Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

287. Memorandum for the Record¹

Vientiane, November 6, 1959.

SUBJECT

• The problem of constitutional reform in Laos [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. The question of amending the Laos constitution to prolong the legal mandate of the present National Assembly for an additional year beyond 25 December 1959 is inextricable from a host of complex corollary issues in Laos, including those of political evolution, factional and personal political rivalries, the question of “modified democracy” and the political role of the King, and the ever present threat of internal subversion. At the center of this vortex is the Committee to Defend the National Interests (CDNI) and the contentious policies this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] group is currently following.

2. Present Situation

In January 1959 a “De Gaulle-type” power move spearheaded by the Lao Army and the CDNI persuaded the National Assembly to vote special powers to Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone for a period of twelve months. Phoui was empowered to constitute a completely new cabinet if he so desired, to govern without reference to the National Assembly, to prepare the way for constitutional reforms (including a revamping of the electoral law) and generally to take extraordinary measures to check Communist subversion throughout Laos, with the expressed hope that through the application of special powers, non Communist political factions would acquire a more solid foundation for contesting the general elections with the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat. Unresolved then was what would happen at the termination of the special powers. The National Assembly’s popular mandate of four years expires in December 1959. (Parenthetically, it should be noted that a constitutional provision fixing the deputies’ terms at five years was adopted after the election of the present Assembly and applies only to future Assembly elections.) According to the present constitution general elections have to be scheduled either late in 1959 or early in 1960.

3. In recent months—and particularly since the outbreak in July 1959 of Pathet Lao/NLHS guerrilla warfare in many sectors through-out Laos—a certain sentiment has developed against scheduling general elections until late in 1960 out of conviction that non Communist political elements would not be prepared to contest the elections successfully until that time. This sentiment is found principally among deputies of the non Communist majority party in the National Assembly, the Lao Hom Lao, who of course have a vested interest in a prolongation of the life of the current Assembly. Lao Hom Lao sentiment, however, is not unanimous on this score. Some deputies fear a popular reaction against such a prolongation and are resigned to facing the electorate early in 1960. The leadership of the Lao Hom Lao, including Katay Don Sasorith and Phoui Sananikone, favor not only a prolongation of the Assembly term to five years, but equally another twelve month extension of Phoui’s special powers. If the Assembly’s term is to be extended this probably will have to be accomplished through a constitutional amendment. Phoui favors this, as does the Ambassador, who also regards an extension of Phoui’s special powers as essential.

4. The cabinet, however, is sharply split on the issue, with CDNI ministers opposed to a prolongation of the Assembly mandate. Out of this cabinet dispute a decision was reached to present the question to the Regent (now King) for determination. The Regent, however, kicked it back to the cabinet with the admonition that it was the cabinet’s responsibility to make a firm recommendation for the Regent’s approval. He implied that he would concur in the convening of a National Congress to amend the constitution to permit a prolongation of the current Assembly’s mandate if this is the recommendation made to him, and if the manner suggested for extending the mandate is not against the grain of the constitution. At this moment the cabinet remains divided on the issue.

5. The CDNI position

The entire “reform matière” of the CDNI is directed against the political excesses permitted under the Lao brand of parliamentary democracy and the personal abuse of their privileged position for self aggrandizement on the part of the deputies in the Assembly. CDNI leaders reason that vast political changes have occurred since this Assembly’s election in 1955 and that the Assembly’s mandate should not be extended without again facing the electorate. They are convinced that a large number of the deputies have lost popular favor, could never be reelected, and deserve political retirement. This opposition to extending the Assembly’s mandate is coupled with an equally firm conviction on their part that parliamentary democracy, as Laos had known it, is totally unsuited to the level of political sophistication in the country and that some form of “modified democracy” must come about. Military leaders of the CDNI have been deeply impressed by recent events in Pakistan, Burma, Thailand and France where the army was instrumental either in establishing or strongly influencing the installation of governments with vastly strengthened executive powers at the expense of the legislatures. France in particular served as a useful precedent and guideline for the January 1959 power move in Laos. Again in emulation of De Gaulle’s constitutional revisions which curbed the excesses of parliamentary democracy in France, the CDNI now looks to sharp constitutional revisions in Laos to accomplish a similar objective. Laos has no De Gaulle, but the CDNI draws a parallel between De Gaulle and successor-King Savang Vatthana, who with the Lao Army and the civilian CDNI leaders forms a political triumvirate latently, and sometimes openly, opposed to Phoui and the elder politicians who comprise the Lao Hom Lao.

