31. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State1
451. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Following is summary report restricted session held Wellington from 9:55 to 12:15 April 10. Meeting was held in Cabinet Room Parliament Building with chief delegates and two advisors. For US Johnson and Felt accompanied Dillon. No verbatim reporters were present and no formal record was made of meeting, it being agreed discussion would be entirely informal and strictly confidential character maintained. Public record of activities showed only chief delegates were invited by chairman “for morning tea”.
Dillon opened meeting with oral report on last NATO Ministerial meeting in Washington. Report was previously coordinated with UK and France. Only discussion following report concerned likelihood of Summit meeting.
Australian Foreign Minister Casey then made presentation on Australian concern over possibility Indo “unofficially” using force in West Irian asking “SEATO partners seek means of impressing on Indo importance not using force in any form in West Irian dispute”. Noted tendency of Indo build-up military forces beyond internal security needs, mentioning Communist jets, naval build-up, et cetera, as well as fact that because of continuation rebellion in North Celebes military forces being concentrated in eastern portion country close proximity West Irian. Australia has “lingering anxiety” that next 12–15 months Indo might, possibly through labor troubles involving approximately 10,000 Indos resident in west tip New Guinea, foment some incident [Page 88] which could provide basis for “indirect” use of force by Indo. Stressed that while Djuanda and Subandrio have renounced use of force, Sukarno has thus far not made any statement this regard.
Sandys (UK) agreed use of force anywhere in area would “eventually involve us all” and importance of exercising steadying influence on Indo.
Nash (New Zealand) spoke of problem of “competition in supplying arms” between East and West, presumably Indo thus obtaining a greater amount of arms and, because of strength of PKI, possibility all arms would come under control Communists.
Dillon made detailed explanation US policy, pointing out US emphasizes to Indos on all suitable occasions US opposition to attempt bring about any territorial changes by military force or military action in any way. Believe considerable progress has been made in Indonesian attitudes this problem and US appreciation of Indo situation thus little more optimistic than that of Australia. However, US was and would continue as matter of practice make clear to Indos its views on use of force on all suitable occasions. Pointed out that if US refused all Indo requests for arms it would probably result in Soviets sending in many times greater supplies and US would be denied voice which it obtains by supplying some arms. Communist situation in Indo far better than a year ago and leaders appear increasingly to recognize Communist threat as demonstrated by postponement of elections and return to 1945 Constitution. US feels armed forces have generally indicated their anti-Communist attitude and US hopeful trend will continue and develop. Also pointed out importance of training given in US on pol attitudes of Indo army officers.
Sandys supported US views.
Imperial (Philippines) said that although Sukarno apparently “loved by great majority Indo people” attempt had been made on his life and somewhat cryptically asked whether “if something happened to Sukarno” army would be used against Communist elements in Indo. Noted that Nasution2 was “definitely anti-Communist.”
Khoman (Thailand) said that he thought Indo had in UN promised not to use force against West Irian and expressed doubt Indo non-government forces would be sufficient create incident. In his mind real danger being possibility hostilities between Indo and Dutch Government forces.
Qadir (Pakistan) then made statement on Pakistani-Indian frictions, strongly urging search for some third party or parties mediation. Said Pakistan “will accept whatever is decided by an outside body” and for first time, “and perhaps for last time” present regime in Pakistan [Page 89] is in position to arrive at and accept solution of difficulties with India. Pakistan realized friction between two states was only to advantage Communists; efforts to obtain settlement in UN were always vetoed; UK had advised Pakistan not to go to ICJ as “Commonwealth has own machinery for settling disputes” and Pakistan would accordingly appreciate countries “reflecting on this problem.” During course of discussion, Pakistani Representative said he was not seeking any SEATO action, any statement from SEATO, or any propaganda advantage but was rather genuinely seeking some suggestions for solution its problems with India.
Sandys expressed sympathy with Pakistan and pointed out arbitration depended upon agreement both parties.
Imperial then made statement on economic aid, stating that while Philippines “grateful for bilateral aid,” if SEATO is to attract uncommitted nations it should reappraise its attitude with regard to economic aid.
Dillon then made extended presentation on US aid policies. Said was sympathetic to Philippine statements and pointed out US desire to favor countries which had declared themselves and undertaken free world defense responsibilities. Pointed out that defense-support appropriations were available only to countries which had undertaken such responsibilities.
