Office of the Historian

35. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Department of State1

Pearl Harbor, T.H., May 29, 1959—2 p.m.

300100Z. Personal for Asst Sec Parsons from Felt. Your 21 May 10 pm (received by NAVCOMMSTA 281859Z and passed by NAVCOMMSTA as 282145Z)2 received 29 May which explains delay my reply.

1.
I agree that clear and forceful statement of roles and missions for indigenous forces is vital to defense of our military assistance program this area. With exception Cambodia, these statements already approved or awaiting approval of JCS. Am studying proposed Cambodian statement now prior submission to JCS. Have recommended these statements be incorporated in DOD MAP guidance and that they be provided OCB for use in development national policy guidance.
2.
Suggest Philippines as excellent illustrative case to convince Congress that we assisting in development indigenous forces solely in accordance U.S. concepts for strategic defense of area. Believe you and SecDef have all background info showing disparity between Filipino concepts and requirements and those reflected by our planned force goals and missions for Phil armed forces.
3.
Believe it advisable to stress, at risk of repetition, the objectives and criteria which govern MAP in the PACOM and which I reemphasized at recent conference with my MAAG chiefs and principal commanders. The fundamental objectives of MAP are:
A.
To provide the means to maintain internal security.
B.
To insure minimum ready forces to meet overt Communist aggression in a limited war situation and to conduct defensive delaying action while the forces of the U.S. and other allies are brought to bear. The criteria for granting U.S. aid are: [Page 96]
a.
It must be needed by peoples to maintain their freedom.
b.
Recipients must be able to use it effectively in consonance with U.S. strategic objectives and policies.
c.
It is emergency aid.
d.
We are not providing assistance for use by one free country against another free country.
4.
Planned force goals for PACOM indigenous forces, together with my basic arguments in support thereof, are held by JCS. Suggest you contact LtGen Picher, Director Joint Staff for info this subj. Also, current studies which substantiate force goals for ROK forces have just been made available by Gen. Decker to me and to OSD/ISA.
5.
With reference Senator Mansfield’s statements, assume you refer his proposal for 3 year program of de-emphasis military aid and shift from economic grants to loans. I prefer Senator Carlson’s3 more reasonable observation in which he reportedly finds “a lot of merit” in proceeding now to contemplate the character of the MSP “on a long-term basis.” My long range MAP planning must necessarily be predicated on some tenuous assumptions which are dependent on factors controlled by our economic (including defense support) programs. For example, future force goals for Vietnam will be greatly influenced by the effectiveness of the Civil Guard and the existence of an adequate road and telecommunications net. I still insist there can be no early de-emphasis on military assistance while we face the present internal security threat in South East Asia and the threat of external aggression throughout this area. Any relaxation of current emphasis on security will open the door to Communist pressures, both overt and covert, which can forestall economic development in these nations unless they accommodate to the Communist colonial empire. John Steeves’ paper which he presented at Baguio should provide you with some fine material on this point.
6.
Any major shift from grant economic aid to loans must be on a carefully considered case-by-case basis to avoid playing right into Communist hands, particularly in those countries which are either deplorably underdeveloped or sitting astride the fence.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5–MSP/5–3059. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩

  2. This unnumbered telegram, marked “No Distribution Outside Department” and “Limit Distribution for Admiral Felt from Parsons,” reads as follows:

    “Question of FE country force goals and missions likely come up in course appearances I may have to make next two or three weeks before Foreign Relations and possibly other Committees. Recalling your remarks and Under Secretary Dillon’s remarks at Baguio re importance making complete, forceful, sound definition roles and missions, I would much appreciate receiving on personal informal basis any suggestions and views you might care to pass on to me re answering anticipated questions. Will use them only for background and on unattributed basis. Believe it particularly useful if you could give overall basic arguments for currently planned goals, especially ROK and GRC, particularly in light Senator Mansfield’s recent statements and current interest economic (DLF) as opposed military aid (including defense support). Would appreciate reply by May 25.” (ibid., 790.5–MSP/5–2159) Mike Mansfield of Montana was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

    ↩
  3. Frank Carlson of Kansas, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.↩