6. The CDNI would let the Assembly’s mandate end on schedule in December 1959, after a revised constitution was adopted which placed greater executive and legislative power in the hands of the King. Between the end of the Assembly’s mandate and the call for general elections a government of “technicians,” possibly directed by the King himself, would govern. It is a lack of clarity in the CDNI view as to when general elections would be called by such a government of “technicians” which has created a considerable amount of uneasiness over CDNI ultimate objectives. Linking this with the CDNI momentum for sharp constitutional revisions in favor of increased power for the King, the Ambassador has drawn the conclusion that the CDNI is bent on instituting an authoritarian regime in Laos which would kick over all traces of constitutionality and severely cripple democratic processes in Laos. The Ambassador is convinced that any such potential threat must be forestalled and that this can be done only by “freezing” the present situation for another year—that is, extending the Assembly’s mandate, renewing Phoui’s special powers and permitting more time to be bought for more deliberate constitutional changes and the projection of general elections when non Communist political factions would be better prepared to go to the electorate.

[5 paragraphs (2 pages of source text) not declassified]

12. The CDNI record

There can be no question that the CDNI has become the political pressure group on the RLG as originally envisaged. In cementing a firm alliance with the leaders of the Army and the King the civilian CDNI leaders have acquired a position of considerable political power, which is currently manifested through CDNI occupancy of half the ministerial portfolios in the RLG. The CDNI played a key role in the adoption of monetary reform and in straightening out the complex morass of RLG finances; it launched an assassinissement campaign for rooting out the most corrupt civil servants in the RLG hierarchy; and most important, through its leaders’ occupancy of key ministries, has provided a very favorable atmosphere for United States agencies to inaugurate programs for coping with subversion and other serious problems confronting Laos—a situation which never prevailed in preceding Lao governments. Its strengths as an organization have, however, contributed to deep internal political divisions. The CDNI has become suspect in the eyes of the Lao Hom Lao, who look upon it as a greater threat to their acquired political positions than the Neo Lao Hak Sat—which appears a more distant threat to them.

13. The overall problem for United States

The CDNI has remained convinced that extensive alterations in the constitutional-governmental framework are essential. These convictions are buttressed by the following factors:

A. CDNI disappointment over Phoui’s exercise of his special powers mandate; the CDNI points to Phoui’s failure to strengthen his cabinet as he was authorized and his disinclination to provide strong leadership;

B. King Savang’s desire to play a more decisive role in the government, particularly in the direction of RLG foreign policies;

C. Coolness between King Savang and Phoui/Lao Hom Lao elder politicians;

D. Army dissatisfaction with old guard civilian leadership and sympathy with the political roles acquired by the military in Pakistan, Burma, etc.

E. The cumulative effect of Phoui’s agile political maneuvering of one faction against another—the CDNI is convinced that Phoui’s pre-occupation with such maneuvering is motivated more by a desire to retain political power than by a dedicated effort to bring all non Communist factions together under his leadership.

F. The CDNI clearly regards itself as the wave of the future in Laos and is convinced that the expansion of its political power should be accelerated.

14. On their part Phoui and the Lao Hom Lao are fearful that the end of the current Assembly’s mandate in December, sharp constitutional revisions strengthening the Crown at the expense of the Assembly and new elections within such a revised constitutional framework would lead to their early forced political retirement. Many of the Lao Hom Lao regard CDNI pressures for instituting “modified democracy” as a smokescreen for forcing the Lao Hom Lao out of politics. The CDNI suspects the willing acceptance of the necessity for modified democracy by certain Lao Hom Lao as inspired principally by a determination to engineer constitutional revisions which would further consolidate Lao Hom Lao bases of political power. Interestingly enough there is widespread acceptance on the part of the most responsible leaders in both the CDNI and the Lao Hom Lao that some form of modified democracy must be instituted. As the Embassy has recently noted, however, differences occur in moving from exhortation to realization.

15. In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust between the CDNI and Lao Hom Lao it is perhaps superfluous to repeat the long-held Department of State [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] view that the CDNI and the Lao Hom Lao must coalesce their efforts into a united approach to the problems confronting Laos. While this remains as true as ever the problem of how the RLG is to be organized within a constitutional framework has generated such heated passions in Laos as to transcend this general guideline. [6 lines of source text not declassified] The Laos Desk shares the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] conviction that evolutionary forces at work in Laos and the demonstrated inability of the Lao version of parliamentary democracy to cope effectively with the backwardness of Laos may make mandatory certain constitutional changes to strengthen the hand of the Crown at the expense of the Assembly. The CDNI can neither be encouraged nor discouraged in their convictions without clearer expression of United States policy on these questions. [5½ lines of source text not declassified] One thing is certain: the convictions of the CDNI are deep seated and not easily dissuaded. They would be impressed, however, by a clear enunciation of United States policy which comes to grips with the problems such as the merits of “modified democracy” for Laos, which to them are paramount in considering how Laos is to combat effectively the subversion menacing its independence.

