Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

247. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 24, 1959, 5:15 p.m.¹

Washington, August 24, 1959, 5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • M—Mr. Murphy
  • G—Mr. Merchant
  • FE—Mr. Parsons
  • SEA—Mr. Anderson
  • SEA—Mr. Chapman
  • U/MSC—Mr. Bell
  • U/MSC—Mr. Weiss
  • U—Mr. Martin
  • IO—Mr. Wilcox
  • H—Mr. White
• ICA
  • Mr. Riddleberger
• CIA
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Mr. Bissell
• OSD
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Mr. Shuff
  • Mr. Knight
  • Col. Bingham
• JCS
  • Admiral Burke

Mr. Parsons explained that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the question of supporting increased force levels of the Lao security forces, raising the Army from 25,000 to 29,000 men and the Auto-Defense from 16,000 to 20,000. He said that we were under very great pressure to reach a decision. The increase had been recommended by the Country Team, CINCPAC, DOD and the JCS. As a result of the answer received this week from Vientiane,²FE also now recommended this increase.

Mr. Dulles passed out a background paper on the latest intelligence estimates of the situation.³

Mr. Parsons remarked that, while the Secretary was still there, he would like also to consider the Lao situation from a broader view, that is, as a serious probe by the Communists. We in FE, Mr. Parsons said, would like to explore various avenues for resolving this situation, notably: the UN; SEATO; what political support Laos might receive from its neighbors which had become increasingly concerned by the situation, and thus indicating to the Communists that there were sanctions in pushing too far; requesting the Government of Thailand to prevent Vietnamese crossing the Mekong; briefing Congress; possible political pressures which might be applied on the occasion of the visit of Khrushchev; finally, we might consider issuing, with France and the UK, a tripartite declaration, such as was done in early 1957.

Mr. Murphy wished to know whether the new recruits would be drawn from the 40,000 veterans who, he understood, were available.

Mr. Parsons answered that the first to be recruited were from the first reserve which consisted of men with smaller families. In answer to another question, he explained that the term “volunteer” in volunteer battalion was a misnomer because the entire Lao army was composed of volunteers. However, the mission of the volunteer battalions was the maintenance of internal security in each province. The proposed increase in force levels would mean the release of seven battalions of regular troops, Mr. Parsons explained, which could be used as intervention forces, but which were tied down at present on security duties. When Mr. Dulles questioned the loyalty of the veterans, Mr. Parsons said that he had no late information on the subject but the veterans had generally been considered one of the most patriotic elements in Laos. They had fought and hated the Vietnamese.

The meeting generally agreed with the comments of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Dulles regarding the lack of facts preventing a clear picture of the situation and the difficulty of getting these facts.

The Secretary noted that northern Laos was as heavily wooded as the Malayan jungle and asked what would be lost to Laos if the two northern provinces, which were admittedly poor, were sealed off. Mr. Parsons answered that, in the latter phase of the Indochinese war, fighting was not limited to the two provinces but spread throughout the country, and that the two northern provinces had come under Pathet Lao control when, instead of regrouping as they were required to do, the Pathet Lao had set up a mock government there. It was true however that the two provinces were oriented more toward Tonkin than toward Laos. Admiral Burke stated that even if the two provinces were given up this would not end the fighting and Mr. Murphy added that such an abandonment would give a serious blow to Lao morale.

The Secretary again noted that it had cost some $800,000,000 to restore security in Malaya and, in fact, the situation had not gotten under control until the rebels had been starved out by putting barbed wire around all the villages. Mr. Murphy noted that in northern Laos it was much easier for the rebels to obtain supplies, which they received from North Viet-Nam, than for the rebels in Malaya.

To the Secretary’s question whether there was any place where the rebels might be sealed off, Mr. Dulles answered that Laos was ideal terrain for guerrilla warfare and Mr. Parsons added that this was the reason that the only real solution was a political and psychological one.

The Secretary asked whether it was true that there was no evidence of Viet Minh participation. Mr. Murphy then suggested that, in order to control possible Viet Minh participation, South Vietnamese forces might be used to create a diversionary movement in the south, but emphasized that such a decision was a serious one. Mr. Wilcox mentioned that, so far, few Viet Minh had probably crossed into Laos but if a diversionary movement were undertaken, more would cross. Mr. Anderson stated that such a move would provoke a strong reaction on the part of the DRV.

The Secretary asked how many members the ICC had had and how had the Commission carried out its controls, with helicopters or with what means. Mr. Parsons answered that he believed the ICC had 400 or 500 personnel, but that when the Royal Government requested it to investigate a violation of the Agreement, the Commission was always frustrated by the Pathet Lao.

The Secretary then asked, if that were so, what could either a UN or an Indian observer see. Mr. Anderson mentioned that eventually equipment belonging to rebels might be captured.

The Secretary also inquired into the nature of the tribes in the area. Mr. Parsons answered that they were mostly Thais and Meos who straddled the border and who were pretty stratified, the Meos living on the top of mountains, the Thais in the middle, and the Lao in the valleys. In answer to Mr. Murphy’s question regarding the present estimated strength of the Lao army of 22,500 in comparison to the authorized strength of 25,000, Mr. Parsons explained that some 1,500 slots had been left open to integrate the two Pathet Lao battalions and that there are 700 ineffectives.

A discussion of costs ensued. It was pointed out that the original estimate of some $6,000,000 was rough and included various items beside the proposed force increase. This increase alone was estimated at between $4 and $5 million. Admiral Burke stated that the JCS felt this increase quite important. He said that everyone concerned had recommended this increase which would take a little time to put into effect. If there is a mistake in judgment, it would mean the waste of 4 or 5 million dollars. If, on the other hand, it was a mistake on the other side, it would mean another red spot on the map. Mr. Murphy asked whether the increase was not being made too fast to become useful, to which the Admiral answered that it might not be effective but it was likely that it would be more so now than three or four months hence.

