Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

288. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, November 10, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Vientiane’s Telegram No. 1300, November 8, 1959² on the U.S. Effort in Laos

Following is a summary of the subject telegram which is divided into three parts: I. the USOM Director’s first report to the Director of ICA; II. the Ambassador’s assessment of recent political developments; and III. the joint recommendations of the Ambassador and the USOM Director.

I. USOM Director’s Report

The new USOM Director, John Tobler, arrived in Vientiane six weeks ago. He is fully convinced that, unless an all-out fully-coordinated U.S. effort is made in the near future, the chances are slim that Laos will survive as an independent country. He states that the central government has in effect lost control over wide areas of the country and that travel outside metropolitan areas by both Lao and Americans is severely restricted. He attributes the failure of the U.S. program to the multiplicity of uncoordinated approaches to the many problems—[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Defense with more flexibility than USOM in emergency situations have resorted to unconventional approaches, forging ahead in different directions and undercutting and undermining USOM, which must operate on a conventional basis requiring full accountability. He summarizes our program in Laos as an appalling example of programming for failure.

II. Political Situation

The Ambassador recounts the highlights of Phoui’s tenure as Prime Minister, and contrasts the reasonably sanguine outlook of last January with that of today. He states Phoui has not felt in a position to utilize his full powers nor has he been successful in carrying out his program which has virtually come to a halt. He attributes this primarily to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CDNI’s obstructionist tactics, as well as to the opposition of the still politically influential Katay don Sasorith and Bong Souvannavong and the ineffectiveness of certain cabinet members.

III. Joint Recommendations

A. Political. We should prepare the U.S. public for the very real possibility of failure in Laos by emphasizing the degree of insecurity that has developed. At the same time we should (1) make it clear to Phoui and the CDNI that there is no dichotomy in U.S. policy and that the U.S. Government continues to support Phoui fully and has no intention of supporting an unconstitutional authoritarian government established under CDNI control by coup or royal decree, and (2) make it clear to Phoui that he must meet the obligations implicit in his full powers; unless he does, we can not justify continuation of support at present levels.

B. Economic. Special supplementary funds should be appropriated for road building, USOM should be effectively staffed, competitive programs of other agencies should cease or be phased out, and an attempt should be made to enlist the support of other free world sources of aid.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1059. Top Secret. Drafted by Erikson and cleared by Anderson, Usher, and Steeves. Transmitted to Herter under cover of a brief memorandum by Parsons, November 10, in which the Assistant Secretary informed Herter: “I believe I should express the early opinion that much of this report should be treated with reserve although we agree that the situation in Laos is indeed serious.” Herter initialed this covering memorandum.
2. included in the microfiche supplement. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–859)