With regard to DLF, it was US desire wherever possible, and to maximum possible extent, show additional favor to countries that had been willing to take a clear position between Communist and free world. However, this cannot be sole criteria and it was important that countries submit good projects for consideration. Countries must make real effort, not necessarily a larger financial effort, but in terms of thinking out useful and realistic programs. US aid missions in countries concerned willing to work with governments to this end. In comparing size of US programs in various countries, account should be taken of differing sizes and populations of countries. US attitude toward regional financial institutions had changed since last SEATO meeting. Where states in a region desired multilateral approach on financial matters and were willing to contribute their own resources US was prepared to help or give aid to the extent practicable. Noted President’s offer to UN for Near East institution and Arabs had legally created such institution. However, it was not yet effective and it had not indicated that it was interested in USG assistance. This week there had been concluded agreement on an inter-American bank of Latin America and Latin America was subscribing approximately one-half capital with US contributing other half. Latin American portion made up approximately equally of gold or dollars and local currencies. If it was desire of SEA countries, US would be willing to adopt similar policy but must recognize total amount of resources available for this [Page 90] purpose limited and to extent multilateral aid increased, bilateral aid would have to be decreased. Fully recognized usefulness of identifying SEATO with economic betterment but because geographic distribution of SEATO countries difficult deal with this matter solely within SEATO framework. However, US was willing to consider concrete suggestions and willing to discuss in Council representatives.
Khoman commented that he was glad to hear that DLF loans were based on merits of projects and there were not any advance bloc allocations to individual countries. Also stated he felt size and population of country should not be only factors but should also include responsibilities of countries.
Khoman then made presentation on internal Thai situation, pointing out October 20 movement was supported by King and people. Present government was not “military dictatorship”; out of Cabinet of 15 only 4 were military men; liberties and freedom of people not impaired and movement was necessitated by dilemma of whether it would retain parliamentary system even at cost of permitting Communists disintegrate country or temporarily abandon parliamentary system. Khoman then made factual presentation on relations with Cambodia, pointing to good Thai relations with Burma, Malaya, India, and Indo as refutation SIHANOUK’s statements Thailand trying to pressure Cambodia join SEATO. Said Thailand will not interfere in Cambodian internal affairs and that he had accepted Cambodian invitation visit Phnom Penh doing so as soon as schedule permitted. [If] Discussions there were favorable, he would recommend Prime Minister Sarit accept Cambodian invitation for visit. Thailand recognizes stability of all countries SEA prerequisite for Thai stability.
Jacquinot (France) welcomed Thai statements and said French estimate was that Cambodia was slowly but surely moving toward free world.
Sandys also welcomed “statesmanlike and moderate” Thai statements; emphasized importance of removing suspicions of countries of area by closer contacts. Read Pravda article attacking Wellington meeting and particularly noted Pravda statements SEATO was trying force Cambodia give up its neutrality.
In reply to question by Nash as to genuineness German desire for unification, Sandys replied that no German in public life could appear not strongly to favor unification but in hearts many Germans were frightened of possible consequences and others realized unlikelihood of being achieved. Dillon said no indications Soviets would be willing to let go of East Germany or agree to any terms for unification that would be acceptable to West. Jacquinot agreed with Sandys and Dillon and stated that West must be careful avoid appearing to be to blame for failure Germany achieve reunification and must continue to stress unification. In reply to statement by Nash concerning “lurking fear” of [Page 91] a strong and unified Germany some places in Europe and among Soviets, Sandys pointed out Germany could not be danger so long as associated with others as in NATO and essential Germany continue to be so linked. Danger of Rapacki and other plans looking toward withdrawal Western forces from Germany or neutralization Germany was that Germany was, in fact, too powerful to remain neutral and in playing one side off against another might eventually throw lot in with Soviets.
Meeting closed with general strong affirmation desirability have similar restricted sessions at future Council meetings and scheduling more time for such sessions. Sandys suggested usual opening statements in normal closed sessions not be presented orally but circulated before-hand. Casey suggested Council meetings be extended to five days. Jacquinot agreed. Dillon expressed agreement with value restricted session but stated should not be at expense of regular sessions which also important. Suggested matter be referred to Council representatives for further discussion which was agreed.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WE/4–1159. Secret; Seato; Limit Distribution. Dillon and Parsons had flown to Canberra the evening of April 10.↩
- General Abdul Haris Nasution, Indonesian Minister of Defense and People’s Security.↩
- The final session of the SEATO Council meeting, held that afternoon, is summarized in telegram 293 from Wellington, April 10. (Ibid., 396.1–WE/4–1059; included in the microfiche supplement) For text of the meeting’s communiqué, dated April 10, see Department of State Bulletin, April 27, 1959, p. 604.↩