Mr. Dulles remarked that we believed the Viet Minh would hesitate to move into Laos in organized units.

Mr. Dillon then asked what had happened to the U.S. Attaché’s opinion that training should be undertaken first before the force levels were increased. Mr. Parsons answered that this opinion had been given on June 1, and, at that time, we also felt that no increase should be undertaken before the army was properly trained. Circumstances had now changed, Mr. Parsons added.

Mr. Irwin then stated that so far we have hesitated, but the field has remained solid, and the questions have been resolved. Thus, we end up with a feeling that it is a gamble with money and time.

Mr. Dillon raised the question of publicizing our decision and Mr. Parsons agreed that it would have a very important psychological effect but that the Lao view should be taken into account. He himself thought that we should publicize our decision.

Mr. Dillon then inquired into what was happening in the UN on this matter. Mr. Parsons said that it was rather unsatisfactory. The Lao Government had been dead set against mediation because it did not wish to be considered on a par with North Viet-Nam. However, the Lao representative, Ngon Sananikone, had agreed to the Secretary General’s proposal which envisaged two steps: (1) to search for a “mediation formula” by an Indian in Hanoi and Vientiane, and (2) once a formula was agreed upon, then the Secretary General would be requested to appoint a neutral mediator who might be suggested by the ICC. Mr. Dillon expressed the opinion that it was important to publicize the Lao appeal to the UN, so that it could be clearly indicated we were seeking a peaceful solution beside making a show of force. Mr. Wilcox explained that so far all the steps had been made on a confidential basis and that, therefore, the Secretary General was hesitant, because he did not think he could send an observer unless both parties agreed to it. The Secretary General’s position was questioned both by Mr. Dillon and Mr. Dulles. Mr. Dulles pointed out that the Communists had declared the fighting in Laos to be a civil war and the Secretary inquired into what was to be mediated since only one party declared itself aggrieved. Mr. Murphy thought it would be advisable to inform Hammarskjold that we were responding to the desperate appeal of a friendly nation. Mr. Wilcox remarked that there previously had been a question of sending an observer but that the Secretary General’s letter to Nehru of Saturday mentioned a “mediator.”⁴ It was evident that a frame of reference would have to be worked out later for whoever was appointed. The Secretary General felt his authority was limited in particular because of the ICC’s existence. The Secretary stated he could not understand why the UN should ask the Government of India for a mediator when a mediator was not wanted and when the Indian on the ICC had not given the Lao Government a square deal. Mr. Wilcox explained that the Indian would not be the mediator but that a frame of reference would have to be worked out. Mr. Irwin added that as soon as you asked for a mediator, you put the Lao Government in a difficult position.

The meeting decided that there was nothing else to do but agree to the proposed increase in the force level which was estimated to cost between four and five million dollars. It was felt that this increase would give the Lao a lift in morale and would also act as a deterrent to the insurgents for, as Mr. Parsons pointed out, there was a limit on how far the Pathet Lao could go with their own people. Beyond that, the Viet Minh would have to intervene. Admiral Burke then suggested that, in view of the many small requests for matériel and equipment which would have to be met quickly, such as those President Diem had received the other day from the Lao Government, we authorize CINCPAC to provide equipment and matériel available within his component commands not exceeding $1,000,000 in value without reference to Washington for authorization.⁵ When Mr. Dillon asked whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff were quite clear on the military necessity for this increase, the Admiral stated that they were, that something was going on and if Laos were lost, this loss would have a deep effect on all the other countries in the area.

It was agreed that the announcement of this decision should be carefully timed so that the Lao Government, our Allies and interested parties could be informed in time. It was agreed that we might prepare a statement for the President to be used at his press conference on Tuesday, August 25,⁶ and that we should cable that very night to Vientiane and other interested posts requesting our Ambassador to pass on the substance of this decision to the governments to which they are accredited.⁷ It was agreed that Congress should be briefed on Tuesday, after the President’s press conference and that an announcement should be made on Wednesday.

In the course of the discussion, Mr. Murphy asked whether it would be so bad to have SEATO become involved and Mr. Parsons answered that we were considering the advisability of suggesting to the Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat, the convening of a special SEATO meeting which, because it was conspicuous, might have a deterrent effect on the Communists.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–2459. Secret. Drafted by Chapman. At the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting earlier in the day, Assistant Secretary Wilcox raised the issue of the Lao request for a U.N. mediator. Parsons and Murphy expressed surprise at the request since it gave the Pathet Lao equal status in the dispute. There was a long discussion on the Laos situation resulting in a a decision to hold this meeting. (Notes by Calhoun, August 24; ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)
2. Supra.
3. Not found.
4. Apparent reference to a letter from Hammarskjöld to Nehru, August 15, not found.
5. This authorization plus the decision of the U.S. Government to support 40 additional 100-man volunteer companies and auto-defense corps at strength not to exceed 20,000 was transmitted to CINCPAC and Vientiane in joint State–Defense telegram 282, August 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/8–2259)
6. Eisenhower made no prepared statement on Laos at his news conference of August 25, but he did answer a question on Laos. See Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, pp. 594–595. The Department of State Spokesman read a statement on Laos at the August 26 daily press briefing; see Department of State Bulletin, September 14, 1959, p. 374.
7. Circular telegram 173 to Vientiane, Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Phnom Penh, Saigon, Bangkok, Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Canberra, Wellington, Manila, Karachi, and Buenos Aires, August 24. (Department of State, Central Files 751J.5–MSP/8–2459; included in the microfiche supplement)