Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

350. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 29, 1960—11 p.m.

3093. Reference: Deptel 2109;² other channel message to Smith from Parsons, May 28.³ On basis ref Deptel and message from Parsons I saw Phoumi this afternoon by appointment:

1. MinDef informed me first that “King plans abide by parliamentary principle of entrusting formation new PDSP Parliamentary major leader only obstacle to which appeared to be attitude of friendly nations.” Phoumi claimed everyone wished him assume Premiership but he “would cede place to someone else of his own choice if US objections to him as PriMin were unsurmountable.” Otherwise he would try himself “to save country from unfortunate situation which has existed in Kingdom for past ten years.” Phoumi said his party (PDSP) has 35 Deputies plus support of 10 unaffiliated and of “four of seventeen RPL who also members PDSP”. (Figures given by MinDef do not of course gibe with 59 total Assembly membership and so far as we know PDSP has only 26, not a majority, and RPL has 19 plus as many as 9 sympathizers from among 14 unaffiliated Deputies.)

2. I then passed Dept’s advice as contained ref Deptel adding paras 2 and 3 of other channel message.⁴

3. After thanking me for our counsel and past suggestions, Phoumi stated he did not feel he and PDSP had gone beyond Dept’s desires. He considered himself one of key leaders in seeking unified front in pre-electoral period, blaming on Nouphat and Ngon Electoral Committee’s failure achieve conservative unity during electoral campaign. He added that govt must now be formed rapidly but at same time if he were PriMin he would being about national unity through establishment coalition Cabinet composed of representatives three Assembly groups “provided RPL not too demanding”. Actually, he said, PDSP could form govt without RPL but was nevertheless willing have certain of its members join Cabinet.

4. Re next govt’s policy, Phoumi stated there would be no change in political, economic or financial spheres from that followed by previous govts and would confirm to US wishes. He could therefore see no objection to his being PriMin in a govt of primarily civilian character. While admitting security situation “not perfect”, MinDef asserted state of calm now exists which can only be maintained if new RLG follows proper policy and promised he would take all necessary steps to ensure internal and external security as well as observe recommendations from friendly countries. He repeated that he could however yield Premiership to another but still could not understand our reservations since his party’s program was flexible, made no reference to military activities and placed emphasis on winning over loyalty of population. Role of FAL would be to protect civil program and civil authorities.

5. According Phoumi there are two possible formulas: (A) govt headed by himself and (B) govt headed by Tiao Somsanith. In either case there would be no Vice Premier and total number participants limited to twelve. Composition of Cabinet regardless of who takes Premiership will be identical: Phoumi as MinDef, Tiao Somsanith Min Interior, Khamphan Panya Min FonAff, Thao Leuam Min Finance, Keo Viphakone Min Econ and Rural Affairs. Distribution remainder portfolios undetermined but Cabinet would include three unaffiliated Deputies (Nhouy Abhay, Dr. Khamsouk, Leuam Insisiengmay), two RPL (Ngon Sananikone and Oun Heuan Norasing), and two of following four PDSP reps: Oukeo Souvannavong, Inpeng Suryadhay, Bouvan Norasing and Kou Voravong.

6. In concluding conversation I inquired whether Phoumi planned also consult at least with British Amb as I gathered he had indicated he might and possibly also with French Amb taking into consideration support given by HMG and GOF and deep and friendly interest these two powers in Laos. Phoumi replied he would plan see both of them tomorrow morning once ceremony Provisional Govt’s resignation over at 10 a.m.

Immediately thereafter I informed British Amb Addis of substance above meeting with Phoumi and DCM also notified French Amb Falaize.

Smith

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/5–2960. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. Supra.
3. Not found.
4. Telegram 3098 from Vientiane, May 30, contains the verbatim text of Smith’s oral message to Phoumi, including these two paragraphs. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/5–3060; included in the microfiche supplement)