Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

290. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Laos Affairs (Chapman) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Anderson)¹

Washington, November 13, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Internal Political Problems in Laos

In recent telegrams,² Ambassador Smith has focused his attention on the Phoui–CDNI differences and has referred to a number of factors and issues arising from and causing these differences. In order to arrive at a clear understanding of the situation, I have listed below, in brief, the principal factors and issues which, taken together, form the present complex of political problems in Laos.

Factors in the Situation

1. The King: As Prince, Savang Vathana developed an emotional dislike to the present Assembly and its deputies and would have been glad to be rid of them. He also displayed an increasing interest in directing the affairs of the country. Perhaps because of both his dislike for the Assembly and his interest in the country’s future and clearly because of his long attachment to the Army, he became one of the staunch supporters of the CDNI. While it is too early to tell, it should be presumed that he would maintain these attitudes now that he is King, and in this capacity he will have a greater influence on the situation.

2. Phoui: Phoui has always remained a party man, realizing that the basis of his political strength resides in the Lao Hom Lao. His ability lies principally in tactical maneuvering among groups and individuals, but he has not displayed the type of energetic leadership which the situation requires. At the same time, he is the only man of sound judgment and amenable to our view who at present can unite under him all the anti-Communist factions in the country. He has proven himself a true friend of the U.S., and has generally sought our advice on all major issues and consistently followed our suggestions. His Government has faced and resolved some major problems confronting Laos, i.e., monetary reform, stability of government, and training the Army.

3. CDNI: The CDNI comprises an elite of the younger civilian and military Lao. They will in all probability furnish many of the leaders of tomorrow. They have [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] created a new public spirit in Laos. They are generally patriotic, pro-U.S. and anti-Communist and share the King’s distaste for deputies. It must be recognized that on certain issues CDNI members have strong feelings not easily swayed by reason. However, they are still Lao in that they are not well organized, lack energy, and their judgment is often not sound. They tend to take their wishes for granted. It may be questioned whether they could be successful at the polls and their power resides principally in the support of the King, key army officers [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

4. Lao Hom Lao: The LHL has never succeeded in welding itself into a real political party. It is rather a grouping of individual Parliamentarians. It has been rather discredited by the past activities of its members who have been involved in the corruption stemming from our aid program and who have been more interested in personal gain than in the country’s welfare. Nevertheless, the LHL deputies were elected in generally fair elections and many of them are representatives of their region. The more able members have in the past year shown considerable irritation and frustration at the evidently growing power of the CDNI which they feel is a direct threat to their positions. Friction between the LHL and the CDNI cannot probably be wholly eliminated; we can only seek to reduce it to the minimum.

5. The Army: While there are factions within the Army, it is probable that the great majority of officers would remain loyal to the King, and the great majority of the young officers, many in key positions, are affiliated to or at least sympathetic with the CDNI. Since the spring of 1958, when the Army was called to participate in the election campaign, certain officers had become increasingly interested in politics. Their interest has been manifested by their inclusion in the Cabinet since August 1958. Officers in general share the King’s and the CDNI’s attitude toward the Assembly.

[Numbered paragraph 6 (7½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Issues

1. Extension of the Mandate of the Assembly: The Assembly mandate terminates on December 25, 1959. Phoui proposes to convene a National Congress to vote a constitutional law to extend the Assembly’s mandate by one year. The CDNI prefers to have the Assembly dissolved in accordance with the Constitution. Most probably, Phoui basically considers he owes a debt to his Lao Hom Lao colleagues while the CDNI believes its position will be strengthened with the dissolution of the Assembly.

2. Timing of the Elections: With the Assembly mandate extended by one year, Phoui would like to have elections held in December 1960. He argues that a campaign lasts three months, that there has been no time to prepare for elections now and that anti-Communist elements are not in a position to make a good showing at present while, given another year, the Government could, through various village aid programs, improve its electoral position. The CDNI considers that once the Assembly has been dissolved, the King should appoint a government which would carry on until elections could be held at a more propitious time.

Neither Phoui nor the CDNI appear to have taken into consideration the security situation existing in the country. Mention is made in certain telegrams that the Government has lost control over important areas. It may be wondered, therefore, how elections could be held under these circumstances. Furthermore, if an electoral campaign were to get under way in the near future, it may be feared that the CDNI and LHL would split and the Government’s entire energies would be devoted to this campaign, creating a dangerous void of authority at a time when the country is seriously threatened.

We have just received a copy of the new electoral law which provides, among the principal changes, that elections will be held in two stages and deputies will be elected on the basis of Muong constituencies rather than provinces. These two modifications are aimed at giving anti-Communist candidates an advantage over their opponents. We are now studying this law to ensure that it serves its purpose.

3. Modification of the Constitution: The first point in Phoui’s “action program” which he presented to the Assembly in January 1959 in requesting special powers was a proposal to create a constitutional commission to study amending the Constitution. A constitutional commission was formed but we have no clear information regarding the results of its work. The CDNI is now strongly favoring what they term a “granted” constitution which, if I understand it correctly, would be a document issued by royal decree. It would provide for a very much enlarged role for the King and for strictly limiting the powers of the Assembly. Last spring Phoui also favored a strengthening of the Executive as against the Legislative but never spelled out his ideas in precise form, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] a new constitution devised by Joubert, a French lawyer in Vientiane, which, as I understand it, practically eliminates the Assembly as a political factor and places the reality of power in the hands of the King. This constitution apparently reflects the opinion held by many Lao, particularly the CDNI, that Laos needs a constitution along De Gaullist lines.

The working level of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the Department believe that it is preferable to start from the present constitution and amend it as necessary rather than throwing it away and starting with a brand new text.

4. U.S. Aid: Grafted onto these political problems and rendering them more acute is the question of our aid program, its composition, magnitude, and implementation. There is, I believe, a growing frustration among the Lao at the apparent lack of progress their country is making. Phoui believes that a larger, more dynamic program would strengthen his position as proof of U.S. support for himself as Prime Minister, while the CDNI accuses Phoui of having failed to give the necessary leadership to make the most out of the aid program. On the U.S. side, we have found it extremely difficult to establish a USOM of sufficient size and quality to implement effectively our aid to Laos. Therefore, until ICA could do so and in view of the emergencies of the past few years, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] PEO have been requested to carry out crash programs which by their very nature carry unfortunate consequences. The situation in Laos requires both long-term projects, such as roads, to give the country the necessary basis for its future development, and short-term projects, such as village aid, to make tangible the benefits of the central government to the outlying areas of the country. Recognizing the need for both types of projects, the problem is one of coordination in the field.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1359. Top Secret.
2. Telegrams 1293, November 6; 1300, November 8; and 1307, November 9. (ibid., 033.51J11/11–659, 751J.00/11–859, and 751J.00/11–959, respectively; all included in the microfiche supplement)