249. Memorandum of a Meeting, Chequers, United Kingdom, August 29, 1959, 3:30 p.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- United States
- President Eisenhower
- Secretary of State Herter
- Deputy Secretary Gates
- Mr. Merchant
- Mr. Irwin
- Mr. Berding
- Mr. Hagerty
- General Goodpaster
- Major Eisenhower
- Mr. White
- United Kingdom
- Prime Minister Macmillan
- Foreign Secretary Lloyd
- Sir Norman Brook
- Ambassador Caccia
- Sir Anthony Rumbold
- Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
- Mr. Blye
- Mr. de Zulueta
- Mr. Evans
- Mr. Wilding
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
Laos
With regard to Laos, the next subject raised, Mr. Lloyd reported that the UK Government was very worried about this situation. He had received a communication from Soviet Ambassador Malik2 suggesting the possibility that the three chairmen of the delegations previously making up the ICC might return. The UK Government was now exploring the possibility of the three chairmen of the delegations going back. This formula possibly was intended by the Soviets as a face-saving device to the Laotian Government, but to make this workable it would be necessary to get a new Indian chairman. This would be easier if the Canadian were also changed. The President inquired whether there was anything new on Laos, and Secretary Herter reported that there had been a new raid. Mr. Lloyd reported that the evidence indicates that the dissident influence is getting beyond the two northern provinces and pointed out that we were dealing with a jungle area. In view of British experience in Malaya, it was doubtful whether the Laotian Government through military measures would be able to bring the dissidents under control.
[Page 577]Mr. Macmillan added that it was very important to try to prevent the area from being won over by the Communists. It was even more important at this juncture, when an effort was being made for a détente in the West, to hold the Communists in the Far East in check. The United States was familiar with the record of the British Government; that when Taiwan was threatened last year, the U.K. had stood by the U.S. The problem in Laos was technical; “you can’t get at it”. President Eisenhower inquired whether the British had any proposals. Secretary Herter added that the U.S. was now providing equipment for Laos, but it was a very tricky situation to avoid being in violation of Article 9 of the Geneva Agreements on Laos.
Mr. Lloyd added that the previous day he and Secretary Herter had discussed the long-term problem;3 that the Laos situation was quite different from that of Korea where the U.S. had been in a position to and had in fact provided massive support. Mr. Gates mentioned parenthetically that the U.S. had no intention of sending five divisions to Laos.
President Eisenhower said that the United Kingdom, as well as the United States, should endeavor to control the Communists in Laos and to take action if necessary. We must give the Laotian people some hope against the Communists. We must together get into the problems and not merely talk procedures. We couldn’t just talk about getting someone to carry the job but should get into it ourselves. The President said that it must be an indigenous effort. That we should get the Philippines or some other Asian group to do something. The White peoples couldn’t do much alone. The Secretary added that it would be a mistake to attempt to get someone to mediate, which would suggest two sides to the issue within Laos, and that we had to recognize that both Hammarskjold and the Laotians had handled the situation there rather badly. Instead of mediators, the presence of observers would serve as a psychological deterrent to the Communists from the North. Mr. Macmillan concluded by saying that we are agreed on that.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Berding. President Eisenhower and Secretary Herter visited Bonn, London, and Paris, August 26–September 4, for talks with European leaders. They were in the United Kingdom August 27–September 2.↩
- Reference is to an oral communication by Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom Yakov Malik to the British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Lansdowne. A translation of this message is in Secto 13 from London, August 28. (ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/8–2859; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- This discussion, August 28, took place at the British Foreign Office at 4:30 p.m. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199; included in the microfiche supplement)↩