16. Alternative courses of action

A. Termination [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support of the CDNI

Despite the deep seated differences between the CDNI and the Lao Hom Lao, [2½ lines of source text not declassified] support of the CDNI as a popular movement eschewing partisan political rivalry with the Lao Hom Lao would be counterproductive. To place this support on a sacrificial alter would ignore the basic situation of fact: viz., the CDNI has become a powerful political element which will continue in business irrespective of the support or absence of support it receives [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] United States. There is no question, however, that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support would dull the enthusiasm of certain CDNI leaders to continue to expose themselves in pushing anti-Communist measures in Laos, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in the face of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] support they would doubtless conclude that they had been set adrift and thereafter formulate their own policies irrespective of United States viewpoint. We can, however, even in the continuation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] CDNI support, effectively modify the terms of reference of this support.

1. We are in a position to try to build into the CDNI leadership greater control factors which would make the CDNI more responsive [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] guidance within the framework of Department of State policy, if this is clearly enunciated.

2. We can continue to concentrate the bulk of our efforts on the buildup of the CDNI organizational mechanism and the strengthening of its capacities to rally popular support to the anti-Communist, anti-Neo Lao Hak Sat pro Royal Government cause—without creating in the minds of CDNI leaders a conviction that this kind of support automatically carries [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] approbation of extremist CDNI policies, or any policies for that matter which are at variance with a clearly delineated Department of State policy treating the broad questions of “modified democracy,” etc. The enunciation of these policies/viewpoints to the CDNI should be left to the Ambassador [2 line of source text not declassified]. But to do this we must have a clarification of Department of State policy on the following questions which are at the center of CDNI/Lao Hom Lao controversy.

B. The timing of general elections

Whether general elections are to be held in early 1960 or at the end of 1960 is crucial to the corollary issues of the extension of the present Assembly’s mandate and constitutional reforms. Certain of the CDNI and Lao Hom Lao leaders are persuaded that elections should be held in early 1960 and that with a unified non-Communist candidate slate the outcome would be highly favorable to them. If this view prevailed there would be no necessity for extending the present Assembly’s mandate. Since only a few extremists in the CDNI and the Lao Hom Lao so belittle elections as to be unconcerned over their timing, it is imperative that a decision be reached on the timing which reflects the best available estimate of the popular voting mood. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

C. Alternative courses prior to elections

If the best available estimate for the timing of elections is at the end of 1960 the question then to be resolved is the nature of the RLG’s composition up to that date. The alternatives are either to extend the present Assembly’s mandate or else let their mandate run its natural course and thereafter endorse a provisional government (either as presently constituted or modified with cabinet changes) to rule without benefit of the Assembly until elections are held. The latter would, of course, be the greater departure from constitutionality, unless constitutional changes were made immediately to incorporate extraordinary procedures for such rule without reference to the Assembly. We are actually confronted here more with the facade of constitutional procedures than with substance, since even an extension of the present Assembly’s mandate for one year, coupled with a twelve month renewal of Phoui’s special powers, would differ little in actual practice from the absence of an Assembly mandate—under special powers the Assembly remains in a state of suspended animation. This is a decision for Department of State. The argument for retention of even this facade is, however, compelling if elections are not to be held until the end of 1960.

D. The substance and timing of constitutional revisions

If all disinterested parties agree that the concept of modified democracy is a valid one for Laos, then are we not faced more with a technical question of the substance of constitutional revisions rather than one of the questionable motivations of those advocating these revisions? If we are, the alternatives to be considered center on the kind of power balance which should be retained between the Crown and the Assembly. This can be subjected to cold scrutiny divorced from the heated passions which have, to this date, clouded this basic issue. [18 lines of source text not declassified]

17. Conclusion

Calm reason can prevail in this situation of complex political factors. If a clarification and delineation of Department of State policy can be obtained on the issues noted above and the alternative courses available to resolve them there is every reason to believe that both the CDNI and the Lao Hom Lao would respond in a cooperative vein to a confrontation by the Ambassador presenting in detail Department of State views on the entirety of these interrelated political problems. If, on the other hand, a decision is reached to sweep these problems under the rug in an attempt to ignore their existence, then in all candor we must accept a continuation and exacerbation of the differences which separate the CDNI and the Lao Hom Lao—with governmental paralysis in Laos the inevitable result.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.03/11–659. Secret. The source text contains no indication who drafted this memorandum. Handwritten by the same hand that wrote the file number is the phrase: “Vientiane From-Repa.”