philippines would now have become a military dictatorship.

Admiral Burke pointed out that with respect to the comments on our higher military schools, at least fifty per cent of the teaching in such schools is now oriented towards the development of a philosophy of government rather than to purely military or tactical matters. Foreign personnel studying in these schools are pretty well oriented toward democracy when they return to their own countries.

The President went on to say that we should all stay closer together in these matters. We should indoctrinate all our attachés— military, commercial, agricultural, and others—so that they each will have a background or a philosophy which he actually exemplifies in his daily life.

The President looked over at Mr. Clarence Randall and said he thought that Mr. Randall probably had some ideas on this subject. Mr. Randall replied that he had actually been bursting to speak his piece. He felt that the Council had just engaged in the biggest issue which he had heard discussed in this body in a very long time. He said he was doubtless in a small minority but that it was his belief that Mr. Ramsey’s paper was much too complacent. He detected in it too much readiness to give up pushing for the democratic ideal. Mr. Randall insisted that what he wanted to see was more and better education for civilians in these backward countries. In his opinion more than any other single factor, it was Robert College10 that had brought Turkey to the healthy state in which it found itself today. Similarly, the American University in Beirut had accomplished wonders for democracy in the Near East. He believed that institutions like these profoundly advanced our American and Western ideals in the areas in which they were located. He only wished that we could have another such institution to serve Africa South of the Sahara.

[Page 101]

There ensued a brief discussion in which the President thought that the American University in Beirut was under considerable Communist influence inasmuch as a few years ago the University had advised against having Secretary Dulles visit and make a speech at the University. Mr. George Allen said that he thought that the attacks on Secretary Dulles came rather from pro-Nasser than from pro-Communist students at the American University in Beirut.

In any event, continued the President, he was all for Mr. Randall’s idea. However, if you go and live with these Arabs, you will find that they simply cannot understand our ideas of freedom or human dignity. They have lived so long under dictatorships of one form or another, how can we expect them to run successfully a free government? Mr. Randall replied that there was a real chance for free governments in the region of Africa South of the Sahara. Linked with this was the economic question—whether the U.S. should provide considerable economic assistance to socialist economies in the underdeveloped countries. It seemed obvious to Mr. Randall that in certain instances, we would have to provide assistance to states with socialist economies in the overall interests of our national security. Nevertheless, we should always and persistently exert pressure in favor of the free enterprise system. The President commented that here too he was glad to go along with Mr. Randall’s idea.

Secretary Dillon in defense of the State Department report, pointed out that the report was not endorsing the continuation of military regimes forever in these underdeveloped countries. The report was merely insisting that in the short range, parliamentary democracy simply will not work in these countries as it works in the U.S. Accordingly, our best bet was to try to civilianize these military regimes as far as possible in the interest of the ultimate victory of democratic government. Apropos of Secretary Dillon’s remarks, the President pointed out that the so-called colonial powers had often taken the position, not that their colonies should never become free countries, but that before these colonies did become free countries their citizens should be trained for freedom. It was indeed pretty difficult if such colonies became independent before they had trained any of their people in the art of government.

Mr. George Allen recalled the views expressed by the Vice President when he had returned from his trip to Latin America.11 The Vice President had taken the position that, as between dictatorial and democratic regimes in Latin America, the U.S. ought to adopt a policy of being a little more friendly to the democratic regimes. This was at least, as Secretary Dillon had suggested, the ideal to keep in mind as our ultimate goal.

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The President alluded to what he called the paradoxical situation in Nicaragua. After years of a heavy-handed dictatorship organized by his father, the young Somoza had permitted and encouraged the development of a number of freedoms in Nicaragua such as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and the like. For his pains Luis Somoza was now confronted by a revolution against his relatively mild authoritarian regime.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget said that it seemed to him that Mr. Ramsey’s report did not really evaluate two potential risks in the trend toward military take-overs in these underdeveloped countries. The first of these two risks was whether there would not be an increased danger of Communist subversion when a government in one of these countries became heavily centralized. The second risk might come from the fact that the increased power of a military ruling caste in one of these countries could result in aggression by this country against its neighbors. Mr. Stans wondered whether these two risks had been considered by those who had drafted the State Department paper. The President replied that he was quite sure that these risks had been calculated and asked Mr. Ramsey who likewise replied in the affirmative. Mr. Ramsey added that the second risk was more controllable than the first.

(At this point, 9:55 a.m., the President and Secretary Dillon left the meeting for a short time.)

The National Security Council:12

a.
Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral summary by Mr. Henry C. Ramsey, Department of State, of the study transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 22, 1959.
b.
Noted that the Department of State would continue follow-up studies on the subject in the light of the study and the discussion, and that the NSC Planning Board would take the latter into account in preparing policy recommendations with regard to the Afro-Asian area.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.

[Here follow the remaining items.]

S. Everett Gleason
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Gleason.
  2. Entitled “U.S. Policy in the Near East,” October 3, 1958; scheduled for publication in volume xii.
  3. Entitled “Current U.S. Policy in the Far East,” December 22, 1954; Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 10621074.
  4. Entitled “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” January 10, 1957; ibid., 1955–1957, vol. viii, pp. 2943.
  5. Document 12.
  6. Not found. It transmitted a Department of State study entitled “Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers,” dated May 22. The section of this study entitled “Summary of Conclusions” is included in the microfiche supplement. A copy of the full study (as revised May 28) is filed as Enclosure 1 to instruction CA–1333, August 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.90/8–1159)
  7. Henry C. Ramsey of the Policy Planning Staff.
  8. Not printed. In these remarks, Gray stated that the study had been undertaken at his request, and that the Planning Board had discussed the paper without either endorsing or rejecting its conclusions. The text of the remarks is included in the microfiche supplement.
  9. Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador in India.
  10. In Istanbul.
  11. Vice President Nixon visited South America April 27–May 15, 1958.
  12. Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2098. (Department of State, S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)