Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

25. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for SEATO Affairs (Zimmermann) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon)¹

Washington, March 30, 1959.

SUBJECT

• SEATO: Discussion of Force Availabilities and Command Relations in Connection with Measures to Counter Communist Insurgency

The SEATO Military Advisers at their Ninth Meeting in September 1958² agreed 1) that member nations should submit estimates of their forces which might be available for inclusion in a SEATO force assembled to counter Communist insurgency and 2) that they would bear in mind the question of command structure. Both matters will arise at the Tenth Meeting, April 2–4, and DOD is now requesting State concurrence to establishing the following CINCPAC recommendations as U.S. positions for the meeting.³

Force Availabilities: As a SEATO force would not necessarily be under U.S. command, the U.S. should limit the size of basic forces estimated to be available and no major supporting forces should be included.

A) In general, U.S. forces which might be made available would not exceed a Marine battalion landing team or Army battalion combat team together with lift and/or logistic support for the team, a USAF composite airlift squadron, a communications detachment and technical and advisory personnel.

B) In the specific case of Laos, U.S. forces which might be made available to a SEATO force are one aerial delivery and supply detachment from the Army plus technical and advisory personnel, a composite airlift detachment and one communications detachment from the Air Force. In addition, limited Naval and airlift support might be available for support under U.S. control.

The foregoing does not constitute force commitments and forces selected would depend upon the existing situation.

Command Relations: By discussing principles and not details the U.S. will avoid revealing U.S. plans or committing the U.S. to specific solutions. The subject would be developed along the following general lines:

A) No SEATO Command organization in being is required at this time.

B) The headquarters of a member nation having the necessary facilities and personnel should be considered to form the nucleus of a SEATO headquarters.

C) When the decision is taken to implement a SEATO plan, a member nation should be appointed to be responsible to the SEATO Council through the Military Advisers for the conduct of SEATO military operations.

D) The appointed nation should designate a combined commander.

E) There should be the widest possible member nation representation in SEATO headquarters.

F) Administration and logistic support should be the responsibility of member nations providing the forces.

1. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, SEATO 1959. Secret. In a covering note to Parsons dated March 31, Zimmermann stated that Dillon had requested this memorandum on March 30 in preparation for his meeting with the President on March 31; see infra. According to the note, the digest of the CINCPAC recommendations contained in this memorandum is based on CINCPAC telegram 010202Z, February 1, and was delivered to Dillon the evening of March 30. Telegram 010202Z has not been found.
2. Held in Bangkok, September 26–28.
3. In a letter from Irwin to Robertson dated March 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–2659) Parsons’ reply, dated March 31, is summarized in footnote 3, infra.