351. Editorial Note
On June 3, the Lao National Assembly approved a Cabinet headed by Tiao Somsanith. Other key members of the government were Phoumi Nosavan as Minister of Defense and Veterans Affairs, Khamphan Panya as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inpeng Suryadhay as Minister of Finance and the Plan, Keo Viprakone as Minister of Economic and Rural Affairs, and Ngon Sananikone as Minister of Justice and Cults. On May 31, Deputy Director for Central Intelligence Robert Amory gave the National Security Council a preview of the new government as part of the usual briefing, “Significant Developments Affecting U.S. Security.” Amory’s assessment reads as follows:
“Mr. Amory said that after some delay the King of Laos had designated Tiao Somsanith as Premier. Somsanith will probably be accepted by the Laotian Assembly. The King would probably have preferred General Phoumi, but the United States and its allies felt he was unduly antagonistic to Communism and that his appointment might result in stirring up the local hostilities in Laos. However, General Phoumi would probably be the real power in the new government.” (Memorandum of discussion at the 446th NSC Meeting, May 31; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
A summary account of Tiao Somsanith’s acceptance speech to the National Assembly, in which he promised a “realistic policy” based on international neutrality, restored internal security and rural development, fiscal conservatism and a balanced budget, and a more favorable trade balance, is in telegram 3168 from Vientiane, June 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–360) The Embassy made a long preliminary assessment of the new government in telegram 3171 from Vientiane, June 4, in which it noted that Tiao Somsanith would suffer, at least initially, from the stigma of being a “front man” for Phoumi. The Embassy was impressed by Tiao Somsanith’s honesty, patriotism, [Page 777] moderation, and willingness to accept advice and the anti-Communist and pro-U.S. orientation of the Cabinet. Telegram 3171 ended with the following assessment: “We believe it safe expect that proposed Cabinet will be prone seek less our (or any other outside) counsel, will welcome it less when volunteered, and will be less responsive to such guidance after it is received.” (ibid., 751J.13/6–460)
Telegrams 3168 and 3171 are included in the microfiche supplement.