251. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Parsons) to
the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)1
Washington, September 1,
1959.
SUBJECT
- Your Discussions With JCS on
September 2 Regarding Laos
General Picher has indicated to us that the Joint Chiefs wish to have a
general discussion of the Laos situation with particular reference to
U.S. courses of action. He has informally sent Mr. Green a copy (Tab A)2 of the briefing sheet which the Joint Staff
has prepared for the Chiefs at their meeting with you tomorrow.3
I believe it would be useful if you could give the Chiefs the benefit of
our general views on how the Laos situation should be met. In this
connection, the paper at Tab B may be helpful to you.
At Tab C you will find a list of (I) the actions taken to date in
improving the RLG’s position (notably
that of the Army) to resist Communist pressures, and (II) actions now
under consideration for improving the RLG’s position. (Tabs B and C will be largely responsive to
Tab A.)
At Tab D is a paper showing the current position of various key countries
toward initiatives in the UN and the
ICC for sending observers or
mediators to Laos.
Tab B
OUTLINE ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES IN LAOS4
A. Communist Objectives
- 1.
- Presumed specific minimum objectives include: (a) Disruption
of RLG’s economic, social and
educational development programs; (B) Disrupting the
implementation of the new FAL
training program; and (c) Regaining at least the degree of
Communist influence in Lao Government affairs as existed in
1957.
- 2.
- Possible broader objectives include: (a) Maintaining tensions
and continuing to keep the free world off balance; (b) Pressures
for a summit meeting or for counterconcessions in the Eisenhower–Khrushchev
[Page 580]
talks; (c) Upsetting
the general stabilization process going on in SEA and South Asia over the past 5
years; and (e) Ultimate re-establishment of Communist control in
Laos.
B. Communist Methods
- 1.
- To carry out the above objectives by various means short of
open or clearly identifiable invasion.
- 2.
- A principal method is psychological warfare conducted by
limited military elements (ex-Pathet Lao soldiers, local
sympathizers and tribal peoples) against peasants and hill
people who, being impressionable, uninformed and widely
dissatisfied, are susceptible to psychological warfare
tactics.
- 3.
- On the diplomatic front, a principal means is pressure for the
revival of the ICC, Laos, and
utilization of the ICC for
demoralizing the RLG and setting
the clock back in Laos.
C. U.S. Objectives
- 1.
- Prevent the loss of Laos to Communist control, even at the
cost of direct U.S. intervention.
- 2.
- Enhance the ability and determination of the RLG to maintain internal security
and to proceed with measures for economic and social
development.
- 3.
- Ultimately root out all armed dissidents, recognizing that
this difficult task will take time and that inordinate risks in
the attempt to shorten the time should be avoided.
D. U.S. Countermeasures To Assist the RLG
1. With regard to strengthening
the RLG and its Army:
- (a)
- Give that degree of additional military and other assistance
necessary for preserving Laos from Communist control and for
improving the stability and progress of Laos.
- (b)
- Ensure as far as possible the uninterrupted continuation of
long-range economic, social and educational development
programs, despite Communist pressures to disrupt those
programs.
- (c)
- Stress to the RLG the urgent
need for major efforts to remove antagonisms and suspicions
among minority peoples in Laos (who together outnumber the Lao
in Laos). These minority peoples will otherwise be highly
susceptible to Communist pressures.
- (d)
- Improve RLG capabilities for
identifying outside intervention. This will help deter such
intervention in at least its more naked forms.
- (e)
- Improve RLG capabilities to
localize Communist insurgency as far as possible into defined
pockets, with a view ultimately to eliminating these pockets.
(This may require many months or years, judging from Malayan
experience.)
[Page 581]
2. With regard to UN and other Diplomatic measures in
support of the RLG:
- (a)
- The chances of discouraging clandestine external Communist
intervention through UN or other
diplomatic measures do not seem promising, but keeping the issue
in the forefront of international attention through, for
example, UN activity or newspaper
publicity, will help deter identifiable DRV or ChiCom
intervention. We must always appear anxious to be working for a
UN solution.
- (b)
- However we should probably avoid pressing for any major United
Nations (SC or GA) initiative at this time because:
- (i)
- Evidence of DRV
intervention is circumstantial;
- (ii)
- UN prestige should not
be prematurely engaged, but reserved for critical
needs;
- (iii)
- Pressing for UN
measures invites Communist counterpressures for the
ICC, and some
countries like the UK are
soft on the ICC;
- (iiii)
- It is possible that the Communists, having discovered
that there is little disposition in South and Southeast
Asia for imposing the ICC on a reluctant Laos, might wish to let
the issue simmer down at least for a while and we should
not make moves which would obstruct that possible
simmering down process from occurring.
- (c)
- Our statements and diplomatic approaches should stress that
Laos is a sovereign nation possessing the inherent right of
protecting its borders and otherwise preserving its integrity;
that its limited self-defense measures constitute no threat to
anyone except those trying to sabotage the nation’s progress and
security. We should not allow the real issues to become obscured
by debates over provisions of the Geneva Accords and the
“legality” of the ICC.
- (d)
- On the other hand, Laos should be encouraged to profess
neutrality and to abide by the general spirit of the Geneva
Agreements. The latter should be respected so far as possible
consistent with our major objective of preserving Laos from
Communist penetration.
3. With regard to SEATO:
- (a)
- Should attempts to secure the Laotian Government by political
means against an armed Communist threat fail, the question of
SEATO military
intervention may be expected to arise because:
- (i)
- SEATO’s prestige
would be dangerously and possibly fatally undermined
should the Laotian Government be overthrown by Communist
armed force, or its composition changed by evident
Communist intimidation, whether or not SEATO intervention had
taken place.
- (ii)
- Even apart from the involvement of SEATO prestige, the
likely additional strategic and political consequences
of Communist domination of Laos would dangerously weaken
the Western position in South East Asia.
- (b)
- Firm support from SEATO’s
Asian members, particularly Thailand, is an essential
precondition to SEATO
action.
- (c)
- United Nations endorsement may not be a political
pre-requisite for SEATO
intervention (in fact maintenance of SEATO’s prestige might depend on its ability to act
where the United Nations fails), but sympathetic acquiescence on
the part of a majority of the United Nations members and
preferably formal endorsement by a two-thirds majority of the
General Assembly would be most desirable.
- (d)
- Until such time as SEATO
might be called upon to intervene, SEATO’s activities should be played in a low key.
Its prestige must not be prematurely engaged; on the other hand,
it cannot conceal—not that it should attempt to do so—the fact
that it is keeping a close watch on the developing situation.
This should be done with minimal publicity as long as military
activities in Laos are light.
4. With regard to other
Actions:
- (a)
- Bearing in mind MOSCOW’S primary position in the Communist
cosmos and bearing in mind probable Moscow desires not to
interfere with Khrushchev’s current sweetness-and-light campaign,
we should pin the blame on Moscow as far as possible for
Communist intervention in Laos.
- (b)
- If necessary, the issue might be discussed directly between
top U.S. and Soviet representatives.
- (c)
- A U.S. military build-up in the West Pacific may at some stage
become desirable in order to hearten friends and discourage
foes.
- (d)
- If all diplomatic efforts fail and the issue must be resolved
by arms, then be prepared to take the necessary military
measures. The U.S. cannot afford the loss of Laos.
