Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

349. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, May 26, 1960—7:41 p.m.

2109. Embtel 3008.² If Phoumi should consult you re designation next Prime Minister you may review Department’s position along following lines:

1. We have carefully avoided supporting any leader for Prime Ministership, considering this matter best decided by Lao themselves. We certainly have nothing against Phoumi personally as he himself knows.

2. However US would be remiss in role of friend if it did not express its views with situation as it sees it. Thus we have frankly discussed these views with King and Lao leaders including Phoumi.

3. First we consider security situation far from satisfactory.³ Skirmishes, acts of terrorism, propaganda activities continue to be reported from all parts of country. There is no evidence that Communist capabilities have been seriously reduced. At same time while FAL’s capabilities have greatly improved over past year, we continue receive disturbing reports that its actions in certain areas have been deeply resented by villagers. We continue believe that security cannot be maintained by military means alone and in any case could not be assured if population alienated. Six-man teams are not sufficient answer to this problem; FAL as a whole must develop sense of responsibility.

4. Secondly as Phoumi knows we encouraged and supported single slate of government candidates. We considered that such a slate could win an overwhelming majority in wholly free and fair elections which would have considerably strengthened prestige of Laos internationally. Unfortunately circumstances under which elections held have caused doubts abroad.

5. In light security and international considerations we became concerned that if next government appeared led or dominated by military, Communists might intensify their armed insurgency thus inhibiting economic and social progress on which peace and stability of Laos finally rests. This concern is all more acute since NLHX and fellow travelers have been eliminated from Assembly and thus prevented from carrying out overt legal activities as safety valve. This view is strengthened by escape of NLHX leaders.

6. We concluded that interests of Laos best served by reconciliation of patriotic elements and formation predominantly civilian government composed of representatives all these elements. Besides presenting united front to world, a government so formed could be most effective in obtaining services of able men from among older leaders whose experience should not be lost to nation. This view generally held by all friends of Laos. Besides ourselves, UK, France, Australia and UNSYG himself have expressed concern re situation. This advice is well intended and should not be taken lightly as rumors reaching us have indicated certain Lao were saying it should be. But final decision remains naturally with Lao. We can only hope that they will have considered all factors before taking decision. FYI. Above is summary Department views which you and staff may use as appropriate. You should bear in mind however that if despite all counsel to contrary King designates Phoumi Prime Minister and latter accepts, we may have no choice but to support new government as long as its policies and actions are consistent with our objectives. End FYI.

Concur your suggestion that our advice should be proffered on basis “since you have asked for it”.

In order preclude Phoumi and cohorts retaining any documentary evidence of “interference” believe above exercise if carried out should be on oral basis only and no aide-mémoire left with him.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.13/5–2660. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Chapman; cleared by Anderson, Cleveland, and Steeves; and approved by Parsons. Repeated to London, Paris, USUN, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 3008, May 24, Smith reported that he had called on Khamphan Panya and Phoumi as instructed in telegram 2086 to Vientiane, May 21, to inform them that U.S. concern over the next Lao Government was based on U.S. desire to maintain Laos’ international prestige, peace, and stability. While the United States was not threatening to reduce or terminate aid if it did not approve of the composition of the next Lao Government, changes in policies and attitudes, such as a return to discredited fiscal procedures, would require “readjustment” in U.S. aid. (ibid., 751J.02/5–1860 and 751J.02/5–2460; both included in the microfiche supplement)
3. This view is confirmed in telegram 2874 from Vientiane, May 12, in which Smith summarized security estimates prepared for him by the [less than 1 line of text not declassified] Army Attaché. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/5–1260; included in the microfiche supplement)