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  4. Document 30

30. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State 1

Wellington , April 20, 1959—8 p.m.

295. From Dillon. Reference: London’s 36;2 Department telegram 220.3 Department will have noted paragraph on Tibet in SEATO communiqué which fairly reflects views expressed during conference discussions.

As suggested reference telegram, delegation discussed with three Asian delegates plus Vietnamese observer possibility resolution or more extensive treatment communiqué. Asian delegates all felt despite their condemnation Chinese Communist actions in Tibet that a resolution would be undesirable. It was their view that for SEATO to inject [Page 87] itself further would be likely give Nehru excuse deflect rising Indian indignation by labeling Tibet as issue being fronted for cold war purposes. These delegates believe it preferable to allow indignation Asian neutrals leaven by itself. Vietnamese in particular cautioned against SEATO going further because of effect on Indians.

In my opinion language of communiqué is maximum that could have been obtained and fully reflects Department’s desire for forth-right expression of indignation on part of all SEATO members.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/4–1059. Confidential; SEATO.↩
  2. In telegram 36 from London to Wellington, April 7, repeated to the Department as telegram 5162, the Embassy reported that the British Foreign Office, in deference to the Indian Government, felt it best for Britain not to take the initiative to comment on developments in Tibet, except to point out that Indians and Southeast Asians were highly critical of the actions of the People’s Republic of China. According to the Embassy, the Foreign Office had instructed its SEATO delegation to work for limiting any SEATO announcement on Tibet to an expression of general concern. (Ibid., 793B.00/4–759)↩
  3. In telegram 220, April 8, the Department instructed Dillon to work for a resolution strongly condemning “Chinese Communist behavior” in Tibet, in preference to the general expression of concern advocated by Britain. (Ibid., 793.00/4–759; included in the microfiche supplement)↩