248. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
403. For Parsons and Murphy from Ambassador. Re Deptel 2562 (Embassy would have no objection to distribution outside Department if desired).
After 17 months in Laos I find RLG still facing same potential and actual external threats as when I arrived but internally, during last twelve months it has, through monetary, fiscal and administrative reforms and skillful political leadership of Phoui Sananikone supported by LHL and CDNI and by US financial assistance, greatly enhanced its chance of winning its battle of ballots against the Communists. By training programs more recently developed or developing for the army and police another ten months could show considerable improvement in the chance of either (1) winning the internal battle of bullets that has all along been inevitable when Communists decided they no longer had good chance of winning battle of ballots without bullets against RLG, or (2) forcing Vietminh at least to supply and infiltrate so heavily to continue battle of bullets that FAL can produce incontrovertible proof that might bring effective UN or, as a last resort, SEATO intervention.
I say “could” rather than “should” for four reasons (1) there are limits to RLG wisdom, political, economic and military know-how, ingenuity and determination as well as to Lao human, material and fiscal resources that require a type of continual guidance and assured support which US Government has so far seemed find difficult or impossible to supply in the amounts and with the timeliness required to assure the RLG making effective headway against internal Communist pressures supported from outside Laos.
(2) The extent to which Communists can interfere by stirring up active opposition to the government and outlying areas will depend in part on (A) the size and effectiveness of the RLG’s efforts to reach the people with its aid programs, (B) rapidity with which minimum roads are broken through or improved and rapidity with which airfields, telecommunications facilities, and transport equipment are provided, and (C) upon the relative effectiveness of FAL and police. However, it will also depend in part, and at first probably more largely, upon extent to which Vietminh and ChiComs are willing to back, supply, [Page 574] support and perhaps cadre the Pathet Lao. This would appear to be limited by (A) possible international diplomatic or UN disapproval and (B) possible effective UN or SEATO intervention.
(3) The chance of limiting clandestine VM intervention effectively through diplomatic or UN pressures does not seem very promising. By an ordinary definition of intervention, such as Turbay’s at recent meeting Foreign Ministers of members OAS in Santiago, there would seem to be no reason to question that VM have intervened in Laos. From the best information available here it seems certain they have permitted radio broadcasts that encouraged rebellion in Laos, they have allowed the recruiting and training of revolutionaries for service in Laos, they have supplied weapons to start a civil war in Laos and permitted those weapons to be exported into Laos. The lack of roads and communications facilities, the rugged and jungle-covered character of the terrain and the lack of clear-cut racial differentiation enabling easy identifications of infiltrees of VM nationality make it difficult to provide proof the VM have also infiltrated Laos with cadres and provocateurs and perhaps even temporarily invaded Laos with regular VM border battalions to launch the rebellion. Nevertheless, Laos seems [so?] obviously the victim that Indian, Russian and Polish pressures for revival of ICC and earlier British and recent Cambodian and UNSYG pressures for a “mediator” rather than a “factfinder” disturb RLG and make it reluctant accept assistance offered. Even if a truly neutral factfinder, observer or mediator is found, VM intervention on a scale large enough to hamper RLG considerably could still be very difficult to detect.
I had been most hopeful that recent French and British cooperative attitude on Laos could be developed into a team approach both locally and internationally which, in latter field particularly, would be most helpful. I had even hoped that with recent developments of what seemed clearer Indian understanding of Communism we might have a change for the better in their attitude on Laos. For the moment at least, the extent to which it will be possible to develop such understanding cooperation now seems likely to be much more limited that I had hoped.
(4) The crux of the problem now faced both politically and militarily seems to lie with the minorities. Past Lao governments have apparently refused to admit the existence of a major “minorities” problem. Even the present RLG had found it difficult to take adequate measures to recognize and meet it. American suggestions for a more direct approach were turned down tactfully by Phoui last winter who preferred to try to meet the need through a general rural self help program rather than any moves especially keyed to the minorities. I believe he can now be persuaded to cooperate but it will be much more difficult to make headway under present conditions.
[Page 575]Fortunately there has been a tightening of conservative ranks and the battle will not be within the government but between the conservative government front against alien supported Communists for the control and loyalty of the people of Laos, particularly the minorities. However, the time limits and the additional strains [constraints?] that must be met mean new dimensions in the amount and character of US aid required. Furthermore it makes it imperative that the operations and staffing of US agencies here be adjusted to meet the need for the type of American guidance and assistance that will now be required. For instance if I am to keep the Department abreast of significant political, economic and military trends the Embassy’s staff, which is already embarrassingly inadequate for this purpose, must be increased along with those of USOM, USIS and PEO.
I therefore consider it clear that the RLG is being forced into a new state [stage?] in its battle to preserve the independence of Laos from Communist domination. Pedestrian as they were, RLG plans [apparent omission in the source text] now in the loyalty of its people including the minorities, by economic, social and educational development programs and constitutional and administrative reforms and to win their confidence by programs of army and political training and political re-education, could in time have made it difficult for the Communists to win internally with either ballots or bullets. I am convinced that the Communists are now trying to prevent the implementation of these programs by every means available short of open invasion.
The encouragement in reference telegram to give first priority to keeping the Department provided with my broad independent evaluations and recommendations most valuable to me since for past two months key members staff all agencies have been devoting at my insistence long hours overtime to helping me prepare evaluation of new situation I saw coming and to meet my requirements for specific recommendations and programs designed to meet it adequately.
In immediately following3 and subsequent telegrams and airgrams I will cover all aspects of situation and make specific recommendations as to measures required or desirable.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/8–2459. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.↩
- Document 245.↩
- In telegram 404 from Vientiane, August 25, the Embassy listed immediate requirements which the Department could use as a checklist in aiding the U.S. missions in Laos to meet the current emergency. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2559; included in the microfiche supplement)↩