Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

250. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos ¹

Washington , August 29, 1959—3:45 p.m.

348. Re Vientiane’s 444, repeated USUN 21, London 44.²

1. Under UN Charter SYG is impartial international civil servant. You should make clear to RLG SYG’s limited independent authority. This is why SYG has sought acquiescence Geneva co-chairmen or ICC to appointment by him of observer.

2. Because your personal suggestion Khamphan Panya constitutionally not feasible, you should emphasize in future conversations RLG that SYG cannot dispatch factfinder or observer whose function would be determine whether DRV intervention has occurred simply on basis RLG’s request. As SYG made clear his August 27 statement (USUN’s 269 rptd info Vientiane 2),³ he can send factfinder or observer in Laos-type situation on request by parties to dispute, SC, or GA.

3. Both UK co-chairmen approach and SYG two-stage proposal designed obtain agreement both sides; i.e., Free World and Communist bloc, to dispatch of factfinder while minimizing role ICC. Soviets have apparently rejected co-chairmen approach and advanced unacceptable counterproposal (London’s 32 to Vientiane).⁴ SYG’s proposals, therefore, deserve fair opportunity yield results, particularly if observer rather than mediator were sought.

4. FYI. If SYG’s proposals fail, only remaining possibility for RLG obtain observer, whom it now seems to want, would be through formal appeal either SC or GA. For reasons we will elaborate later, we continue believe premature press for further UN action. End FYI.

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2759. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Michael H. Newlin of UNP, cleared with SEA, and approved by Parsons. Repeated to USUN, London, Paris, New Delhi, Ottawa, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In this telegram, August 27, Smith reported he discussed with Khamphan Panya the possibility of requesting a U.N. factfinder to assess if there were sufficient evidence of North Vietnamese intervention in the north. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Telegram 269, August 27, transmitted the text of Hammarskjld’s statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2759; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. In this telegram, August 27, sent from London as 1117 and repeated to Vientiane as 32, the Embassy reported a conversation in which British Foreign Office officials stated that the Soviet Union had rejected the factfinder idea in favor of an investigation by an ICC representative who would report to the Geneva Cochairmen. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2759; included in the microfiche supplement)