244. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
Washington, August 19,
1959—9:33 p.m.
247. For Ambassador from Parsons. Re PEO 1419–59.2
- 1.
- Your separate message mentioned reftel not received.3
- 2.
- We agree fully situation serious and that special measures should be undertaken support and strengthen FAL.4 Only question is which measures will be most effective, both in short term and in long run, in protecting independence and integrity of Laos and rest of SEA.
- 3.
- Any increased aid to Laos will have to be justified to Congress on
solid grounds or Lao program may be jeopardized and MSP as whole possibly damaged. Defense
has given preliminary estimate proposals will cost some $6 million
which at least initially will probably [Page 563] have to be diverted from other FE programs with consequent difficulties
other countries. Since we feel we must inform key members of
Congress of anticipated measures involving increased aid and since
they bound to ask searching questions for which we in any event
would wish to have as complete information and justification as
possible, urgently desire detailed info on following points:
- a)
- Would not addition of 4000 untrained men to army and 4000 to Auto-Defense further dilute these already untrained and ineffective forces to point of creating greater problems rather than adding to their strength?
- b)
- FAL has stated that raising this additional manpower would present no problem as it could recruit veterans. However most veterans are of older generation with families and if recruited on same basis other members FAL presumably would receive same pay and allowances. In consequence they would add sizable new burden to budget. We appreciate political advantages giving veterans jobs but might not these advantages be dissipated and on contrary turned into disadvantages when emergency concluded and veterans discharged? Such handling might generate considerable bitterness. Assume Lao realize force augmentation would be strictly temporary and terminable at US discretion.
- c)
- Since present emergency has undoubtedly posed serious problems to training program is not a new approach to program required? Would you consider it politically possible and militarily feasible to have French and US teams train units in the field, in order to achieve quick, solid and lasting results?
- d)
- Is conscription feasible? Has this question been studied, and if so with what findings?
- e)
- If we accede to RLG request for increased force levels, would it be feasible to have new recruits raised on temporary basis and paid only salaries but no allowances?
- f)
- Do you feel there is any element other than emergency military necessity involved in augmentation proposal? Have French or others who recently assessed crisis as less serious than felt by our observers expressed any views on need for and practicability of force increases at this time?
- 4.
- While above info will be needed realize it will not be feasible to furnish all immediately. Appreciate your forwarding answers as they become available.
Dillon
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5–MSP/8–1959. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Chapman, cleared by SEA and FE, and approved by Green.↩
- CINCPAC apparently repeated this telegram to OSD/ISA and JCS as telegram 170510Z, August 17. (Department of State, EA Files: Lot 68 D 77, Laos, 1959; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- Apparent reference to telegram PEO 1408–59, USARMA 151015Z, August 15. (Washington National Records Centers, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 63 A 1672, 581.1 Laos; included in the microfiche supplement)↩
- The FAL (French abbreviation for Armed Forces of Laos) included all military and paramilitary units; ANL generally referred to the regular army.↩