246. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

389. For Parsons from Ambassador. Deptel 247.2 Following replies to six points listed reference telegram a through f, on which Department urgently desired detailed information: [Page 565]

a.
It is inaccurate to imply ANL is an untrained army and inaccurate to assume all men for new units will be untrained. Estimate 65–70% ANL strength composed of veterans; 25–50% are recruits. Major recruitment for new units will be from veterans. ANL plan as follows: Existing companies will be cadred to form new company. Approximately 30%, officers and NCOs, will be used as cadre. Remaining 70% for new units and 30% to refill old units provided by recalling veterans and recruiting some new men. Auto-defense personnel composed of locally selected veterans familiar with their area. Consequently, reply to question a is no.
b.
Important to understand that ANL is a volunteer army. Men accepted for terms of service for 6 months, 1 year, 11/2 years or 2 years. Approximately 40,000 reservists available having served average of 4 years—1/3 of these held NCO rank. For period of emergency contract period of service will be 6 months or 1 year. Men accepted for 6 months are all NCOs since only NCOs may enlist for this period; recruits must enlist for 1 year. It is in interest of economy not to hold NCOs too long since they accumulate dependents, hence cost more to support. Laos system of recall is:
(a)
Those recallable immediately (first reserve) are those with two–four children.
(b)

In next category are those with five children.

In accepting volunteers same order is followed—those with less children taken first. Presently, only those from first reserve being accepted. In view above, no problem foreseen reducing forces after emergency. Best information available here indicates no bitterness will be produced. ANL does understand augmentation temporary and terminable US discretion. Agree sizeable increase to budget will occur. Unavoidable, though, in view of personnel to be recalled and recruited, marital status, dependents, etc. At one time, Laos had law requiring recruits be unmarried. This law had to be revoked since everyone marries very young (17–18 years).

c.
Agree that serious problems have been posed, though not insurmountable. Regarding sending French-US teams into field it should be recalled this has always been our desire. Such action would produce more solid and lasting results, though, to obtain quicker results more US personnel would be required—24 teams instead of 12 in order to provide one team per battalion. However, while sending teams into field believed militarily feasible it is not believed politically possible at present time. RLG deadset against this at present for political reasons and doubt if British and other friendly powers yet prepared to accept necessity of such “provocative action.”
d.
Question as to conscription has been studied and use of conscription has been considered. Policy is that conscription should not be adopted until general mobilization. Believe country not yet reached that danger point. In summary, conscription is feasible but politically not recommended at this time.
e.
In view explanation given under b above, answer to question e is unqualified no.
f.

Emergency military necessity is primary element involved. It must be recalled, however, we are on record to effect that 25,000-man force is too small for Laos. Realistic force level for Laos computed as 32,700.

Regarding the 2nd question under f:

(1)
The following constitutes present local French opinion: French Ambassador agrees situation critical. General D’Arrivere states force augmentation indispensable. Lt. Colonel Delafon, French military attaché stated that, although his June and July intelligence reports on present Laos crisis were optimistic, he now feels situation critical. Latter added that on 21 August he had apprised Paris of present situation and said his point of view now most pessimistic.
(2)
The British Ambassador and his counselor called on me this morning to express their concern over the situation in Sam Neua which they believe has turned critical during past 2 weeks. British Ambassador said he has always maintained situation potentially and probably serious although forced to agree with his military attaché’s previous intelligence reports that there seemed no definite proof of Viet Minh infiltration and little to indicate extent Viet Minh participation beyond point FAL “should” be able to handle although whether FAL “could in fact” handle in present state of efficiency if possible expansion of dissidence developed he has always doubted. He now considers it probable that expansion is occurring in Sam Neua at least to point where it doubtful if area can be recovered or even held by ANL. I told Tamaboui FAL requests for 4,000 additional volunteers and 4,000 additional auto-defense and told him of our reluctance since last May to permit or finance any expansion beyond 25,000 and 16,000 previously authorized. I told him that all FAL available reserves consisting of 5 battalions already committed Sam Neua area but possibly not enough for even this one area and pointed out that 7 out of 12 battalions intended as central reserve for interventions in incidents such as Sam Neua now tied down to cover areas 4,000 additional volunteers and 4,000 additional supporting auto-defense intended soon to cover. I explained it my understanding that after army fully trained and equipped and police somewhat augmented and trained and roads and communications improved we had hoped and still hope to see FAL reduced to some 16,000, but that in face present circumstances it doubtful whether even double that number would [Page 567] provide adequate force to insure internal security and adequate border patrol. I concluded that in view of recent developments in Sam Neua, Phong Saly and elsewhere we from our Embassy, army attaché and PEO were now recommending that this 4,000 volunteer temporary increase be granted. What Washington would decide I did not know but it would be helpful to know what Lincoln’s personal judgment and that of his military attaché would be. He said he did not know but would study matter.
(3)
All answers except French and British attitudes above doublechecked by Heintges with Colonel Phoumi Nosavan, Secretary State for Defense in 2 hour conversation yesterday. Conviction re seriousness of situation and determination to fight it out themselves if we can give them the temporary financing required for the additional 4,000 volunteers and 4,000 auto-defense and thus release the 7 regular battalions now tied down and also permit them to go ahead with rapid training under present program, reflected in my conversation with Phoui reported in separate telegram.

Smith
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/8–2259. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution.
  2. Document 244.