Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

293. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 16, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Situation in Laos

1. Several recent telegrams from Laos (one of which—No. 1300 of November 8—was summarized in my memorandum of November 10)² have focused attention on two major problems of political and economic policy in that country.

Political

2. The political problem revolves around the necessity for action to prolong the constitutional framework of Prime Minister Phoui’s coalition government. We support Phoui’s view that this should be accomplished by extending for an additional year the legal mandate of the National Assembly, which is due to expire on December 25, 1959, and to extend the special powers which that Assembly granted to Phoui until December 1960. This would provide time for anti-Communist elements to build popular support, and for the implementation of programs to achieve greater economic, social, and military stability.

3. The CDNI, an anti-Communist group of younger better educated men associated closely with the Army and the new King, is an essential component of Phoui’s coalition government. However, it is dissatisfied with the caliber of many of the older politicians in Phoui’s own LHL party and, as a means of ejecting these politicians, favors the abolition of the National Assembly. Moreover, the CDNI advocates constitutional revisions to strengthen the executive and the establishment of a strong interim Government in December 1959 to hold office until it decides the time is propitious for general elections.

4. On November 3 the Prime Minister told our Ambassador that the CDNI was blocking his programs for resolving the constitutional issue as well as programs for enforcing greater efficiency in Government. He said he feared that use of his authority to overcome this opposition would lead to a CDNI–Army coup [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. However, on November 10, following separate discussions by Phoui and Ambassador Smith with CDNI politicians, Phoui appeared to the Ambassador to be somewhat more confident that he could manage the problem of CDNI opposition.

Economic

6. The Ambassador reports that Phoui is disheartened over what he regards as the meager impact of USOM’s economic assistance program. Phoui particularly emphasizes his conviction that a greatly expanded road-building program is imperative if Laos is to be unified in the face of Communist psychological warfare and creeping subversion of the rural population, especially in inaccessible areas.

7. The Ambassador and the new Director of USOM have endorsed Phoui’s views and have expressed in strong terms their own views that our aid program has been uncoordinated, slow, and quantitatively inadequate.

Comment

8. Phoui, the Ambassador, and the USOM Director have emphasized their belief that a major cause of these problems is divergence and frequent conflict between the operations of the Embassy and USOM on the one hand and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Defense³ on the other. Our view here is that, although there may have appeared at times to be divergence in the field, there has not in fact been any divergence of concept in Washington. The solution to this problem is to be sought in removing the appearance (and if need be the reality) of it in Vientiane, primarily by ensuring that the Country Team headed by the Ambassador speaks with one voice.

9. The resolution of Phoui’s political problem requires primarily that Phoui be confident of our support. However, such support must be dependent upon his exertion of appropriate leadership to hold his coalition together by maintaining balanced contact with all elements of it. We should not be placed in the position of enforcing Phoui’s will, but rather of supporting his leadership. The key problem of enlisting support of the CDNI, the Army and the King for wise constitutional procedures as advocated by Phoui will have to be worked out by frank discussion among them.

10. Pending the anticipated early receipt of specific Country Team recommendations on the aid program, the Department, ICA and the Bureau of Public Roads are moving forward here with the coordination of plans for an accelerated road program based on recommendations and execution by the BPR. BPR engineers have surveyed the program in Laos, and the Bureau is prepared to move ahead rapidly with plans which should produce substantial results within six months.

11. While recognizing that the situation in Laos is perilous, we consider that the problems described above are manageable. They represent an important aspect of the difficulties that confront us, but have been portrayed in recent telegrams in an overdrawn and somewhat emotional manner. The general line of approach recommended above, together with other actions to improve the capability of the internal security forces, stabilize the currency, gain the support of minority tribes, prolong the UN presence, and broaden the scope of participation by other free world countries in building stability, offers promise of continued progress in strengthening the country against the Communist threat.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Laos. Secret. Drafted by Usher and cleared by SEA and FE.
2. The November 10 memorandum is printed as Document 288. Regarding telegram 1300, see footnote 2 thereto.
3. This is the first indication of any dissatisfaction on the Ambassador’s part with the Defense program, which he has been strongly supporting. [Footnote in the source text.]