Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

24. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, February 16, 1959—11 a.m.

2066. While I have not yet seen any indication of Lao attitudes with respect to joining SEATO following its renunciation of the Geneva Accords, I presume that this question may arise. Therefore, suggest it would be helpful if we could have Department’s views and guidance.

It seems to me principal argument in favor of encouraging Laos formally to join SEATO would be that it might give present RLG greater sense of security and confidence in dealing with internal and external Communist threat as well as serve to strengthen its ties with SEATO neighbors, principally Thailand. From SEATO political stand-point addition of Asian member would also serve give broader Asian and regional character to pact.

Following seem to me to be principal arguments on negative side:

1. As formal member of SEATO Laos would enjoy no greater protection than it presently enjoys as protocol state.

2. Militarily Laos would bring only liabilities to SEATO.

3. Formally joining SEATO, particularly on heels of renunciation of Geneva Accords and other steps taken by Phoui against NLHX might tip decision of latter again to “take to bush” and with Chinese Communists and Viet-Minh support resumed guerrilla action at time when RLG position in countryside and capability of Army is still very weak.

4. Probable negative reaction of Sihanouk to fancied “encirclement.”

Therefore, on balance, am inclined to view we should not now encourage Laos to apply for formal SEATO membership, but rather regard this as move for future when RLG internal control is better solidified.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/2–1659. Secret. Repeated to Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Manila, Karachi, Canberra, Wellington, London, and Paris.