26. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 31, 1959, 8:44–9:30 a.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Acting Secretary Herter
- Mr. Douglas Dillon
The President asked Mr. Dillon if he had read the draft of the proposed speech to be made at Gettysburg College.2 Mr. Dillon said he had and that he thought it should help the Mutual Security Program a great deal. The President said he would send a copy of the text, when it was about in shape, to Secretary Dulles.
Mr. Dillon next referred to the forthcoming meeting of SEATO. This will be the fifth meeting. The Asians want the next one to be held outside their area, and the French and British agree. He wondered if we might offer to have it held in the United States. The President said he had been toying with the idea of suggesting that the next meeting should be a meeting of Heads of Government, to be held in the [Page 77] Philippines. In that case the President would go, with the thought of going on to India and Pakistan (perhaps also to Indonesia, spending something like ten days in the Far East beyond Manila). During discussion, difficulties were recognized such as probable pressure to visit Japan, Formosa, Korea, Australia, etc. Mr. Dillon pointed out that if it were agreed to hold the Foreign Ministers meeting here next year, there would be relatively little difficulty in changing it to a Heads of Government meeting in the Philippines. The President agreed that the offer to hold a Foreign Ministers meeting here might be made.
Mr. Dillon next said that the SEATO military planners have been active, with Admiral Felt taking part. They have agreed that the countries should inform each other as to the forces that might be made available in case of insurrections, in particular in Laos. The Department of Defense wants to say that the maximum we might make available is of the order of one battalion, one composite air squadron, plus amphibious and air lift; as to Laos we would contemplate no more than an air delivery and supply detachment. The President said he thought the Asians would prefer to provide the standby forces themselves without U.S. or European elements because of the old concerns over Imperialism. Mr. Dillon stressed that what is being discussed is not a commitment, but is an indication of intention. The President said it is his instinct to hold back on the question of forces, even while he strongly agrees that this kind of planning is valuable. Mr. Dillon commented that forces could only be called upon by unanimous vote of SEATO. He thought he could play down the question of U.S. participation, stressing that troops should come from Asia. He added that present thinking is that no command organization in being is required. Should necessity arise, it would be met by using the military headquarters of some one nation, augmenting it with other nationals. He said only the principles would be discussed. The President agreed that it might be studied.3
[Page 78][Here follows discussion of the Philippines, Central and South America, and NATO.]
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 3. Dillon prepared another memorandum of this conversation on March 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–3159)↩
- Draft not found. For text of the speech as delivered on April 7, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 309–317.↩
-
In a letter to Irwin dated March 31, drafted by Zimmermann and cleared with Dillon in draft, Parsons gave the concurrence of the Department of State to presentation of Admiral Felt’s proposals on SEATO command relations and U.S. force availabilities as the U.S. position at the forthcoming SEATO Military Advisers’ meeting, with the following caveat: “In considering the question of force availabilities, however, the Department of State, for political reasons, would wish to assure that a SEATO force assembled to counter Communist insurgency would be as broadly representative of the member nations as possible and that United States participation would be kept to the minimum required by the circumstances, particularly with regard to non-technical operations.”
A marginal note by Zimmermann indicates the President cleared the paragraph in substance in a conversation with Dillon. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–2659)
↩