32. Telegram From the Delegation at the SEATO Council Meeting to the Department of State1
448. From Dillon. My overall impression of SEATO meeting was its uneventful character. It was uniformly marked by fine spirit of cooperation and no real differences of opinion came to light. Expected assault on US aid policies and drive to put SEATO in economic development business did not arise, probably due to absence of Serrano. His replacement, the Philippine Ambassador to Australia, appeared to be over his depth and played minor role throughout meeting.
In addition Thanat Khoman was most restrained in this regard during public sessions and in fact stated publicly that US bilateral programs could be considered as fulfillment of obligations under Article [Page 92] III. However, in private he shows strong feelings regarding US aid to India in favoring neutralism. Khoman was particularly helpful during meeting uniformly supporting US views whenever there was slightest difference of opinion in discussion. US gave early support to Thai proposal re rural development centers which greatly appreciated by Khoman. Pakistan Qadir was also very friendly merely taking every opportunity to stress Pakistan willingness and ability to accept any arbitrated or neutral decision on differences with India and urging us to do our best with India to take advantage of opportunity for settlement offered by present strong Pakistan Government.
I was pleased to note universal recognition of importance to SEATO of US action in Taiwan Straits last fall and implicit recognition that defense of Taiwan was of direct concern to SEATO. Fact that Nash supported this view was particularly encouraging. It was clear that recent events in Tibet have completely shattered Nash’s long-held illusions re Communist China. At one point he said he had not expected such action and frankly no longer knew what to think regarding ChiCom.2
Unanimous and strongly held view of Asian partners including Vietnamese representative that SEATO and Western powers in particular should avoid getting out in front on Tibetan matter also significant. They clearly feel this is most important development that can permanently affect thinking in hitherto neutralist Asian countries and wish avoid any action which might upset present trend.
Frank exchange of views at restricted session was particularly useful and interesting. Unanimous view was that there should be more of this at future Council meetings.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–WE/4–1159. Secret; Seato; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi, Paris (also for USRO), Wellington, London, Manila, Djakarta, Saigon, and Phnom Penh. Passed to CINCPAC POLAD.↩
- According to Parsons, commenting on the meeting in telegram 449 from Canberra, April 11, Nash had made public remarks to this effect at a luncheon on April 9. “This was open recantation persistent faith that somehow ChiComs less bad than we said. Earlier, thanks to Secretary, yourself and Francis Russell he deferred to us because he did not wish to hurt us in grave matters for which we, not he, had responsibility. Now I think his convictions have been shattered.” Parsons concluded: “There was general shock over Tibetan matter but Nash’s reaction was the most arresting.” (Ibid., 396.1–WE/4–1159) Francis Russell was Ambassador in New Zealand.↩