Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

289. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, November 11, 1959—5:11 p.m.

1037. For Ambassador from Parsons. Ref. Embtel 1293.² In view Hammarskjold’s imminent arrival Vientiane I am sending this partial response reftel although on uncoordinated basis, today being a holiday.

There has been evidence over some months that Hammarskjold has been concerned that U.S. policy and activities in SEA have suffered from lack coordination and are unduly influenced by Military and Intelligence Agencies. There has also been indications from several posts that certain French officials have not been averse to undercutting U.S. by spreading reports that our Intelligence operates independently of Department. We have endeavored at every opportunity correct such misconceptions.

Reftel indicates this subject has been discussed rather frankly with British, French and Indian Ambassadors in Vientiane in effort convince them no such dichotomy exists.³ I hope fact that this is current topic in Vientiane will not somehow serve confirm Hammarskjold’s suspicions. I am sure you will lose no opportunity to try and convince him that U.S. policy and action fully unified under you as Ambassador. In so doing I hope you will put emphasis on fact that U.S. supports legitimate government of country, constantly emphasizing need for national unity at time of crisis and, far from supporting one non-Communist element to detriment of other non-Communist elements, strives play correct role in position of great responsibility which U.S. necessarily has by reason of budgetary support and other aid. I am also sure you will be careful not to give him or anyone else notion we support one or another element as means influencing internal political situation. We try instead influence all such elements pull together under RLG. Obvious delicacy this whole subject requires extreme caution particularly at this time.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/11–1159. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Parsons, cleared by Anderson, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In telegram 1293, November 6, Smith reported a long conversation he had with Phoui on November 3. Phoui was “profoundly disheartened” over his reception in Washington during his trip and was fearful that the United States was preparing to sell Laos down the river, to paraphrase the cable. Smith suggested that additional U.S. “moral and material assistance” would be required to allow Phoui to resist certain CDNI effort to undermine him. (ibid., 033.51J11/11–659; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. This reference to telegram 1293 from Vientiane is in error; the reference should be to telegram 1307 from Vientiane, November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–959; included in the microfiche supplement)